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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Year after year, it seems, federal regulation of the automobile
is a subject of public controversy and legislative debate. No one should
be surprised that this is so. We are dealing with a sophisticated,
mass-produced machine which is fueled by a complex chemical. It is
operated under diverse road and climatic conditions by motorists with a
wide variety of living and driving habits, and serviced by mechanics
who range from the expert to the incompetent and unscrupulous. The side
effects we try to control are large: Among the technical devices of
modern society the automobile has emerged as the largest source of air
pollution, the largest consumer of fuel, and the largest cause of
accidental death. Yet the vehicle itself is not thesole cause of any of
these problems. Thus legislative and administrative action must be
taken in the face of imperfect knowledge of the cause-effect relation-
ships between improvements in cars and safer travel, healthier air,
and lowered national energy use.
Moreover, the industry being regulated is one of the largest and
most highly concentrated in the country: GM, Ford , and Chrysler are
three of the top 10 firms in the "Fortune 500." The stakes are tremen-
dous in terms of economic cost and employment impact, and the industry
response to different forms of regulation may be difficult to foresee.
The resulting problems are evident in the current regulatory frame-
work, As late as July 1977 the auto manufacturers were preparing to
turn out model year 1978 vehicles which, under current legislation, could
not be sold. Naturally, the law will be changed, even if at the last
minute. But it is not clear that the regulatory framework that produces
these confrontations will be fundamentally improved. Indeed, in the face
of these difficult circumstances, there very likely is no fundamental
restructuring of the regulatory system which would easily resolve all the
problems being encountered. There simply is no solution which can resolve
all the difficulties, including the political ones, at the same time.
This is not to say that dramatic solutions are not suggested. There
is a large body of work on the use of selective financial instruments--such
as gasoline taxes, effluent charges, and taxes and subsidies based on fuel
economy--to control automotive impacts. No doubt in terms of economic
efficiency and administrative simplicity, these market instruments would
work pretty much as their proponents argue. But these measures have
never come close to political acceptance, and it is not evident that
they ever will.
Others argue that the answer lies in the establishment of a single
administrator or commission, with the power to choose regulatory methods,
plan and establish future standards, and coordinate the various functions
now spread among the EPA, DOT, and ERDA. Such a change might lead to
improved tradeoffs among conflicting objectives of regulation, but there
are many problems that centralization would not solve, even if regulatory
authority could be so concentrated. The role of the Congress in the details
of regulation would remain, and the fundamental societal conflicts (which
lie behind so many of the problems) cannot be ameliorated by any govern-
mental reorganization.
So there is no master stroke which will lead to well-informed,
efficient, and equitable regulation of this sector. What we may look for
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are marginal improvements which will produce better knowledge of con-
sequences, help avoid some of the gross waste, and yield more equitable
tradeoffs among the several competing objectives. The purpose of this
study is to contribute to the search for these improvements by developing
a better understanding of how our current system works, how it evolved,
and why.
We have approached this task by exploring selected aspects of three
questions about the automotive regulatory system:
· What do we do? Our current system evolved from
three independent and largely uncoordinated
legislative efforts. How does one develop a
coherent framework for thinking about the
system, and for analyzing potential changes?
What effects does it have? The regulations are
supposed to improve air quality, safety, and
fuel economy. How much do we know about the
results of all this effort, and what does
available analysis show?
Why do we do it this way? Analysis of improvements
to the regulatory system must take account of the
political context out of which these laws and
administrative rulings come. What does the legis-
lative and bureaucratic history reveal about the American
political system, and its influence on the style
and content of auto regulation?
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Five studies were carried out in order to shed light on these questions.
The resulting descriptive material, insights, and analysis have been
distilled into the five chapters of this report. The intent of the report
is to form a basis for more detailed and mission-oriented studies of specific
changes in the structure of automobile regulation.
What Do We Do?
Chapter 1, "The American System of Regulating the Automobile, looks
across the three primary areas of regulation and seeks a common framework
for describing the system's structure and its effects. Several insights
result from such an exercise. The regulatory systems fall into three
rough categories, as shown in the accompanying table. From the top
1. Equipment Standards
2. Performance Standards
2a. On the vehicle
2b. On a fleet average
3. Financial Penalties and Incentives
of the list down, the schemes differ in that greater and greater flexibility
is allowed the automobile manufacturer. Though often proposed, financial penalties
are not an important part of the current regulatory system (why they are
not used is discussed in Chapter 4), and so the focus of discussion is
on equipment standards (used in safety regulation), and performance
controls on the vehicle (emissions) and on the fleet (fuel economy).
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The choice of regulatory form at this level determines the character
of the detailed aspects of standard-setting and implementation. In
the case of safety, it has not proved possible to define adequate standards
which apply to the vehicle as a whole (though work goes on in this area),
so the regulations consist of requirements for devices or design features
which the regulatory agency can demonstrate are safer. In the case
of emissions and fuel economy, on the other hand, it is possible to define
numerical measures of performance (grams of pollutant emitted per
mile, miles per gallon of fuel consumed) which can be related directly
to national goals. Thus one determinant of differences in regulatory
form is essentially a technical one: it may simply be impossible to
define a reasonable performance standard for a whole vehicle or for
the fleet.
If performance standards are feasible, then another possibility opens
up. The regulations can require performance beyond that attainable with
existing technology (as opposed to an equipment standard, where regulators
must prove the device works before they can mandate its use). This the
Congress did in the air pollution area, and by going into such numerical
detail, the Congress was able to establish a set of targets far stricter
than could have been justified by an administrative agency working under
general Congressional guidelines.
Thus in the area where numerical performance standards can be set, it
has been possible for the Congress not only to regulate the manufacturers
but to try to "force" technological change. Judged by the emissions goals
set in the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, it has not worked. On
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1978 models, emissions are still far above the limits set for the 1976
model year, and it is not clear that the standards set in 1970 will
ever be achieved. In this circumstance the system has shown a crude
feedback mechanism. Time after time automobile manufactures have proved
unable to meet the legislated deadlines, within acceptable cost, and
fuel economy penalties, and the statutory standards naturally have
been postponed. Considerables pressure has been kept on the industry
to improve emissions performance, however, and the resulting industry
investments in control technology have been large. And, in fact,
emissions of new vehicles are substantially lower now than they were
in 1970.
In the case of fuel economy, a similar approach has been followed. An
almost arbitrary set of performance goals has been set, with penalties
if industry fails to meet them. In the fuel economy legislation, the
controls are on fleet-average consumption, so the manufacturers have
more flexibility than in the emissions case. For example, if technology
improvement does not bring fuel consumption down as much as needed,
the companies can take measures to shift the fleet mix toward smaller
cars. Whether the legislated targets will be met remains to be seen.
Clearly this approach provides all the necessary incentives to industry
investment in new technology--though as noted in Chapter 4, the incentives
may prove much more complex than appears on the surface.
Given that we have chosen performance standards for emission control
and fuel economy, another problem arises--that of durability. Proof of
performance is established by tests on factory prototype vehicles, and
these may not bear a close relation to actual vehicle behavior on the road given
all the variation in operating conditions. The deterioration problem may
not be too bad for fuel economy, but for emissions control it is very
serious. If equipment standards were used, then this problem might be
ameliorated: the federal government could mandate control devices that would
not deteriorate, and could not be disconnected by the motorist. The path
has not been followed in any but the safety area, and probably this is
for the best. The technology is simply not now well enough established
to make such specific design controls reasonable.
Of course, many of these problems--the safety issue, performance of
emissions controls, and fuel economy--could be greatly reduced if the
government could but influence the driving and maintenance behavior of
the motorists themselves. Given that this has not proved possible--and
probably won't in the future--the regulators of the automobile will
continue to face these fundamental choices. One can set performance
standards, but it is very difficult to enforce them on the road. To get controls
that stand up on the road may require detailed design standards, but then the
government must take over the role of technology development and the task
of proving that designs are "necessary" and "practicable."
Thus there seems to be no sweeping change in regulatory structure
that would yield vast improvement over the way we do it now. On the other
hand, a review of the history indicates that there should be a continuing
monitoring of the regulatory structure in search for those areas handled
by performance standards that might better be tied down by a design standard
or vice versa. As technology matures and new data are gained, the relative
emphasis on insuring durability (as opposed to pushing technology) will
shift, and the regulations should very likely change with them.
_____
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What Impact Does It Have?
No doubt the automotive regulatory system has resulted in some changes,
and will produce others. New cars have catalytic converters, head restraints,
and other devices which are unlikely to have appeared without legal
coercion. Cars are getting smaller, major bureaucracies have been
established--both in government and in industry--to ensure that regulations
are developed and complied with. Some factories are closing, others
opening; jobs are being created in some areas and wiped out in others.
Given that the stakes are so large, one would hope for the best
possible information about the relationship between various controls and
the ultimate objectives of the regulatory system--better health, fewer
deaths and injuries, and energy conservation. There needs to be a constant
balancing of conflicting social objectives, and to do this in any but
the most crude manner, some data must be available on effects. No doubt,
many claims have been made concerning the results of federal regulation--
past, present, and future. But unfortunately the facts are distinctly
unconvincing. The relationship of public health to ambient air pollution
levels is not well understood. Historical trends in ambient air quality
are difficult to detect at all, due to the pervasive influence of
meteorological fluctuations. Even more difficult is the attribution of
air quality trends to reductions in emissions from the motor vehicle
fleet. What is known is that very small numbers of specially-prepared
new vehicles meet stringent criteria when operated by trained professionals
over driving cycles designed to simulate conditions in downtown Los Angeles
As discussed earlier, uncertainties in the levels of emissions are very large due
to deterioration of control equipment (due to natural causes or tampering), varia-
tions in driving patterns, differences in certification and production vehicles,
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uncertainties in the contribution of non-automotive sources of pollution,
and a host of other phenomena. A related but distinct problem is the
forecasting of the impact on future air quality of present and future
emissions standards. In this case the picture is clouded by changing
traffic patterns as well as by the complex relationship of emissions to
ambient air pollution levels.
The analytical difficulties in determining the past and future impact
of safety are equally severe. It is very difficult to disentangle the
effects of the behavior of vehicle operators and the effects of changes
in speed limits and road design.
Along with the primary impacts, there are secondary effects which
cannot even be well enumerated. The impact of emissions standard on
fuel economy is a prominently discussed technical issue. The indirect
effects of the emissions standards on vehicle sales and employment may be
very important, but are poorly understood. For purposes of forecasting
the impact of future standards, the behavioral response of the automobile
industry--in developing and introducing new technology, in changing
marketing techniques and prices, and in altering the types of vehicles
sold--is crucial, but not well understood.
We have chosen to address two particular questions in an attempt to
illuminate the problems in determining the effects of automotive regulation.
Chapter 2, "Uncertainty in Automotive Emissions Regulations," examines
the technical question of how well we can detect and forecast the impact
of emission regulations on ambient air quality. If we are to know the
effects of regulation, two types of issues arise, even after the vehicle
designs are known. First, there is a problem of measurement of the actual
state of the system at any one time. At each stage, of course, there are
_ ___
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uncertainties in measurement; this applies from the determination of
ambient pollution levels all the way back to the imputation of fleet
performance from samples of prototype vehicles.
Whatever the difficulties of measurement, they limit our ability to
deal with the second batch of uncertainties--those involved in
predicting changes in air quality and public health. For prediction
involves the possibility of unforeseen combinations of meteorological
conditions, population distribution, driving habits, etc. For example,
the original setting of standards in the 1970 amendments to the Clean
Air Act involved a prediction of the results, in terms of air quality,
of certain performance controls on new cars. Such a calculation involves (1)
the industry response in terms of new technology, (2) the translation of
performance data from the test stand to the field, (3) the link from
aggregate emissons to air quality, and (4) the link from air quality to
population exposure and human health.
One would hope to monitor (i.e., measure) developments at these various
points and feed the data back into the regulatory process as evidence that
standards were too lenient or too strict, or otherwise in need of change.
Unfortunately, this is very difficult to do (a difficulty which is
increased by the low effort devoted to data collection), and coherent
statements of effects are confounded by inherent uncertainties and the
long time lags before trends can be established statistically.
In an effort to explore this problem, Chapter 2 looks in detail at
several of the key measurement and prediction problems. Attention is
given to the measurement and prediction of automotive emissions and to the
measurement and prediction of ambient air quality. The analysis includes
one experiment which attempts to quantify uncertainties in air quality--
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and air quality trends--using data from a particular site in Boston.
The relationship of ambient air quality to public health, and the associated
measurement and prediction problems, were not examined.
Several important conclusions emerge from the analysis. The most
important is this: if we want to know what is in fact happening as
a result of regulation, then surveillance programs must be larger than
those now in place. Moreover, we must be prepared to sustain them for
many years if we hope to establish resulting trends in either aggregate
emissions of ambient air quality. If we fail to do this, then we may
proceed with a set of standards that may be far too tight (and therefore
wasteful) or too lenient (because effects are worse than early predictions
show). Current standards were based on an analytical model with almost
no empirical basis whatever, and with current data and data-collection
systems, there is no basis for determining whether they are anywhere near
correct. The time lags are too long for any kind of tight feedback
loop, but it should be possible to generate some reliable guidelines
for future regulation. At this point, it would seem, there is a
feedback adjustment when jobs or other severe economic damage are threatened
(as with the 1978 new vehicle fleet), but no such process--or the data
to support it--for the standards themselves. Needless to say, the
implications in terms of vehicle cost and national energy consumption are
very great.
To complement the technical study on the physical impact of emissions
regulation, we studied the behavioral impact on the automotive industry of
the fuel economy standards. It is reported in Chapter 3, "Average Fuel
Economy Standards the the Automotive Industry." The results illustrate
the complex incentive effects that regulations can have on industry
behavior. The fuel economy regulations of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act are particularly interesting in this regard, because the averaging
___
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process does in fact provide manufacturers with corsnderable flexibility.
However, the technical details of the averaging process may give automakers
incentives which were quite unforeseen by those who drafted the
legislation.
The study looks at the situation, which may occur in the early
1980's, where the fleet average fuel economy standards are constraining.
That is, the firms must either break the standards and pay the penalties,
or take some other short-run action to meet the standards. Today,
the companies are in the process of making technical alternations to
their vehicles--downsizing, improving engine efficiency, etc.--to
meet the standards. And as a result, new vehicle fuel economies for
all sizes of vehicles, are being improved. The structure of the
dmeand for new vehicles, by fuel economy (i.e., size), with historical
pricing policies, is moving slowly toward smaller cars. The question,
then, is what incentives will be faced by the manufacturers if this
combination of changes does not bring them within the fleet standard.
To explore this prospect we assume that an automobile manufacturer
behaves as a profit-maximizing firm under some degree of competition,
and thus will act to bring marginal return in line with marginal cost in
each of his vehicle lines. No doubt this is a primitive description of
the automobile market, but it does give some reliabb insights to the complex
incentives that may be offered by the current law.
we can look at two types of response by the firm. On the one
hand, the firms may be willing to violate the standard and pay the
legally-established penalties. Then they will add to the marginal
manufacturing cost of each car type a "marginal penalty," so it will
bear its full marginal cost, including fines. The marginal penalty
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is the change in the total civil penalty (before tax) incurred in
violating the standard, due to the production of ore incremental vehicle.
Such a penalty has the desired effect of raising the competitive
price of vehicles with poor fuel economy and lowering that of vehicles
with high fuel economy. The level of the marginal penalty that a
firm would use is calculated from the harmonic averaging procedure
specified in the law.
The application of this straightforward calculation can lead to
some very surprising results. We examine the case of a simple two-
vehicle industry. There are circumstances where a car whose fuel
economy is better than the fleet average may be assigned a positive
marginal penalty, i.e., the over-all fine is increased by production of
a relatively efficient car! This is due to the fact that the fine is
based on the difference between the actual fleet average and the standard,
but the average is calculated as the (non-linear) harmonic average.
In the extreme, the penalty reduction for production of a very high
fuel economy vehicle--say, a "souped-up" go-cart--is so high that the
firm may profit by giving these away!
The second form of response would occur if companies decided that
they must meet the standard, even though it requires new pricing schemes
which encourage the sale of small cars and discourage large ones. If
this is the path the industry chooses, the impact on the structure of the
industry could be dramatic. Essentially, each firm would attempt to
cross-subsidize the sale of low-priced smaller vehicles with high profits
from high-priced large cars. The actual prices necessary are a function
of the demand for vehicles, by class, and the degree of deviation of the
firm's unmodified structure of sales from that it desires (i.e., just
___
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reaching the standard). In this case the firm with the largest capacity
in large cars would offer the lowest prices on small cars, establishing
the price in that market. Firms with less large car production would
not have such cross-subsidies available, and would take major losses.
Thus, under this scenario, American Motors gets quickly driven out of
business as General Motors and Ford balance off revenues among car
sizes. Of course, this sort of pricing behavior is termed, in other
circumstances, "predatory pricing," and is patently illegal. In this
case the industry giants could rightly claim that it is necessary to
meet national energy goals!
While this simple analysis of possible industry actions is highly
uncertain, one inescapable conclusion is that more detailed analysis is
needed of the likely effects of fuel economy regulation under various
forseeable circumstances. Overall industry impacts, through pricing
and fleet mix changes, could be far more disruptive than currently foreseen.
Why Do We Do It This Way?
As has already been made clear, there are substantial problems
with the present system of automotive regulation in the United States.
Probably the most salient of the apparent difficulties is the inability to.
agree upon national automotive goals and the technical measures to meet
them. It is in the very nature of the process established in the emission
and fuel economy regulatory systems that regular battles over the legislated
standards will occur; the standards were chosen explicitly without
close attention to the technology which might be available to meet them.
In the safety area the seat belt interlock and air bag debates demonstrate
a similar indecisiveness, in the form of a grand-scale bargaining situation
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with many powerful players and large stakes. A question crucial to any
proposals to change the automotive regulatory system is just how and
why the present system was chosen. We address two specific questions concerning
the process by which the basic structure of the American automotive
regulatory system has been laid out.
First, Chapter 4 addresses the issue of "Standards versus Taxes,
the Political Choice." Probably the most important single feature of
the regulatory system is that it utilizes mandatory standards applied
to the particular attribute of concern, rather than a system of monetary
incentives. Many analysts have claimed the superiority of "emissions
taxes" over fixed standards, ever since serious analysis of environmental
issues was first undertaken. In a world of economic competition,
emissions charges could offer the incentive to attain economically
efficient levels of control, so that the trade-off between pollution
costs and costs of control is optimally made. A taxation scheme would
offer a continuing incentive to install pollution control devices and
modify motor vehicle designs, and, over the long run, to develop new
automobile technology to replace that which evolved in an age when
pollution was not important. The annual confrontations, where industry
and government threaten each other with the dire economic consequences
of quantum changes in emisson levels, could be avoided.
However, while financial incentive schemes offer enough apparent
advantages, generally they do not even appear to be part of the choice
set from which policy has been made. The question of why emissions charges
have been so clearly rejected is the subject of this chapter. Five impor-
tant areas are examined for clues to this puzzle. First is the identifi-
cation of pollution as a health problem, thus invoking the traditional
I _ I ____1_1__ _____
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responses to health issues. In general, health issues are regulated by
constraining the relevant level of activity to eliminate the health
hazard, with health viewed as an all-or-nothing affair. Second is the
predominance of lawyers as opposed to engineers, economists and others in
the policy process. A view of pollution control as a matter of rights,
to be resolved by law and the courts, and a lack of knowledge of (or
faith in) the operation of the market system will tend to dampen
enthusiasm for market-oriented solutions. Third, the use of tough regulatory
standards as symbols in the political arena is attractive compared to
taxes. Fourth, the positions of the key interest groups in influencing
pollution control legislation and the commitment of those groups to
particular policies and, fifth, certain other features of the Congressional
system, seem to point toward outcomes which are apparently "tough"
and "certain," and do not confuse revenue-raising with pollution control.
In short, there are underlying forces that have mitigated against
the use of taxes, and there seems no reason to expet these to go away.
Thus, one should look for marginal improvements to the current system; a
radical change toward the use of financial penalties is not likely to
be acceptable politically.
Of course, the issue of taxes vs. standards is a very general one,
and does not deal with the particular style with which we use the standard-
setting process in the United States today. In automotive emissions control
the process is characterized by the establishment of standards which the
industry claims are not technically possible, in order to "hold the
industry's feet to the fire," followed by administrative proceedings
and legislative debate to determine whether or not those standards should
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be postponed. So far they have always been postponed and some suitably
effective but painful interim standards implemented. The differences
in air quality which would result from the differences in proposed
standards are so small as to appear trivial over the subsequent five
to seven years, and the difference in health and welfare benefits are
highly speculative even if existent. This is a distinctly American
way of setting emission standards; in other countries the accomodation
is less painful, and, in the view of many, less likely to involve
great debates over trivial benefits.
Chapter 5, "Another View of the Politics of Auto Emissions Control,"
detail at just how this particular way of regulating automotive emissions
came out of the legislative process. The chapter is centered around
an analysis of the players in the process, other affected-but-not-
playing parties, and the costs and benefits each would feel from the various
legislative possibilities faced in 1970. The analysis reveals what may
be an important flaw in the Congressional policy process--one that goes
well beyond the buunds of automotive regulation. In the legislative
process it was assumed that those who played an important role represented
a complete set of the interested parties. In this case it appeared that
the environmental groups represented the gainers from stricter standards,
and the industry represented the losers, with the Congress having the job
of balancing these interests. The difficulty comes from the fact that the
interests of these players were different in important ways from the real
gainers and losers--i.e., the air-breathing and car-consuming public.
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Conclusion
Although it is not the purpose of this report to develop recommendations
for change in automotive regulation, we are tempted to add a few concluding
observations. First, if we continue to use mandatory product standards as
our regulatory instrument, then there is no revision that would make things
fundamentally better. The difficult choices of environment vs. energy and
consumer cost are basic to this problem, and one way or another these
value tradeoffs will be worked out in the political arena. At this
stage in our history, the Congress is deeply involved in the details of
this type of automobile regulation and this brings with it both the
great power of the Congressional will, and the sluggishness and
peculiar politics of the legislative process.
Surely the process could be better informed--by more analysis of
the effects of policy on both the manufacturers and their customers,
and by an improved system of monitoring and surveillance of actual
regulatory results. To argue otherwise is to support the spending of
billions while wearing a blindfold. But the task is not easy, for the
facts of weather and the mass American market make the uncertainties
particularly troublesome. At any rate, a program of improved
monitoring, surveillance and analysis would require several years
investment before it could produce meaningful results on emission and
health, or on safety.
Another issue relates to the standards themselves, and how they may
be revised over time. The precise numbers written into the clean air
standards have taken on a life of their own; they have a symbolic value
that seemingly makes them unchangeable, even in the face of errors in their
definition, clear conflicts with other goals of a much heightened priority
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(i.e., fuel economy) and the fact that they may never be attained. Yet
the industry lives year after year with one-or-two-year postponements,
with the predictable effects on investments in research and development and
technology adoption. A similar fate may befall the fuel economy standards
if the crunch comes and it appears that jobs are threatened.
If numbers do take on a symbolic life of their own, then there is
little to be done other than what is being done now. However, it would
be very useful from the standpoint of research and development and
new product planning if emission standards could be set at interim
levels for some reasonable length of time (say five or six years)
and, perhaps some provision made for fleet averaging.
Finally, in the emissions area, regulation must address the
durability question. Both clean air and fuel conservation might
be served by a shift away from greater tightening of standards on proto-
types and toward greater concern for durability (even at a somewhat
higher level of measured emissions of'prototypes). Improvements in
this area may call for a reconsideration of the role of equipment or design
standards in the process of automotive regulation.
__ __
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Chapter 1
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF REGULATING
THE AUTOMOBILE
by
Lawrence H. Linden and David Iverach*
1. Introduction.
The automobile has long been, in economic terms, the most important
consumer product manufactured in the United States. It is the second
largest purchase made by most households, and the three principal domestic
firms which manufacture it have aggregate annual sales of about $90
billion. Until about a decade ago, the technological attributes of
automobiles were determined almost entirely by manufacturers. Today,
the situation is very different. Mandatory federal regulations determine
to a significant degree the type of vehicle that can be offered for sale.
There is no question that federal regulation of automobile safety and
emissions has had significant effects on American society, and that in the
future the fuel economy standards will do the same. What is unclear is
whether the results have been, or will be, worth the economic costs and
the political pain. More people are beginning to question whether or not
the use of mandatory product regulation on the automobile companies is the
best way to achieve the goals of the safety, emissions, and fuel economy
programs. In some cases, this feeling stems from a belief that an alter-
native system, such as financial incentives, would be better. In others,
the feeling derives from a belief that there simply must be a better way.
*The authors wish to thank Christopher R. Frey and Philip A. Lorang
for their research assistance and critical review.
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In the light of these attitudes, it is remarkable how little we understand
the present system--its strong points and its weaknesses, how it developed,
how it is changing, etc. People seem to agree on only one thing--that we
should be able to improve it.
This chapter is an examination of the American automotive regulatory
system. It is principally descriptive, but sets forth hypotheses
concerning the nature of the system and how it might be improved. All three
important areas of regulation -- safety, air pollutant emissions, and
fuel economy--are examined simultaneously in the hope that such a cross-
sectional view will stimulate perceptions and hypotheses that might not
otherwise be obtained. In the present administrative structure for
regulating the automobile there is no organization where emissions regula-
tion is viewed together with safety and fuel economy. This is true in
both the legislative and executive branches of the government. The only
exceptions are the highest levels of leadership, which have never been
strongly involved in consideration of anything but particular standards.
Thus there are substantial differences in both the evolution and the
structure of the three areas of regulation, as well as important similarities,
and the comparative analysis approach yields a provocative set of insights
into the automotive regulatory system.
This chapter is laid out as follows. First, in Section 2, a brief
history of the evolution of the present system is presented. This is de-
signed principally to provide important background material for the re-
mainder of the chapter.
In Section 3, the issues associated with the standards used to force
changes in passenger car technology are examined. The attempts to change
passenger technology are the centerpieces of the automotive regulatory
__
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system, and are the focus of this paper. First the procedures -- both in-
stitutional and analytical -- for setting automotive regulatory standards
are compared. The procedures available for use by the federal government
depend on the structure of the standards and this is examined next. The
types of standards used in the three regulatory areas -- individual vehicle
equipment standards, individual vehicle performance standards, and new car
sales fleet average performance standards -- are contrasted. Since the very
purpose of the standards is to change motor vehicle technology, research and
development activities by the government and the industry are important parts
of the system for developing and meeting the standards. The extent to
which this is the case is examined in the third subsection, with a focus
on the role of government-supported R&D and the incentives to industry for
R&D in these areas.
In Section 4, two other issues are examined and compared across the
three regulatory areas. First, the role of consumer and operator behavior
in meeting the national automotive goals is addressed. In none of the three
areas have government-induced changes in human behavior made an important
contribution. Second, the role of monitoring and surveillance is examined.
In all three areas the government faces measurement and analysis problems
which are substantial, if not overwhelming. Monitoring, surveillance, and
modeling efforts are crucial to the formulation of regulatory standards
which have some semblance of rationality.
Finally, the last section summarizes and reviews the conclusions that
the authors have reached concerning the nature of the automotive regulatory
system and how it might be improved.
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2. A Brief Review of the Evolution of the Automotive Regulatory System
The present structure of the automotive regulatory system is very much
a function of the particular political, legislative, and administrative ac-
tivities out of which it evolved. The purpose of this section is to provide
this evolutionary perspective as background for the analysis of that struc-
ture which is the subject of the remainder of the chapter. This section,
then, is a brief review of the history of the automotive regulatory system.
2.1 Safetyl
Automobile occupant safety had become a public issue by the end of the
1920's, but at that time and for some decades thereafter concern and regu-
lations were directed mainly at the driver. Some states had vehicle standards
requiring headlights and windshield wipers, etc., to be fitted to automobiles.
With a rising road death toll in the 1960's, increasing attention was
focused on the influence of vehicle design on occupant safety. After
publication in 1965 of Ralph Nader's book, Unsafe at Any Speed, which focused
attention on the vehicle and not the driver, concern with vehicle design in-
creased dramatically. On March 2, 1966, in response to the growing concern,
President Johnson delivered to Congress a message on transportation and
traffic safety, together with the proposed National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966. In his address, President Johnson urged that the
Secretary of Commerce3 be given authority to determine and establish
necessary safety performance criteria for all motor vehicles . Prior
to the "Safety Act," the automobile had remained essentially free of federal
regulatory controls.
_I ____
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The Safety Act: (1) required the unconditional imposition of mandatory
standards, at the earliest possible date; (2) reduced the role of the indi-
vidual states in establishing vehicle standards to a consultative one;
(3) legislated a policy that the federal government would develop an inde-
pendent technical capacity for performing research on accident and injury
prevention, for testing, for initiating innovation in safety design to
serve as a yardstick for measuring industry performance, and for developing
and implementing vehicle safety standards; (4) established mandatory pro-
cedures for notification of consumers and corrective repairs for safety-related
defects; and (5) gave the federal government a responsibility to provide
information on new motor vehicles to assist consumers in evaluating the
safety of competing cars.
The Act was approved by the President on September 9, 1966. It re-
quired that the initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) be
issued by the end of January 1967, and that they be applicable to vehicles
produced after January 1, 1968. Because of the time constraints it was
accepted that the initial FMVSS would have to be based on existing standards.
In fact, most of the FMVSS were direct adaptations of the General Services
Administration's standards for model year 1968 passenger cars to be purchased
for the federal government. Some were also taken from voluntary industry
standards, especially those of the Society of Automotive Engineers, from the
previous work of the National Bureau of Standards, and from several other sources.
The initial accident prevention standards addressed vehicle controls, automatic
transmissions, windshield defrosters, windshield wipers, brakes, brake
hoses, reflective surfaces, lamps and lighting, and rearview mirrors.
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Initial crash protection standards specified lap and shoulder seat belts,
energy-absorbing steering columns, padded interiors, recessed instrument
knobs, a requirement for doors to remain closed upon a crash, laminated
windshields, seat belt anchorage capabilities, and limited hub cap projec-
tion. The only post-crash standard issued dealt with the integrity of fuel
tanks and related equipment.
Since the initial FMVSS a number of additional standards have been
promulgated and a number have been strengthened. New crash protection stan-
dards have been written prescribing head restraints, specifying the security
of windshield mounting, constraining the characteristics of child seating
systems, and specifying side door strength and roof crush resistance. FMVSS
208, passenger restraints, has been by far the most controversial of the
safety standards. The requirement for a passive restraint -- essentially
the "air bag" -- has been on the regulatory docket and in and out of Congress
and the courts since 1970. What was considered by many to be a more modest
compromise proposal, the ignition-seatbelt interlock, was made effective for
model year 1974 vehicles, but overturned by Congress in mid-1974 presumably in an
expression of voter sentiment. A second post-crash standard was issued in
1970 limiting the flammability of materials used in car interiors.
Generally considered an adjunct to safety regulation, regulations to
lower to cost of damage in automotive accidents are promulgated under the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, which became law in 1973.
Damageability regulations promulgated under that Act are principally con-
cerned with requirements that motor vehicles' bumpers be designed to
withstand low-speed contacts with no damage. It required that federal
bumper standards be set in order to reduce damages and economic loss
resulting from automobile accidents.
__
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2.2 Emissions4
As a result of the air pollution situation in Los Angeles and the iden-
tification of the part played by automobile exhaust, California, in 1964,
adopted the first exhaust emission standards in the country. These standards,
applicable in the 1966 model year, controlled hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon
monoxide (CO) emissions. Following California's lead, Congress in 1965 passed
the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act which permitted the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare to set nationwide emission standards for
vehicles as he deemed necessary to protect the public health. In 1966,
the Secretary adopted the California standards and made them applicable
nationwide for the 1968 model year. Later, in 1968, the Secretary promulgated
stricter HC and CO standards for the 1970 model year and an evaporative emis-
sions standard for model year 1971.
By 1970, the "environmental" movement was in full swing. Congress, led
by Senator Edmund S. Muskie and his Public Works Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution responded with tough new regulation in the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970. This law required a 90% reduction from existing controlled levels
of HC and CO emissions by model year 1975 and a 90% reduction by model year
1976 of the then uncontrolled levels of nitrogen oxides (No ) emissions.
Almost simultaneously, regulatory responsibility was transferred to the newly
formed Environmental Protection Agency. Importantly, the EPA was given per-
mission, under strict guidelines, to administratively delay each 90% re-
duction standard for up to one year.
Since 1970 the automobile companies, claiming technological infeasibility,
have fought hard to delay and prevent the implementation of the 90% goals.
The original one year delays were granted by the EPA in 1973, and Congress
in 1974 legislated another one year delay of each standard. A further
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delay of the HC and CO standards was granted by the EPA in 1975, so that
currently the 90% goals are at this writing (June 1977) scheduled to take
effect in model year 1978. A further delay and possible revision of the
goals is expected of Congress shortly. At each delay, interim standards
of increasing stringency have been established. Thus, while the attainment
of the original goals remains elusive, substantial progress in controlling
new car emissions has been made.
2.3 Fuel Economy
The legislative and administrative history of the automobile fuel
economy standards is much shorter and more recent than the others.
Following the 1973-4 oil embargo the federal government decided that there
was a need to reduce automotive gasoline consumption. During the 1973 and
1974 Congressional sessions, numerous bills were proposed to institute fuel
economy (miles per gallon) standards, vehicle weight standards, and excise
taxes on large vehicles. Few of these bills were acted upon, although one
did pass the Senate in late 1973, only to die in the House. In 1974 the
Ford Administration arranged a voluntary agreement with the domestic manu-
facturers in which a goal was set calling for a 40% improvement by 1980 over
1974 levels in the industry-wide new car fleet fuel economy average.
This voluntary agreement never had mued effect due to Congressional action
in 1975. Both the House and Senate Commerce Committees passed bills re-
quiring a series of fuel economy standards. The House Ways and Means
Committee meanwhile passed a bill calling for increased gasoline taxes and
an excise tax on high-gasoline-consumption vehicles as its solution to
cutting gasoline consumption. This bill was later rejected by the whole
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House and a standards bill, a title of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, was enacted in December 1975. This Act calls for each manufacturer's
new car fleet to average 18, 19, and 20 mpg in model years 1978, 1979, and
1980 respectively, and 27.5 mpg by 1985. Standards for model years 1981 - 1984
are to be set by the Secretary of Transportation.
The pattern behind these major thrusts in automotive regulation seems
to hold rather well. In each case the public and its representatives came,
over the period of a year or two, to reach the conclusion that a particular
automotive impact had attained an intolerable level. In the safety case, it
was the rising highway death toll of the early 1960's and the publication
of Unsafe at Any Speed; in the emissions case, it was the rise of the environ-
mental movement; and in the fuel economy case, it was the Arab oil embargo
and the "energy crisis" which acted to bring the issue to the forefront of
domestic politics. In each case exhortation and some relatively mild form
of government intervention preceded the passage of stringent legislation.
In the emissions case there was the 1965 legislation; in safety there was a
set of standards promulgated by the General Services Administration for vehicles
for government usage; and in fuel economy there was the voluntary agreement
between the automobile manufacturers and the Ford Administration. In each
case, in the face of growing public interest, the Congress determined these
less stringent measures to be inadequate, even though they had had little
time to yield significant impact. Finally, a piece of strong legislation
was passed, imposing a set of mandatory measures on the automotive manufac-
turers -- the Safety Act of 1966, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, and the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act. This pattern is, of course, not
terribly different from the way many major policy initiatives make their way
into law.
1-10
There are two notable differences between the course of events in the
safety area and that in emissions and fuel economy. The first is that the
national move toward cleaner and more efficient vehicles was a subordinate
component of major initiatives to reduce aggregate air pollutant emissions
and natural petroleum consumption, respectively. In both cases the automo-
bile was identified as a major contributor to the national problem, and
was singled out for special and specific legislative treatment, but reductions
in the impact of the automobile were related, at least conceptually, to
national aggregates. In the safety case there was no analogous and clearly
identifiable national issue of which the automotive impact was a component.
The legislation on automotive safety deals with that alone.
This difference, however, is of less operational significance than
another related distinction. In the emissions and fuel economy cases numerical
standards and timetables were legislated -- 90% reduction in HC, CO, and NOx
emissions in four to five years, a doubling of average fuel economy in nine
years. In the safety case numerical standards for vehicle safety were not
available; the level of understanding for describing vehicle safety in
terms of a simple set of numbers was (and remains) inadequate. Thus the
Congress could not set numerical vehicle targets. This difference between
safety and the other two regulatory areas is of major significance; its
implications are the focus of this paper and will be explored at length
below.
3. Issues of Standard-Setting and Technological Change
The principal objectives of the automotive regulatory system have been
to reduce health and property losses, ambient air pollution levels, and
gasoline consumption. The principal strategy for accomplishing this has
1-11
been to effect changes in the technology of the automobile by the imposition
of mandatory product standards to be met by the automobile manufacturers.
However, the situation is an extremely complex case, where the extent of
the changes actually made depends heavily on the goals that are set, the
structure of the standards and the associated incentives to change automotive
technology, and the ability of the industry and the government to bring
forth the desired changes. In this section we examine and contrast these
features of the regulatory system for the three areas of automotive regulation.
It will be seen that the most important difference between the three
areas of regulation is in the structure of the standards. In the safety area
standards are generally set as numerical performance criteria or as design
criteria on vehicle equipment or subsystems; i.e., no overall safety index
is used, and each vehicle must meet the standards. In air pollution the
three emission standards are a vector which represents an overall measure
(albeit three-dimensional) of emissions performance, and, as in safety, each
vehicle must meet the standards. Fuel economy standards are set as a
scalar value for each manufacturer's new car fleet average in any model year.
These differing standard structures have coincided with differing allocations
of standard-setting authority between the Congress and the Executive Branch.
In the emission and fuel economy cases the availability of simple quantitative
indices has made it relatively easy for the Congress to retain the standard-
setting function to itself. The results of these procedural differences,
and the analytical differences which accompany them, are explored in Section
3.1 below. With a given standards structure, varying areas and degrees of
freedom may be left to the manufacturers; it is therefore natural to expect
differing responses from firms. This is explored in Section 3.2. Advances
in technology are crucial features of what must occur if the national automo-
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tive goals are to be met. The incentives for, and activities in support
of, technological change in the regulated areas are explored in Section 3.3.
3.1 Standard-Setting Procedures
There are two conceptually distinct aspects to the way in which automo-
tive regulatory standards are set. First there is the set of institutional
arrangements by which data are gathered, arguments made, and some set of
standards is chosen (and subsequently modified if necessary). Second, what-
ever the institutional form, there is the underlying conceptual structure used
to define goals or balance costs and benefits, and ultimately to derive a
specific set of standards. It will be seen here that, while these two aspects
of the standard-setting procedures are conceptually distinct, in practice
they are heavily coupled.
Most importantly, standards established by Congress (with the concurrence
of the President) are subject to review only by the courts, and only for their
constitutionality. Therefore the choices open to Congress are far less
constrained than those of an agency. Outcomes are obviously influenced by
arguments from all sides, but the arguments from those disagreeing with the
outcome do not have to be refuted or even listened to. On the other hand,
when an Executive Branch agency proposes a standard it has to comply with
the requirements laid down in the Administrative Procedure Act which,
among other things, requires the agency to give notice of proposed rule-
making and to publicly answer any criticisms leveled at the proposals.
Hence the extent to which the Congress chooses to establish the regulatory
standards itself is a key determinant of the possible stringency of the
standards.
I _ ____ _
1-13
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 specifies
a set of national objectives and requires that the Secretary "promulgate
by order appropriate Federal motor safety standards. Each such Federal
motor vehicle safety standard shall be practicable, shall meet the need for
motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." A "motor
vehicle safety standard" is defined as a "minimum standard for motor vehicle
performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance." "Motor vehicle
safety" is "the performance of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment in
such a manner that the public is protected against unreasonable risk of
accidents occurring as a result of the design, construction or performance
of motor vehicles and is also protected against unreasonable risk of death
8
or injury to persons in the event accidents do occur." Thus the standards
must be "performance standards," they must be "appropriate" (for the vehicle
or piece of equipment to which they pertain), "practicable" (within the state-
of-the-art at the time of implementation), and "objective" (measurable),
and they must protect the public against "unreasonable risk." The only af-
firmative requirement in opposition to these constraints is that the Secretary
was required to promulgate an initial set of FMVSS by a certain date
(January 31, 1967) and modify them one year later, with this initial set to
be based principally on the General Services Administration and Society of
Automotive Engineers Standards then extant. Thus, beyond mandating nation-
wide promulgation of these relatively inexpensive and technologically
unchallenging standards, the Congress left the further determination of
safety measures in the hands of the Executive Branch.
In fact, aside from the controversial passive restraint standard
(effectively requiring air bags), very little in the way of major new
safety requirements has actually been promulgated. Partly this has been
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due to difficulties NHTSA has had in fulfilling the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act, in that the courts, at the instigation of
the regulated firms, have required the agency to in fact meet the criteria
specified in the Safety Act. This reflects the substantive difficulties the
agency has had in identifying new technical options and then proving that
they meet the legislated constraints. The legislative procedures were also
supplemented, during the Ford Administration, by Executive Branch procedures
requiring cost-benefit analyses and inflation impact statements. While
these were strictly procedural requirements, they indicated that aggressive
pursuit of the discretionary activities under the Safety Act would not have
been consistent with the ideological preferences of the Ford Administration.
The procedures adopted in setting the early standards for automobile
emissions were similar to those described for the safety area. In 1965 the
Congress passed legislation requiring the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to prescribe emission standards after giving "appropriate consideration
to technological feasibility and economic costs." The first standards
were promulgated in 1966 and were the same as the industry had already met
in California; that is, the industry did not need to do any new research to
ensure compliance with the standards. Additional standards were promulgated
in 1968 and early 1970 but again technological feasibility and costs were
fully considered before promulgation.
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 represented a dramatic strengthening
of the Congress' approach. For the first time standards of performance
were set by the Congress. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) was given almost no room to move -- he could delay the intro-
duction of the standards by one year providing certain conditions were met,
but he could not relax the tough performance goals of the legislation.
_ ____i
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In arriving at these new standards Congress did not pay any attention to
technological feasibility or to economic effects. This was not an oversight
onthe part of the Congress -- it was a deliberate adoption of a new process
to stimulate the industry into meeting what were seen as its obligations.
As a result, the implementing agency, the EPA, was placed in a much stronger
position than it, or its predecessors in emissions (and safety) regulation
had been. The industry was required to demonstrate progress -- the EPA
could point to the standards and be openly critical of the industry's attempts
to meet them. The Administrator could postpone the standards for one year
only if (among other things) the manufacturers could show that effective
control technology would not exist by the compliance date. The fact that
the burden of proof was on the manufacturer (to demonstrate that the techno-
logy was not "available") and not on the regulatory agency (to demonstrate
that the standard was "practicable") made a great difference. Further, the
manufacturer was also required to make "good faith efforts" to meet the
standards by the deadlines in order to qualify for the one-year extensions.
Thus not only was the standard-setting procedure changed by the 1970 amendments
in that Congress retained control over what had previously been the Executive
Branch's duty, but the groundwork was laid for a much stronger dose of
annual coercion in the government's dealings with the industry.
It has already been suggested that the Congress can do what an agency
cannot when it comes to setting standards. A close examination of the
procedures used by the Congress to arrive at the 90% control standards
of the 1970 amendments supports such a thesis. It is widely accepted that
the Barth report9 influenced the Congress -- it was virtually the only
analysis in existence at the time that related automotive emissions to air
quality levels. The Barth report concluded that reductions in emissions in
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excess of 90% were necessary if the air quality standards were to be met.
There were a number of important and controversial assumptions made in the
Barth report -- but Congress chose not to analyze the effect of these.
Congress also chose not to adopt the precise reductions calculated in the
Barth report. Instead, a more symbolic 90% reduction for each of the
three major pollutants was adopted. The fact that 90% was adopted for each
of the three major pollutants is good evidence that symbolism was placed
above science in the selection of the standard.1 1
For all the symbolism and arbitrariness of the demand for 90% re-
duction there was the feeling that at least the standards were related to
the objective of meeting the national goals -- in this case the ambient air
quality standards. This gave the proceedings some apparent rational basis
that was lacking in the safety area because of the lack of a quantifiable ag-
gregate goal.
In 1975 the Congress set fuel economy standards. The procedure adopted
was one that again an agency would have found difficult to justify. With
a goal of reducing oil imports (by some unspecified amount and by some
future date) the Congress set about deciding the fuel economy standards for
future automobiles. What emerged can hardly be said to have been a
result of the adoption of any particular analytical procedure. Standards for
the near future (1980) appear to have been based on what was considered
practical. Those for the longer term (1985) seem again to have been chosen
principally for their symbolic value -- a doubling of the economy of
existing new cars. As with the amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1970,
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act gives the administrating authority
(now NHTSA) little chance to change the standards. Hence if the analogy
with emissions standards persists NHTSA will be able to adopt far more
aggressive procedures in implementing the fuel economy standards than it.
·_ ____ _I____
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have been able to do in the safety area.
In summary, it can be seen that a different procedure was adopted in
setting automobile-related standards starting in 1970. Prior to that date
public concern was reflected in legislation allowing a designated agency to
promulgate standards. The agency had to be in a position to defend its
proposed standards at extensive and penetrating hearings, and before a Court
of Appeals. After 1970 a new style was introduced in that the Congress
itself dictated the standards. As a consequence the emission and fuel eco-
nomy standards that resulted were almost certainly more stringent than an
agency could have promulgated. The effects from the changed procedure
include more resources invested in active research by the manufacturers to
meet the standards (as compared to the resources invested in arguing with
the agencies' proposals) and a more aggressive implementation of the standards
by the agencies which are in a position to demand progress from manufacturers.
The key motivating factors were the Congress' and the public's growing unhap-
piness with the responsiveness of the automobile industry to the national
goals, and the Democratic Congress' concern that the Republican Administration
would not be aggressive in pursuing those goals within discretionary regula-
tory authority. A necessary precondition for this change was that numerical
performance standards were readily available for the Congress to use in
establishing its relatively arbitrary goals in the emissions and fuel
economy areas.
3.2 The Structure of the Regulatory Standards
Although the Congress is always involved in establishing the strategic
goals of a national regulatory program and sometimes, as of late with emissions
and fuel economy, in setting the actual standards, the implementation of the
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standards is left to the administrating agency. It has already been pointed
out that in each of the three automotive regulatory areas under discussion
the federal government has chosen to use some sort of mandatory standard as
its regulatory tool, rather than taxes or some monetary incentive scheme.
Thus, product changes are demanded by various rules specifying requirements
to be met by manufacturers in each model year.
Three significantly different types of automotive regulatory standards
have been promulgated: equipment standards and two types of performance
standards -- one which applies to individual vehicles, the other to the
new car sales fleet of each manufacturer. The way the standard is implemented
both by the agency (enforcement) and the industry (compliance) is very much
a function of the type of standard. The automobile industry is wholeheartedly
against equipment standards, arguing that they are in the best position to
decide what equipment is best to meet a given goal. They insist that all that is
required is that an overall goal be specified -- as a performance standard.
As we shall see there are arguments for and against these types of standards,
but first it is worth reviewing the standards in place at present.
Automotive air pollutant emission standards are written in terms of
numerical limits on each of the three major pollutants. Each standard spe-
cifies that a certain number of grams of pollutant must not be exceeded on
the average for each mile the vehicle is driven over a specified driving
cycle, chosen to simulate urban driving. For example, the model year 1976
standards are: 1.5 gm./mi. hydrocarbons, 15 gm./mi. carbon monoxide, and
2.0 gm./mi. oxides of nitrogen. These exhaust standards are supplemented
by a standard on evaporative hydrocarbon emissions (2 grams evaporated per
test), and a crankcase blowby emission standard which specifies no emissions
from the crankcase. (There also is a specification on the lead and phosphorus
content of gasoline to be met by gasoline refiners and distributors, designed
_ ______ _1___ 111__1___
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to protect emission control equipment such as catalysts from deterioration.)
The standards must be met by each vehicle produced. No particular equipment
is required by the regulations; it is up to the manufacturer to determine how
best to meet the standard, but he is obligated to design all models to
meet it.
Fuel economy requirements are specified as a numerical standard for
the minimum average fuel economy of the fleet of vehicles each manufacturer
produces in a given year (sales-weighted harmonic average). For example,
the model year 1978 standard is 18.0 miles per gallon. The manufacturer's
production vehicles are divided into classes, and the fuel economy of each
class is determined by testing on a specific driving cycle chosen to simulate
national driving characteristics. The manufacturer must meet an average
which is weighted according to the sales of each vehicle class. No equip-
ment is specified, nor is there any constraint on the fuel economy of any
individual vehicle or model.
Automotive safety standards are required by the Safety Act to be
standards of performance for motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. In
fact, however, they go so far beyond the emission and fuel economy standards
in specifying actual designs that we will refer to them here as equipment
standards. Each and every vehicle of a given regulated class is required
to meet some criterion applied to some, often quite subordinate, aspect of
the vehicle. In some cases a piece of equipment is required to be mounted,
sometimes with a specification of an aspect of its performance. For example,
FMVSS 202 requires that head restraints meeting certain specifications be
installed in passenger cars and FMVSS 108 requires that headlights, turn
signals, etc., be installed and meet certain specifications. In some cases
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a type of design is banned; e.g., FMVSS 211 forbids wheel projections which
might injure pedestrians. In other cases specifications are prescribed
without explicitly requiring new equipment; e.g., FMVSS 219 specifies side
door strength and FMVSS 216 specifies roof strength.14
The most obvious difference between the three types of standards is
the degree of flexibility available to the manufacturer in meeting the
standard in any given year. Equipment standards leave relatively little
flexibility; the manufacturer provides the specified equipment within the
specified design limits. In the case of vehicle performance standards,
the manufacturer may choose just how he is to meet the standard. Thus dif-
ferences in design between vehicle classes and between firms are allowed;
each manufacturer chooses that system which he determines will provide the
optimum set of vehicle attributes (initial cost, fuel economy, drivability,
etc.), while meeting the standard. If the standard stays constant in time,
he can change the technology from year to year as experience is gained -- either
by each manufacturer individually, or by one firm observing the superior features
(or higher sales) of the vehicles of another firm. In the case of the fleet
average standard the manufacturer has even more freedom, in that he can
emphasize changes for improved fuel economy in those models where they can
be made most readily. Furthermore, since there are are differences in fuel
economy among the vehicle classes, he can change his average by fostering
sales of high fuel economy vehicles with low prices (or rebates), advertising,
dealer contests, etc.
Thus the three types of standards offer different degrees of flexibility
to the manufacturer. Flexibility is important because it helps deal with
problems arising from uncertainty. If the regulatory agency knew with
certainty the best set of configurations well before the effective date of
the standard, then a set of equipment standards could be imposed that would
__ I_ ___ __
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give exactly the same result -- i.e., exactly the same vehicles would be
produced. The uncertainty indicates the need for a dynamic decision-making
process, so that new information can be incorporated as it is learned,
over time. More flexibility allows year-to-year changes in equipment to
take advantage of this. Often, within one or two model years, a "dominant
design"1 7 emerges, where all the manufacturers converge on a certain tech-
nical approach to meet a given standard presumably because it is the optimal
approach. Then equipment standards could be specified with little loss (and,
as discussed later, possibly with some gain).
A crucial distinction between equipment standards and performance stan-
dards is that the latter can be gradually tightened, giving the manufacturer
a continuing incentive to develop new technology for improving the regulated
attribute. This is the present system in emissions and fuel economy regulation.
It is very difficult to do this with equipment standards. In general to
attain higher levels of safety, new standards must be added, but these
standards must be based on design changes or equipment which are known to
the regulatory agency; there is little the agency can do to force the manu-
facturer to develop new designs or equipment. In some cases NHTSA has
attempted to increase vehicle safety by tightening performance standards on
required equipment. This has proved difficult. In the case of the
standard on hydraulic brakes (FMVSS 105) for example, there are approximately
fifty distinct attributes which must be specified to describe the required
equipment. NHTSA did successfully tighten it once.
Even if an equipment standard is promulgated, or tightened, its relation
to the regulatory goal is often unclear. For example, a standard that
specifies the minimum strength of a vehicle side door, thereby presumably
improving safety in collisions on the side, may cause a deterioration in
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the energy management characteristics for front-end collisions. There is
no a priori way to ensure that overall vehicle safety is actually improved.
Of course, if such a phenomenon is actually discovered to be the case, then
the specification can be rewritten to protect against it, or the standard
can be withdrawn if the technical options are not there. This type of sub-
optimization will occur for any standard short of one which specifies some
single overall criterion for the social value of an automobile. Thus, for
example, even in the case of the vehicle performance standard, e.g., on
emissions, meeting a standard on one pollutant may increase the emissions
of another (either regulated or unregulated). However, a CO standard will
very likely lower CO emissions, and a fuel economy standard similarly will
almost certainly reduce gasoline consumption.1 8
One can think of a continuum existing from strict equipment standards
to fleet performance standards with the equipment standards furthest, concep-
tually from the actual goal of the program. Each of the programs is
designed to improve some problem: energy security or human safety or health.
Naturally, the motor vehicle regulatory programs only attempt to control the
motor vehicle's contribution to these problems. A fleet or vehicle performance
standard attempts to deal with this contribution directly; equipment standards
are indirect, allowing more room for unexpected side effects.
As discussed in the previous subsection, Congress has utilized these
features of performance standards to prod the industry into developing and
adopting new emissions control technology, and is hoping to do the same with
fuel economy. This is possible because a reasonably good performance measure
is available, thus allowing a specification to be made without knowing what
technology might be used to meet it, and in confidence that the result will
have a positive impact on the relevant automotive goal. A reasonable, though
·· __ ____
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unprovable, conclusion is that a specified vehicle performance standard
could, if available, be similarly used in the safety area. NHTSA gives at
least formal approval to an ultimate consolidation of its standards into
a smaller set (four) of numerical vehicle performance standards in key
areas: crashworthiness, crash avoidance, etc. The proposed passive re-
straint standard (FMVSS 208) has been expected to be the first step along
these lines; difficulties there have apparently severely hampered the con-
solidation effort, and it seems to have been given a very low priority within
the agency since it was first proposed in 1971.19
Fleet standards, as compared to individual vehicle standards, allow
the manufacturer to phase in new technological developments to meet a given
standard. This is generally much more difficult with individual vehicle
standards, where each vehicle must meet the same standard. Some phasing of
new equipment can be done under individual performance standards, but it is
by definition impossible with individual vehicle equipment standards. The
ability to phase in innovations is important in an industry with massive
quantities of specialized production facilities and a consumer set whose
response to innovation is not readily predictable.
On the other hand, a difficulty with fleet average standards is that,
if the product is highly differentiated on the regulated attribute, the final
new car fleet average is dependent on the composition of the actual fleet
sold. This composition is not well controlled by the manufacturers.
Furthermore, it is hard to predict the fleet composition, adding another
dimension of uncertainty to the manufacturers' product development plans.
Of course, this difficulty goes hand-in-hand with the advantage of fleet
standards -- that, where the regulated attribute is highly differentiated
among vehicles it would be inefficient to make every vehicle meet the iden-
tical standard. For example, if all vehicles had to meet a single fuel
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economy standard, many models would be eliminated (the number depending on
the standard) and some probably would not be constrained at all (indicating
that gains could be made at low cost for these vehicles). Emissions are not
so strongly differentiated technologically among the vehicle fleet as fuel
economy, although NO and CO emissions tend to increase with the
weight of the vehicle. Safety is highly differentiated with heavy cars sig-
nificantly safer; without a good safety index this is difficult to quantify
except from observed accident data. Measures taken to meet fleet average
standards may have serious disrupting effects on the industry because they
give manufacturers incentives, beyond those felt due to real manufacturing
cost differences, to change prices. If there are important differences
among firms in the average levels of the regulated attribute then the results
could be very harmful to one or more of the manufacturers, and competition
in the industry reduced. Fleet average standards have to be viewed with
some concern when the regulated attribute is highly differentiated.2 0
While the flexibility inherent in performance standards has a great deal
to commend it, equipment standards may have an important place in automotive
regulation. Although at the time performance standards are promulgated no
one is certain of the precise nature of the equipment or design modifications
that will be used to meet the standard, as the implementation date nears.
and passes most manufacturers have generally elected to use similar equipment.
As discussed above, a dominant design emerges that, because of its superior
attributes, is widely used. Examples in the emissions area are exhaust
gas recirculation systems for nitrogen oxide control, catalytic converters
for hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide control and charcoal canisters for
control of evaporative sources of hydrocarbons. However, and this results
in many problems, the manufacturers design and build the equipment just
well enough to meet the performance standard -- or, more to the point, just
I _ · · I _______I
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well enough to avoid difficulties with the enforcement agency. There is
little incentive for manufacturers to design and construct the devices so
that they will be durable and reasonably tamper-proof for the life of the
vehicle. In fact, any manufacturer who did this would be penalized in the
marketplace because of higher costs. Hence, manufacturers inevitably se-
lect the least expensive equipment with only secondary attention being paid
to durability in the hands of consumers. In the emissions case where the
deterioration problem is most serious, regulators try to overcome this by
including a durability requirement in the test procedure, but in fact the
deterioration found when the manufacturer drives a vehicle for its 50,000
mile test does not relate closely to that observed in in-service vehicles.
Manufacturers claim this is due to lack of proper maintenance, hence their
support for mandatory inspection and maintenance. However, if the regulatory
agency had some authority to control the construction of the devices used
by manufacturers, it is likely that more durable and tamper-proof devices
could be brought forth.
Automotive emission control systems are technically sophisticated and
complex, and are strongly coupled to the design and operation of the entire
propulsion system. There are a large number of design variables that can
be traded off in order to achieve the optimal combination of vehicle
attributes while meeting a given emission standard.; Therefore, the role
for equipment standards is a limited one. However, if the regulatory
agency were given more authority to specify certain design features, the
emissions system might be improved in ways that are hard to deal with
through a performance standard. For example, an equipment standard might
specify the minimum size of a catalytic converter, if that device is
installed to meet the vehicle performance standard; this would enhance
1-26
the durability of the system. Similarly, it might be useful to specify directly
what sorts of adjustments are to be allowed for maintenance of fuel and
ignition systems so that tampering would be more difficult. While the
ability to innovate under a performance standard is highly desirable and
should certainly be maintained, equipment specifications could serve as
a useful supplement where a stable dominant technology has emerged and
there are significant problems not being adequately handled by the
performance standard alone.
3.3 Research and Development in the Regulatory Programs
Government-supported research and development (R&D) programs have been
prominent parts of the safety and emissions regulatory efforts, and are
becoming more prominent in the fuel economy area. In each case, the gov-
ernment programs have attempted to complement the industry's programs,
filling in key technical gaps and avoiding work where the industry's efforts
are strong. The industry's efforts, in turn, reflect the incentives felt
by the automotive firms under the regulatory system -- the standard-setting
procedures and the structure of the standards themselves as discussed earlier
in this section. Thus, the government's R&D programs have been related to
the structure of the government's regulatory programs. In this subsection,
the relationship between government and industry-supported R&D programs on
regulated attributes and the regulatory structure will be explored. The
emphasis will be on the emission and safety programs where data on govern-
ment and industry behavior are available.
3.3.1 Safety R&D. From its inception, the U.S. government's automotive
safety program was intended by the Congress to incorporate a strong R&D pro-
gram. There has been a continuous series of efforts for the development of
instrumentation and test procedures and, of the most long-run significance,
efforts aimed explicitly at developing the technology for making motor
vehicles safer. The safety R&D has sought innovations of two sorts --
1_1 _ I _ _ it
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incremental changes to the present passenger car, and whole new "safety"
vehicles. The incremental changes studied by NHTSA have included new light-
ing systems, new braking systems, glare reduction techniques, etc.
The safety vehicle R&D programs have been the largest and most important --
in terms of funding and public attention -- of NHTSA's R&D efforts. The
Experimental Safety Vehicle (ESV) program was initiated in 1970, with com-
petitive contracts let to two firms. Somewhat later, one-dollar arrangements
were made for the participation of Ford and General Motors. There were
three phases to the program: design studies, fabrication and testing of two
vehicles from each firm, and procurement of a larger number of vehicles (twelve).
The principal objectives of the program were: (1) to demonstrate the feasi-
bility of advanced automotive safety performance by designing, fabricating,
and testing experimental vehicles; (2) to develop the engineering data from
which to formulate new safety standards; (3) to heighten public awareness
of automotive safety technology; and (4) to encourage the automotive industry
to increase and accelerate its own R&D efforts. The technical focus of the
program was the development of vehicles able to provide protection to occupants
in a 50 mph head-on collision. This was to be accomplished by using an
"integrated systems" approach to the vehicle development -- i.e., all things
related to safety were to be considered. A weight specification and other
criteria were to be met as well.
Of the vehicles which resulted, only one (Ford's) met the crashworthi-
ness standard. The vehicles were from 800 to 2000 pounds heavier than com-
parable production vehicles, and they showed the poor fuel economies implied
by this added weight. The principal technical features utilized in the
effort to meet the safety standard were crushable frames and/or large hy-
draulic energy absorbers, both designed to decelerate carefully the
vehicle and its occupants. There was little in the way of "integration" or
"systems" technology generated. Nor did any of the many incremental
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safety features of the safety vehicles make their way into new regulatory
standards. These results led to the cancellation of the third phase of the
program, in favor of the present Research Safety Vehicle (RSV) program. The
RSV effort does not attempt to influence the near-term course of safety
regulation, rather it explores the trade-offs that would be available for
vehicles in production during the next decade.2 2
3.3.2 Emissions R&D. R&D conducted in connection with the air pol-
lutant emissions control program has included the development of test pro-
cedures and the gathering of vehicle emissions data. In the technology
development area, the focus has been almost exclusively on the development
and demonstration of advanced low-emissions automotive powerplants. There
has been little government support for the development of new incremental
technical options.
The Advanced Automotive Power Systems (APPS) program was initiated in
1970 by President Nixon. The focus of the program was the development
of automotive engines which could meet the stringent emission standards
then proposed for model year 1980. Since the automotive manufacturers
were putting their effort into incremental changes to the conventional in-
ternal combustion engine (ICE), the designers of the AAPS program planned
to have their development work completed by 1975, so that the advanced
engines could be put into production by 1980, in case the ICE could not be
successfully modified. In late 1970, Congress passed the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, which mandated that stringent standards very similar to
the 1980 proposal of the Administration, be met by the manufacturers in
model year 1975, thereby undermining the rationale for the AAPS program.
However, the rationale was adjusted to reflect a longer-term view ("infor-
_il  _______
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mation gathering"), and the program proceeded, intending to keep roughly
the same timing (vehicle demonstrations in 1975).
Initially, the Environmental Protection Agency's efforts in the program
were focused on two alternative automotive engines: the Rankine cycle ("steam")
engine and the gas turbine. They were chosen principally because they
satisfied the mandatory constraint on the selection process -- they had the
clear potential to meet the statutory 1975 emissions standards. (The Stirling
engine and direct injection stratified charge system also were competitors
on this account.) Once selected, the systems were developed and designed
to meet that constraint, while doing as well as possible with respect to the
other important vehicle attributes -- fuel economy, cost, drivability, etc.
Also the systems were designed to fit into conventional vehicle bodies (or
nearly so).
Four different Rankine cycle systems were studied and carried into
initial development; one (water with a conventional reciprocating expander)
was developed finally, fabricated, and tested (on a dynamometer) in 1975.
In the gas turbine case one principal contractor was chosen (Chrysler)
whose previous work was extended to its next "generation", while simultaneous
efforts were made with other contractors to develop components with the in-
tention of incorporating them into the "upgraded" Chrysler engine. The program
was redirected in 1973 to a lower power output (suitable for a compact car
instead of an intermediate) and stretched out to 1977. The resulting "up-
graded" gas turbine engine is now being tested on a dynamometer and in
vehicles. In early 1975, the program was transferred to the newly created
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). In 1976 funding began
on the development of an automotive Stirling engine.
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The AAPS program was, without question, successful in developing auto-
motive engines which could meet the statutory emission standards; the diffi-
culties arise with the engines' other attributes. In the case of the Rankine
cycle system, the fuel economy projected for vehicles powered by engines
similar to that developed by ERDA would be on the order of 50% lower than that
24
of comparable ICE-powered vehicles (at intermediate emission levels). Fur-
thermore, studies do not indicate that developments available in the near
future would significantly alleviate this difficulty. There are other
relative advantages and disadvantages of the steam system, but the fuel
economy problem alone was clearly sufficient (in the eyes of the government
planners) to terminate the program. In the case of the gas turbine, the
engine to be completed in 1977 will have a fuel economy which is somewhat
(about 6%) superior to that of the comparable 1977 production ICE. However,
the problem of manufacturing cost for the special steel components of the
engine remains unsolved. It now appears that the gas turbine will be com-
petitive in cost and fuel economy with future ICE's only after major tech-
nological advances are made in the manufacturing of ceramic components.
Thus, the gas turbine program is continuing, along with the Stirling engine
effort, but neither holds the promise of becoming a commercially viable
passenger car powerplant for at least a decade.
In the meantime, the statutory 1975 emissions standards have been
postponed until 1978 and almost certainly beyond. The automotive industry
has not been able to develop ICE-powered vehicles which can meet the
standards with acceptable levels of other attributes - especially fuel economy
and cost. Furthermore, fuel economy regulation became a major new govern-
ment effort, under the Department of Transportation. This agency has begun
its own set of studies, development of test procedures, tests of new devices
_ ____.
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developed elsewhere, etc., leaving the "long-range" R&D in the area to
ERDA. Thus the AAPS program is not now connected closely to any regulatory
effort.
3.3.3 R&D within the Overall Regulatory Program. The role of R&D within
the overall government program in the safety and emissions areas needs to
be examined in the context of the incentive structure faced by the industry
for R&D in each area, and the recognition that the incentive structure is
dominated by the regulatory system itself. The incentives are strong
functions of the structure of the standards, as discussed in Section 3.2. In
particular, the areas of flexibility for each type of standard will be ex-
ploited by a firm constrained to meet the standard. The timing of the
standards is crucial as well, as the industry will focus its R&D efforts on
innovations which could be available for production at the time the standard
becomes seriously constraining.
The types of R&D necessary to operate, and to comply with, a regulatory
program can be divided between that which actually improves the technology
available for installation in new vehicles, and that needed to develop and
support the regulatory effort. The latter class would include the develop-
ment of satisfactory testing systems and the gathering and analysis of data
to monitor the impact of the programs. These are clearly the direct needs
of the regulatory agency itself. While it may sometimes be in the industry's
self-interest to do work in these areas (e.g., GM developed the specifications
for the dummy now used for crashworthiness testing), EPA and NHTSA will
generally have to fill their own requirements, and they do.
R&D to advance the actual state-of-the-art in a regulated area may be
divided into three general classes: (1) at a given level of the regulated
attribute, work can be done to lower the cost or improve the other nonregu-
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lated attributes; (2) attempts can be made to attain levels of the regulated
attribute which are higher than those imposed (at any given time) by the
development of incremental changes in passenger car technology, and (3) by
developing radical changes to improve the regulated attribute.
Examples of the first sort include lowering the cost or improving the
fuel economy or drivability at a given level of emissions, or lowering the
cost or increasing the level of comfort or ease of utilization of a safety
device (e.g., the addition of inertia reels to seat belts). Once a regulation
is irreversibly in place, it is clear that the industry has all the usually
competitive incentives to do work of this kind. In fact, the automotive
firms have done substantial work of this sort and the regulatory agencies have
not supported this type of work.
Incremental changes to advance the level of the regulated attribute
would include, in the emissions area, exhaust gas recirculation, carbon
canisters for gasoline vapor collection and catalytic converters. In the
safety area, such items as seat belts, steering wheel locks, side door
beams, etc., are incremental advances. In the emissions case, the existence
of long-term statutory goals, with virtually annual debates over whether
they should be put off for another year or two, or not at all, has forced
the industry to thoroughly explore all possible incremental advances. Thus,
as long as there are statutory requirements on the books for fixed near-
term deadlines, the EPA does not have to worry about developing new incre-
mental emissions control options, and in fact they have not supported them
in the past.
In the safety area, on the other hand, the regulatory system provides
no incentive for the automotive industry to develop the technology to attain
higher levels of safety. As discussed in Section 3.2, the equipment standards
used in the safety area do not allow the agency to readily tighten safety
·4
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safety requirements unless a new technical options is well enough in hand
for the development of a standard requiring the utilization of that option.
Thus the burden of developing safety innovations falls on NHTSA. The agency
recognizes this and has supported numerous efforts aimed at developing and
testing incremental changes to improve the safety of passenger cars. In
a small number of cases, these efforts have resulted in new or tightened
safety standards. Examples include the strengthening of vehicle roofs and
doors, decreased stopping distances and increased fuel system integrity
requirements; each has required an R&D effort. Many more innovations have
been studied which have not resulted in improved safety of production
vehicles -- including modified vehicle frames, various alternative configura-
tions for headlights and taillights, automotive brakes, periscopes, convex
mirrors, speed-limiting devices, and drunk-driver interlocks. A number of
these innovations were formally proposed as standards but were not adopted
as NHTSA was unable to make an adequate case that they were both "practicable"
and alleviated "unreasonable risks."
Non-incremental or radical advances in regulated attributes -- as with
the crash energy management systems of the ESV's and the low-emissions alter-
native powerplants -- are much more difficult for the regulatory systems
to deal with. A radical innovation cannot be manufactured and placed in
all-new vehicles in one year. This is due to the requirements for the
development of new production capacity, modifications to vehicle designs
and the relevant vehicle production equipment, etc. Since both the safety
and emissions regulatory systems require all new vehicles to meet the iden-
tical standard, they cannot be used to force a radical innovation into
production. Thus, even though the emissions regulatory system provides some
continuing incentive for advances which would lower pollutant emissions, the
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incentive is weak with respect to radical innovation. The stringent stan-
dards which have been only one to three model years away at any given time
have further forced the industry to concentrate on incremental modifications.2 6
In the safety area, as discussed above, the system provides little incentive
for advances -- incremental or radical -- providing a higher level of safety.
The lack of industry incentive would seem to leave the radical innova-
tions as an appropriate area of government support. In fact, the ESV and AAPS
programs were initiated in part out of a feeling that the industry was not
being sufficiently aggressive in its pursuit of major changes in these areas.
Based on the considerations discussed here, it might be expected that a
socially desirable innovation (i.e., an innovation in which the sacrifices
in unregulated attributes are acceptable to obtain the gain in the regulated
attribute) of the radical sort would not be able to be succesfully implemented
by the regulatory system. This would seem to be the case; however, neither
the ESV or AAPS programs produced a socially desirable innovation. As
described above, both programs led to the development of vehicles which
offered substantial improvement on the regulated attribute, but were decidedly
inferior in the other attributes, and not socially acceptable overall.
In both cases, the initial enthusiasm of the Congress ard the agency led
to technical program choices which had the consequence that the program could
not contribute to the higher level goals of the regulatory program -- lowered
ambient pollution levels or lives saved and injuries prevented. The initial
failure of both programs is indicated by the need for the substantial redirection
which each underwent. The final phasie of the ESV program was never funded;
it was clear that the production and testing of multiple copies of any of the
ESV's would not have served any useful purpose. Rather, the program was
terminated, and the RSV program begun; the goals of the RSV program do not
1-35
include the development of technology which would contribute to improved
safety within the next decade or so. Similarly in the AAPS program, the
Rankine cycle engine was terminated when it became obvious that a low-emissions,
poor fuel economy, system was not a socially desirable innovation. The gas
turbine and Stirling engine programs are now envisioned as long-range
efforts, providing options to the automotive industry in the middle or late
1980's.
In the fuel economy area, the respective incentives for government-
and industry-supported R&D programs are somewhat different from those in
either the safety or missions areas. Because there is substantial consumer
interest in fuel economy, the industry has had under way for the last several
years substantial programs for the development of incremental fuel economy
improvements. More efficient transmissions, electronic ignition, and new
ways of using lightweight materials are examples of small technical improve-
ments for fuel economy. The increasing stringency of the regulatory program
over the next decade will add to the incentives for this type of change
Because the fuel economy standards are written as a new car sales fleet
average, there is no problem phasing in innovations, as contrasted with
the emissions and safety cases. In addition, the schedule of standards
allowed five to eight years from the time of their promulgation until
they became seriously constraining, so the innovation planning horizon under
the standards is considerably longer than the one to three years under the
Clean Air Act. Thus the advantages of a radical innovation in the fuel
economy area are, if still somewhat cloudy, at least not so obviously
missing as in the emissions case. In fact, innovations such as the diesel
and direct injection stratified charge engines, which are forthcoming,
reflect these circumstances. Furthermore, this mixed incentive picture has
led both the industry and the government to invest R&D resources in radical
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fuel economy innovations (advanced power systems and advanced transmissions).
Thus we see that in each case the role of government-supported R&D as
a part of the regulatory program is a strong function of the structure of
that program. In the emissions and safety areas, R&D in the development
of testing instrumentation and methods is of clear importance to both EPA
and NHTSA and is being actively pursued. The same is true of investigation
of the impact of the standards, modeling and forecasting studies, collection
of field data, etc. The role of work on incremental innovations to improve
the regulated attribute is quite different. In the safety case, the industry
has little incentive to pursue such innovations; NHTSA does pursue them and
on occasion has been able to implement the results through regulation. The
emissions regulatory system does provide ample incentives to the industry
in this area; EPA does not pursue them; and the regulations are changed to
reflect the industry's efforts. Finally, in both cases there is a lack of
incentives to industry to develop radical innovations to improve the regula-
ted attribute. EPA and NHTSA developed programs to fill this gap, but the
initial efforts produced systems which offered major improvements in the
regulated attribute at the cost of unacceptable decrements of the other
attributes, and the programs have been restructured. There remain sub-
stantial questions as to how the radical innovations from these restricted
programs might be incorporated by regulation into new passenger cars. In
the fuel economy area, there are not as many data from which to draw in-
sights, but it appears that the incentives for industry-supported R&D
are not as deficient as those in the emissions and safety areas.
_ __ _____
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4. Issues of Behavior and Measurement
While the issues of standards and technological change are, and
should be, at the heart of the automotive regulatory programs, two
other issues will be briefly reviewed here. They are interesting
because in each case similar problems have been encountered in the
safety and emissions areas, and sometimes in fuel economy as well.
This allows some insights to be gained into the nature of the auto-
motive regulatory system.
4.1 The Impact of Human Behavior on the Attainment of
Automotive Goals
In each of the three areas of automotive regulation, the vehicle
buyer and operator can substantially affect attainment of the relevant
national goal through his behavior. In each of the three areas, sub-
stantial efforts have been made to exploit the possibilities inherent
in this, as complements to the efforts at changing the technology of
the automobile. In each case it has proved easier to change the
technology than to change people's behavior.
Behavioral influences on automotive impacts are numerous. First,
the new car buyer has a strong influence on automotive safety and fuel
economy through his choice of vehicle. Most significantly, it is well
known that larger cars are safer, but that they consume more fuel in
providing their transport service. The fuel economy standards explicitly
allow this differentiation through their averaging procedure; in safety
it results from the use of equipment standards which allow large
differences in overall vehicle safety. The emissions standards are
uniform across all vehicles and in fact systematic differences in
emissions between the lifetime emissions of various vehicles are
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probably not as large as differences between other regulated attributes.
Under the Safety Act, NHTSA has operated a program to provide safety-
related information to vehicle purchasers. This program has never
attracted wide interest. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act includes
in its provisions a mandatory vehicle fuel economy labelling program, which
is complemented by the publication by the Environmental Protection Agency
of the results of its fuel economy tests. Here the effect may be greater,
as the published fuel economies do receive wide attention in the press,
and, presumably due to the manufacturer's perception of consumer demands,
are the object of competition between the manufacturers. These informa-
tion programs may help people make decisions more consistent with their
underlying preferences, but are not likely to affect those preferences.
In any case, while it is undoubtedly impossible to sort out empirically
any influence these programs might have had on consumer behavior, it is
hard to imagine that their influence has been significant. At this
writing, there is before the Congress an Administration proposal for
27
taxes and rebates on new cars, differentiated by their fuel economy.
If it becomes law, this would be by far the most significant attempt
yet to affect consumer behavior in the automotive sector, and the
consequences could be important.
If an individual owns a car, he must still, in any given instance,
decide whether or not to utilize it. When faced with a decision about
taking a given trip, he may decide to forego or postpone it, to take
public transit, to go as a passenger in someone else's car, etc.
In most cases these alternatives will cause less emissions, consume
less fuel, and result in less destruction of person and property.
Transportation control plans, to assist in meeting local ambient air
_ ____ ___ i_____l_____ _
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quality goals have been proposed by EPA; they would include bridge tolls,
parking restrictions, preferential driving lanes for busses and car pools,
etc. Over the past five years these plans have been the subject of intense
political controversy, especially as local politicians, reflecting local
sentiments, have resisted their imposition by the EPA. The number of such
provisions in effect now is far fewer than was once envisioned, and this is
not due to improved air quality. The resistance is a measure of the degree
to which the automobile, used in the driver-only mode, is very often the
strong first
governmental
public goal;
suasion have
travel.
Given a
it is driven
sumption of t
choice among travel options. Car pooling has received increased
support as energy conservation joined emission control as a
again it is hard to imagine that publicity campaigns and moral
any significant incremental effect on the choice of mode in
decision to drive a car for a given trip, the manner in which
can significantly affect the safety, emissions, and fuel con-
:he trip. Rapid starts, hard braking, and high speeds all
increase the fuel consumption, emissions, and safety hazards of driving.
Driving under the influence of alcohol is well known to increase safety
hazards and likewise the use of seat belts can prevent death and injury.
Penalties for violating speed limits and driving under the influence of
alcohol are long standing efforts to affect driver behavior for the purpose
of increasing road safety. Since 1974, of course, the national 55 mph speed
limit has been utilized as a fuel-saving measure as well. The success of
these measures has been mixed at best. Violation of the national speed limit
is widespread - in 1975 most states had average speeds over 55 mph on rural
interstate roads, and in 14 states over 75% of the drivers on such roads
were violating the speed limit.2 8 Despite intensive and long-standing
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publicity campaigns, widespread knowledge of their effectiveness, and
mandatory installation, the utilization rate of seat belts remains at only
29
about 20%. While in both cases substantial benefits have been obtained
by the present levels of compliance, the potential is so much greater that
one can only conclude that most vehicle operators value the time-saving,
comfort, and convenience of high-speed driving without personal restraints
more highly than fuel saved, personal risk, and legal liabilities involved.
Finally, the owner of a vehicle affects its safety, emissions, and
fuel economy by the manner and degree to which he maintains it. Proper
maintenance of the engine will reduce the deterioration in emissions that
occur with vehicle use. The condition of a vehicle's brakes, steering,
tires, and other safety-related equipment have a great influence on the
safety characteristics of the vehicle. Although the owner of a vehicle
rarely deliberately tampers with any of the safety-related items (this was
not the case when the safety-belt buzzers and ignition interlocks were in-
stalled), tampering with pollution control equipment does occur. Clearly,
such tampering reduces the effectiveness of the vehicle emission program.
Maintenance does have an effect on fuel economy, though this effect
is small relative to the changes being sought through the regulatory
program. Mandatory inspection-maintenance programs which have been
proposed as part of EPA's Transportation Control Programs have met
with as much political resistance as the other proposed features.
This discussion points to the relatively simple conclusion that public
policies aimed at meeting national automotive goals through behavior modifi-
cation seem to have been relatively unsuccessful, at least when measured
against the program's own goals. It seems that Americans are strongly
_ ____ _____
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attached to their large automobiles, the freedom of using them in the
driver-only mode, operating them as they see fit, and avoiding maintenance
and other inconveniences. The private automobile is just that - its owner
feels he can go where he likes, when he likes, in the company that he
chooses (if any), and in relative comfort. The true costs, dangers, and
environmental impacts that result from his using his vehicle are difficult
for him to perceive and, when perceived, not valued as highly as public
policy would seem to suggest is appropriate. Further, because the individual
sees that he makes only an infinitesimal contribution to the total damage
(or risks or costs) associated with automobile usage, he feels little in-
centive to alter his behavior. He feels it is too easy to look foolish
and that the procedure of voluntary compliance may not be equitable. The
costs - either direct or indirect, financial, or emotional - of modifying
his behavior for the benefit of society as a whole do not seem worth it to
him. Automobile safety, emissions, and fuel economy do not seem like
real crises to most Americans.
The difficulty of changing individuals' attitudes so that the
impact of the automobile is lessened means that alternative solutions are
usually sought. Normally these other solutions are aimed at modifying ve-
hicle technology. Passive restraints are proposed instead of compulsory seat
belt utilization. Improved fuel consumption is mandated rather than a limit
on gasoline consumed. Emission regulations are promulgated rather than
limiting the number of vehicles in a region. On the basis of the record to
date, the technological approach seems more likely to have an impact than any
behavioral approach.
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4.2 Difficulties in Measuring Regulatory Program Impact
As has been emphasized in the preceding sections, the automotive
regulation attempts to influence a highly complex system. The connection
between the promulgation of regulatory standards and an actual change in the
impact of the automotive fleet is not as strong as often assumed. Promulgated
regulations result in some change in new passenger car technology, but the
regulations only guarantee that a carefully selected fleet of new vehicles
meet specified requirements on special tests; whether or not the marketed
vehicles are actually lower in emissions, safer, or more efficient, is less
clear. Once the vehicles are in the hands of owners and drivers, reductions
in emissions, bodily and property damage, and fuel consumption, depend on
details of how they are maintained and utilized. In the case of air
pollution, the emissions are diffused and convected as they influence
ambient air quality, and, further, the changes in air quality affect in
some complex way the public health and welfare. At each point in the
connecting chain between the standards and the impact, there are factors
external to the system whose influence on actual outcomes is important.
Because the connection is not a simple one, measurements of the actual
impacts are necessary to insure that the desired effects are in fact
taking place. However, the lack of clarity and the noise in the system
make it difficult to sort out exactly what effect each important variable -
including the regulations - is having.
In the safety area, the annual toll of traffic-related deaths and
injuries is known well. Generally, this is reduced to a rate of deaths
(and/or injuries) per passenger (or vehicle)-mile, to correct for the
gross scale effect of changes in the total amount of driving. Beyond
that, correction to sort out the underlying causes in changes in the
_ _. ___ __
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death rate is difficult. The highway death rate declined about 3 1/2% per
year from 1947 to 1960, rose very slightly through 1966, and has declined
monotonically since then by several per cent per year, except for a 15%
drop in 1974 as compared to 1973. Thus, even before the initiation of
national motor vehicle safety regulation with model year 1968, there were
important factors lowering the highway death toll. Factors influencing
the highway death rate include: the age distribution of the driving popu-
lation (young drivers are more accident-prone), the spatial distribution
of driving (e.g. urban v. rural), the range of distribution of the weights
of vehicles on the road (a mix of small and large cars results in more
dangerous collisions than a uniform population of either), the distribution
of speeds (deaths are more likely in high speed collisions, and more
collisions are likely when speeds are diverse), the use of alcohol,
the safety of highway structures (which has been increasing due to govern-
ment programs in that area), changes in the availability and quality of
emergency and long-term medical care, etc.
Clearly the most important change of a safety-related variable in one
year occurred when the national 55 mph speed limit was imposed in early
31
1974, and there is little doubt that it was an important contributor to
the large reduction in the death rate that year. However, the efforts to
actually estimate its impact indicate some of the difficulties with the
much more complicated problem of estimating the impact of the vehicle
standards. According to one recent survey, more than 30 studies have
been carried out to explain improvements in highway safety between 1973
and 1977. Table 1 shows the partial results of three of the studies.
Whether the range of disagreement is reasonable or not depends on the
particular requirements at hand. From the point of view of defending a
1-44
Table 1
Factors Affecting Reduction in Highway Deaths, 1973-7433
Factor AASHTOe NSC GM
Reduced and/or more uniform speeds
Reduction in travel
Reduction in vehicle occupancy
Reduction in night driving
Switch in roads used
Switch to weekday driving
Greater use of safety belts
Historical trend
Other
Decrease in safety due to age of
drivers, use of small cars,
motorcycles, and pedal cycles
Total
48
22
46 35
21 25
13 --
8 24
4 1
5
14a
4
-4 -5
100 100d100
Notes
alncludes better roads, better cars, and increased use of safety belts.
bIncludes improved driver behavior, daylight savings time, safety
belt usage, better roads, cars, and traffic programs.
CIncludes better cars, roads, and law enforcement.
dDoes not add due to rounding.
eAmerican Assocation of State Highway and Transportation Officals,
"Effects of the 55 mph Speed Limit", November, 1974
National Safety Council, "Factors Contributing to the Reduction of
Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities (January - April 1974 vs. January-
April 1973)", October, 1974
gJ.F. Carpenter, "Traffic Fatalities and the Energy Crisis--Four
Month Analysis, January - April 1974", Environmental Activities
Publication No. A-3176 (General Motors Technical Center, Warren,
Michigan), November 20, 1974.
__
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new safety standard in a court, the relevant criterion would be whether there
had been a reduction in "unreasonable risk," that is (in this case) whether
or not the impact on safety was significant. In this case, the criterion
would presumably be met. Actual motor vehicle safety standard cases are
generally much more ambiguous, as no single vehicle design change has had
an impact of nearly this magnitude in any given year.
Of course explaining, afterwards, the causes of a change in the high-
way death toll cannot help in meeting a legislated criterion before the
promulgation of a new regulation. This generally requires an understanding
of the impact of a change in motor vehicle technology on safety of the
vehicle. Such information is crucial both to selecting areas of the
vehicle for the promulgation of standards, i.e. the areas causing safety
problems, as well as justifying them afterwards in court. However, as
discussed in Section 3.2 above, equipment standards are used by NHTSA, and
the connection of the changes resulting from such standards to overall
vehicle safety is generally not well understood.
In the air pollution area, many of the same problems arise. Chapter
2 of this report is a detailed analysis of the measurement and analysis
problems that arise in automotive emissions regulation. In the emissions
area, the problems arise both in conjunction with measuring the impact of
the standards on the actual emissions output of the in-use fleet, and in
understanding how those emissions affect ambient air quality.
Monitoring ambient air quality and understanding how changes in air
quality arise are very difficult technical problems. Even if we assume
perfect measurements of the instrument then, as discussed in Chapter 2,
the large variations in local meteorology, compared to the rate of improve-
ment expected from the regulations, imply that several years' worth of data
are required to reliably measure a trend. However, during those years a
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number of variables concerning the monitoring site can change - the
instrument may be replaced or modified; the site may be changed; a building
may be constructed or-demolished nearby; an industrial plant may close, or
open, or increase or decrease throughput (thus affecting emission output);
the number of vehicles driving in the vicinity of the monitor may change or
the way they are driven may alter. All these things, and more, will affect
the quality of air the monitor is measuring.
To overcome the lack of vehicle-related results from the ambient
monitoring system, EPA obtains data on vehicle emissions by measuring
these emissions directly. To do this a specified test procedure is used,
the same one in fact that is used for certification. However, in actual use
there are many important factors that differ in a systematic fashion. For
example, ambient temperature, pressure, and average driving patterns can
vary from region to region and over time. In addition, the degree to which
a customer maintains his car is likely to be less than factory recommenda-
tions, even discounting the possibility of deliberate tampering with
emission controls. There are many other factors which can vary in actual
use as discussed in Chapter 2. Hence it is uncertain how well the changes
observed from year to year in the vehicle surveillance tests reflect true
changes in vehicle emissions. Even if this is adequate (and it probably
is) the problem remains of identifying the reasons for the high emissions
of in-service vehicles.
Thus, in both the safety and emissions cases it is extremely
difficult to relate regulatory standards to changes in the performance
of vehicles in-use, and also to relate changes in vehicles in-use to
the proximate goals of the program. In the emissions case, there is the
additional problem - probably the toughest empirical problem of all - of
relating changes in ambient air quality to changes in public health and
_ 
_________I
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welfare. In fuel economy many of the same issues arise.
The results of this situation are reasonably clear. As discussed in
Section 3.1, in the emissions and fuel economy areas, the Congress has
set relatively arbitrary statutory goals for vehicle performance. In
the safety area, where regulatory standards are much cruder, a set of
legislative criteria are applied to standards set by NHTSA; NHTSA has had
a very difficult time meeting these criteria and advances in automotive
safety seem to have been much less than in emissions or what is expected
in fuel economy. The gathering of data on the effect of changes in
automotive regulations and the improvement of our understanding of the
physical and behavioral processes underlying such changes are crucial to
improvements in the performance of our regulatory system.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This analysis of the automotive regulatory system has been based on
a view across the three areas of regulation. The most important similarity
between the three regulatory systems is that the principal policy tool
utilized is some sort of mandatory technical constraint -- i.e. a regu-
lation -- rather than any sort of monetary incentive (although the fuel
economy regulation is closer to an incentive scheme than the others). The
most important difference between the systems is the type of standard
utilized within the regulatory system; this has great influences on nearly
every other aspect of the system. In emissions control , the regulation
is a set of three quantitative emissions limits--performance standards on
the vehicle as a whole -- which must be met by every vehicle produced. In
safety, the standards are generally equipment standards in that they
specify in a relatively constraining fashion the requirements for par-
ticular vehicle subsystems. In fuel economy, the standard is an average
imposed in each manufacturer's entire sales fleet. Thus, in air pollution
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and fuel economy, as compared to safety, numerical standards are written
which bear directly on the relevant national goal.
This distinction between vehicle (or fleet) performance standards and
equipment standards is crucial because of the way the standards are used.
In both the emissions and fuel economy cases the Congress has taken it
upon itself to choose very stringent, and more-or-less arbitrary (90%
reduction in emissions in five years, doubling of fuel economy in ten),
numerical goals, not readily attainable with the technology available at
the time of promulgation. Thus, they have put tremendous pressure on the
industry to develop technological fixes which could be implemented within
the timing constraints of the standards. This has meant very "incremental"
technical changes in the case of air pollution; more substantial changes
can be accomplished under the timing and fleet-averaging of the fuel
economy regulations. In safety the situation has been very different.
The burden of discovering, developing, and proving the feasibility of new
safety technology lies almost entirely on the regulatory agency. The
agency must support technical efforts to develop safety innovations, and
then defend them as necessary to prevent "unreasonable risk", and as
"appropriate", "objective", and "practicable", through the regulatory pro-
cedure and often into the courts. Thus the emission and fuel economy
programs have been able to be more aggressive than the safety program.
The safety agency is working to develop quantitative vehicle safety
performance criteria. However, these efforts have not been a high priority
item since the initial passive restraint standard, which was written as a
quantitative vehicle performance standard, was thrown out in court (for not
being "objective") in 1972. The analysis here would indicate that the
setting of quantitative performance criteria in the legislation itself can
have significant advantages for the regulatory agency, well beyond those
·_· ____
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associated with a particular technical option such as the air bag.
Insights in a number of other areas come from laying out and com-
paring the three regulatory stsems. In each case there have been and are
substantial government-supported research and development programs de-
signed to produce major technical advances -- e.g., the advanced
automotive power systems and the "safety vehicles" -- but the government
has not been able to work these innovations into the system. In fact, a
major flaw in the safety and emissions regulatory systems is their in-
ability either to stimulate, or even accept, major technological innovations.
The use of fleet averaging in the fuel economy regulations offers the
flexibility to handle major changes, and the incentive structure encourages
such changes more than those of the emissions or safety systems.
In each case the regulatory programs have been accompanied by attempts
to modify the vehicle buying or operating behavior of the public, but to
little apparent avail. The difficulty of changing people's habits in this
area is best illustrated by the low percentage of motorists who wear seat
belts. Talk of compulsory seat belt laws has been heard for fifteen years,
but most individuals still do not seem ready to accept this "behavioral
fix." Similarly, programs to save fuel by driving slower and to reduce
emissions by forming car pools or using public transport have not been
notably successful.
In each case there are formidable difficulties in measuring the real
impact of the programs beyond the visible changes in new vehicles. This
leaves the benefits of the regulatory standards open to serious questions.
After approximately a decade of safety and emissions regulation, it is still
not possible to predict accurately what effect a proposed standard will have
on death and injury rates, or on air quality. This statement reflects as
much the difficulties of the problem as the lack of attention to it, although
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in both the safety and emissions areas there would appear to be a significant
role for improved and expanded monitoring and surveillance systems.
Aside from offering a perspective on the automotive regulatory system
which is seen nowhere outside of the automotive manufacturers themselves,
the comparative view of the three areas of automotive regulation offers
insights into the system which might not otherwise be available. Thus,
while there are significant flaws and problems in the automotive regu-
latory systems, some of which are consistent across the three areas of
regulation, there are important points where the differences seem to offer
room for useful improvements.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This review is taken from D.L. Rothberg, "The U.S. Government's
Automotive Safety Program; A Preliminary Examination", MIT Energy
Laboratory Working Paper MIT-EL 76-029 WP (MIT, Cambridge,
December, 1976).
2. R. Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (Grossman, N.Y., 1965).
3. Automotive safety regulation is now administered by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the Department of
Transportation.
4. A detailed description of the legislative and administrative histories
of the Clean Air Act is given in C.R. Frey, " A Legislative and
Administrative History of Automotive Emissions Control," unpublished
MIT Energy Laboratory Internal Working Note, February, 1977.
5. See Chapter 5 of this report for a detailed analysis of the events
leading to the passage of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.
6. P.L. 89-563, 8 stat. 718, Sec. 103(a).
7. Ibid., Sec. 102(2).
8. Ibid., Sec. 102(1).
9. D.S. Barth, et al., "Federal Motor Vehicle Emission Goals for CO, HC,
and NO Bases on Desired Air Quality Levels," presented at annual
x
meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association (St. Louis, June,
1970), and reprinted in "Air Pollution -- 1970, Part-5," Hearings
Before the U.S. Senate Public Works Committee (Government Printing
Office, Washington, September, 1970).
10. See Chapter 2 of this report for a detailed descussion of the assump-
tion underlying the rollback model used by Barth.
11. See Chapter 4 of this report for a discussion of the importance of
symbolism in regulation, and Chapter 5 for the details of the role
of the 90% figure in the formulation of the 1970 amendments.
12. Although the law is clear in its intent, in practice a significant
number of vehicles are produced which do not meet the standards.
13. See Chapter 3 of this report for a discussion of the fuel economy
averaging procedure.
14. It should be noted that the penalty structure (for violations) in the
three areas is different. Most significantly the fuel economy penalty
is non-prohibitive ($50 civil fine per car for each mile-per-gallon
the actual fleet average differs from the standard), while in
emissions and safety it is prohibitive. Of course a manufacturer may
........ "~" ^-~ ~~ 11"1~
1-52
decide that the cost of violating the fuel economy standard is
significantly more than just the fine, so it may in fact be
viewed as prohibitive as well. Here we will not consider the
possibility of conscious violations of the fuel economy standards.
15. Or even during a production run -- in 1975 Ford found that its
competitors' models had better fuel economy and were thus selling
better. As a result Ford modified the emission controls so as to
obtain better mileage. These models were known as the "MPG" models.
16. Chapter 3 of this report analyzes the alternatives to meeting the
fleet average fuel economy standards with technology changes.
17. See W.J. Abernathy and J.M. Utterback, "Innovation and the Evolution
of Technology in the firm, unpublished Harvard Business School Paper
HBS 75-18R,for a discussion of the concept of a "dominant design."
18. While this is very likely, the degree to which it is true is not well
known. See Chapter 3 of this report for a discussion of the relation
of the emissions performance standard to actual in-use emissions.
19. The consolidation was first proposed in "Program Plan for Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards," (NHTSA, June, 1970).
20. This is the subject of Chapter 3 of this report.
21. U.S. Government Accounting Office, "Improvements Needed in Planning
and Using Motor Vehicle Safety Research", (Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1974), p.32.
22. See Rothberg, op. cit., for a fuller discussion of the objectives
and activities of the ESV and RSV programs and the relationships
between the two programs.
23. See Appendix of J.B. Heywood, H.D. Jacoby and L.H. Linden, "The Role
for Federal R&D on Alternative Automotive Power Systems", MIT Energy
Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL 74-013 (MIT, Cambridge, 1974) for a
detailed history of the AAPS program.
24. S. Luchter and R. Renner, "An Assessment of the Technology for Rankine
Engines for Automobiles' ERDA Rept. 77-54 (U.S. Energy Research and
Development Administration, Washington, 1977), p. 76.
25. The emissions legislation does permit a differentiation of standards
to be met by vehicles sold in California. NHTSA has on occasion
allowed certain small segments of the new car sales to meet a
standard less stringent than the remainder. In both cases there
is no explicit legislative authority for such differentiation and
the agencies would likely run into significant legal problems were
they to explicitly allow a phasing in of a regulatory change.
26. See L.H. Linden, et al., "Federal Support for the Development of
Alternative Automotive Power Systems; the General Issue and the
Stirling, Diesel and Electric Cases", MIT Energy Laboratory Report
MIT-EL 76-014 (MIT, Cambridge, 1976), Section 3.2, for a detailed
· · I_ _I ___ ·
1-53
analysis of the incentives seen by the automobile industry for the
development of advanced powerplants.
27. See Chapter 3 of this report for a brief discussion of the proposal
tax-rebate as a supplement to the present fuel economy standards.
28. U.S. Government Accounting Office, "55 mph Speed Limit; Is It Achievable?,"
U.S.G.A.O. Report No. CED-77-27 (Government Printing Office,,Washington,
1977). p.6.
29. W.T. Coleman, "Decision Concerning Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash
Protection," (U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington,
December 6, 1976), p. 29.
30. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1970 Report on Activities,
(U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, 1971), p. A12, and
, 1975 Report on Activities (U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, Washington, 1976), p. 7.
31. The national limit effectively became law on January 4, 1975, when the
Federal Aid Highway Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 96-643), were signed.
It prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from approving any
federal aid for highway construction in states that do not establish
and enforce a 55 mhp speed limit. It followed a similar but
temporary law (P.L. 93-239) which had been signed on January 2, 1974,
and implemented by all fifty states by March 3, 1974.
32. U.S.G.A.O., op. cit., p. 7.
33. Adapted from U.S.G.A.O., op. cit.
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Chapter 2
UNCERTAINTIES IN REGULATION OF AUTOMOTIVE EMISSIONS
by
Michael K. Martin
1. Introduction and Overview
One of the most striking aspects about government regulation of
automotive air pollution is the numerous uncertainties which exist in
the underlying analysis linking regulation to improvements in public welfare.
It is sufficient merely to examine the responses of other countries to the
problem of air pollution, based on essentially the same information, to
realize that reasonable people can disagree over what can and should be
done about the problem. Some of this difference is of course due to
political and economic considerations, but much is attributable to the fact
that substantially different proposals can be supported by essentially
the same scientific data.
This chapter argues that substantial uncertainties do exist in the
underlying basis for emissions regulation, that they are important, and
that recognition of these uncertainties leads to a particular view of how
regulation should work in this area. The basic contrast is between a
static and a dynamic view of regulation. The current system tends to
reflect the former view--goals are set based on a combination of judgment
and available data, and regulations are promulgated to meet these goals.
These regulations become the focus for controversy and, once set, tend to
remain fixed. The dynamic view, on the other hand, takes as central
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the fact that the informational basis for regulation is uncertain, and that
best judgments in key areas are apt to shift with time as knowledge
improves. In this view, the focus is on the quality of current information
and on the establishment of mechanisms to ensure that that information is
continuously updated. This viewpoint will be set forth in more detail
later; the reasoning is akin to that of a legislator advocating legislative
oversight, or an engineer building in system feedback.
This chapter is an analysis of the sources and magnitudes of uncer-
tainties in our knowledge of the automotive emissions regulatory system.
Ability to predict the future results of a policy-related action--especially
a change in standards--will be addressed along with our ability to
know, i.e., to measure what is happening at any given time.
Before proceeding, however, it is well to consider in a bit more
detail just why uncertainties matter. That is, how regulatory behavior
should be different as a result of these imperfections in knowledge, as
compared to the actions which would be taken if there were perfect
knowledge.
(i) The need for flexibility. As time goes on it is likely that
many uncertainties will be resolved by improved modeling,
surveillance data, etc. It is important that regulation not
be "locked in" based upon false confidence in the certitude
of predicted effects.
(ii) The need for surveillance. The greater the degree of uncer-
tainty, the greater the need for surveillance to assure that
progress is being made in meeting goals. Surveillance often
can both detect and aid in diagnosing problems; an example
is automobile field surveillance. The amount of funds that can
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be justified for such a program is proportional to the social
costs incurred in over or undershooting the emission goal.
For automobiles, this is a large sum of money.
(iii) The need for safety factors. Society, like most persons,
is risk averse--a sure thing is preferred to a gamble--
and extra expenditures can be justified for improved assurance
of meeting goals. In the automotive case, presumably it is
desirable to aim for emissions less than those thought to be
tolerable, to allow for the possibility that the actual air
quality improvement will, for some unforeseen reason, be
less than predicted. The "safety factor" to use depends on both
the degree of uncertainty, which can be roughly estimated
quantitatively, and society's degree of risk aversion, which can
only be estimated judgmentally.
(iv) The need for research. The most obvious response to uncertainty
is to attack it directly. For example, it was exploratory
research that discovered the possible problem of sulfate emissions
from catalyst-equipped vehicles. In areas where uncertainties
are very large, research may be the only practical response
available.
Uncertainties are gaps in our knowledge. An analysis of the un-
tainties in emissions regulation must begin with a look at the knowledge
which is or could be utlized in that system. Figure 1 is a schematic
showing the key variables in the system, and the crucial connections
between those variables. The system is divided into the conventional units
of analysis.
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Two types of connections are shown. The set of links going from
left to right indicates the chain of events which is intitiated when
new regulations are promulgated. Each link represents the causal relation-
ship whereby one variable, say in-use emissions, is dependent on a
previous one, say new car emissions. Each of these links combines tech-
nical and behavioral elements depending on both the underlying laws of
nature and the choices of people or institutions. An understanding of
these relationships is the key to the ability to predict the future
impact of a change in emission regulations, and less than perfect
knowledge leads to predictive uncertainties.
The set of links going from right to left are feedback links. They
indicate that information on the state of the system at any given time
can be used to change the emissions regulations. These are policy
relationships, in that the regulatory authority can set the emissions
standards. Here the interest is not in prediction, but instead in
measurement; it is not possible to have useful feedback unless the
actual state of the system at any given time can first be determined.
Uncertainties here refer to the limits of our ability to know that state
exactly. Three feedback links are shown in Figure 1.
Assembly line testing generates information concerning actual new
car emissions; surveillances rating is used to measure the emission
of the in-use vehicle fleet; and air quality monitoring tests the ambient
impact of the vehicle emissions and can be used to make inferences
about those emissions. Each can help in setting emissions standards.
Because an understanding of the causal relationships is necessary
background for the remainder of this chapter, a brief discussion of
the forward links of Figure 1 now follows. Starting at the left, a given
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schedule of standards will typically have as its aim the introduction
into general use of new emission control technology, and thus changed
emissions of the vehicle fleet. However, it must must be recognized that
the process of forcing new technology into use is dynamic, in that the
time pattern of introduction is sensitive to details of the regulation;
and it is uncertain, since creation of new technology cannot always be
induced by legislation or other pressure. Neither of these aspects
of the problem are well understood.
One example of this is provided by the "original" model year 1976
automotive emissions standards. These standards, mandated by the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970, were intended to "put industry's feet to the
fire"--to force the development of new and presumably unconventional
technology. However, due to the short lead times in the act, the industry
concentrated on the safer course of evolutionary changes in the ICE, instead
of the revolutionary advances anticipated by Congress. Attempting to
force technological change is clearly risky; the mere promulgation of a stan-
dard does not ensure that it will be met.
The second foward link is that between the performance of new
technology under laboratory conditions and its performance in the
field, in the hands of ordinary car owners. In a standard auto emissions
test, the vehicle is required to stand for 12 hours at 68-86° F; it is
then pushed onto a chassis dynamometer, connected to measuring equip-
ment, and driven through a speed-time schedule representative of Los
Angeles metropolitan traffic. Twenty mintues later the vehicle is
restarted and run through the first part of the driving cycle again.
Thes- "cold start" and "hot transient" emissions measurements are com-
2-7
bined in a weighted average (meant to reflect the typical ratio of
hot starts to cold starts) and the resultant values are the reported
emissions. The vehicles used for certification testing are carefully
pre-tuned to factory specifications and follow a prescribed maintenance
schedule as they accumulate mileage.
Obviously in actual use there are many important factors that
differ from those experienced under standard test conditions. For example,
ambient temperature, pressure, and average driving cycle can vary
systematically from region to region and over time. In addition, the
degree to which a customer maintains his car is likely to be less than
the factory recommends, even discounting the possibility of tampering
with emission controls.
The third forward link is the one which relates emissions, aggregated
over some suitiable time scale and area, to a measure of air quality.
Though only automotive emissions have been mentioned so far, obviously
a detailed knowledge of all emissions is necessary to complete this
link. Presently a variety of mathematical models are available for
quantifying this relationship, although none is very accurate.
Under the current regulatory structure, air pollution goals are
set in terms of levels not to be exceeded more than once a year--pre-
sumably anywhere within an air quality region. With this definition
of the goal of emission regulation there is no reason to carry a
technical analysis any further. In a more basic sense, however, it is
clear that improvement in public health (and welfare) is the real
attribute of interest, and so it is worthwhile to look at how this
is related to air pollution levels.
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The next link of interest, then, is the one relating air pollution
levels to population exposure. Little is currently known about this
link, since it is difficult to characterize the movements of people in
and through urban areas, and to relate air pollutant levels inside
vehicles and buildings to those outside. Obviously, however, most
of the population is exposed to levels less than the maximum for most of
the time. Therefore, most of the population should enjoy an additional
margin of safety over and above that provided by the ambient air
quality standards.
The final forward link relates pollutant exposure to effects
on human health and welfare. This is a' subject with its own vast literature.
The most recent review of the evidence on the health effects of air pollu-
tants is that of the National Academy of Sciences , which concluded that
although the database available for setting the standards was unsatis-
factory, there did not exist substantial basis for changing the standards.
On the whole, there seems to be a consensus that the health effects of
low levels of pollutants are known only very approximately. In addition,
there is a growing feeeling that the traditional six pollutants (HC, CO,
NO , O , SO , TSP) represent only the tip of the iceberg, and that
x x x
unregulated pollutants (e.g., sulfates, PAN, nitrates) may in fact represent
a greater danger.
In this chapter uncertainties in four of the links in the automotive
regulatory system are analyzed; measurement uncertainties are analyzed
on two feedback links, and predictive uncertainties at two forward links.
In Section 2 current ability to measure and to predict in-use emissions is
addressed. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 deal with link 2, focussing on EPA's
______
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surveillance program and the extent of the resulting knowledge concerning
in-use emission; and Section 2.3 deals with link 1, the relationship
of in-use emissions to new car emissions. A thorough understanding of
this relationship is necessary for predictions of in-use emissions,
given new car emissions. Section 3 deals with uncertainties in air quality.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 adress problems in the definition and measurement
of air quality, respectively; together they deal with how well it is
possible to know what the air quality is, so that it can be used in a
feedback mode in link 4. Section 3.3 deals with the predictive side
of air quality, link 3. For each of these links the goal of the
analysis is to provide a quantitative estimate for the uncertainty
in our knowledge of the relevant parameters, but no attempt is made to
actually improve that knowledge.
In Section 4 such an attempt is made, as link 4 is explored
in detail and a model developed to allow inferences to be made from
monitoring data about how air quality is actually changing at
a particular site in Boston. The crux of the model is the relationship
between ambient air quality and meteorological conditions.
Finally, in Section 5, the results of these analyses are summarized
with a crude aggregation of the uncertainties, and a set of conclusions
is drawn.
2. Uncertainties in Measuring and Predicting Aggregate Emissions
In keeping with the thrust of this chapter, only uncertainties in
automotive emissions will be discussed. (Uncertainties in other sources
of HC, CO, and NO matter as well, of course). Uncertainties in
X
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measuring aggregate emissions arise both from uncertainties in the field
surveillance data used and from uncertainties in the realism of the
method used to form the measure. Therefore, after a brief summary of
the EPA surveillance program, these two sources of uncertainty will
be examined in turn. Finally, and in light of this examination, uncer-
tainties in predictions of aggregate emissions will be discussed.
2.1 The EPA Field Surveillance Program
Virtually every year since the late 1960's has witnessed some
study to improve our characterization and evaluation of emissions from
vehicles. Table 1 summarizes a number of these studies. Over the years,
the Federal Test Procedure (FTP) for exhaust emissions has changed several
times, and so much of the earlier data are not directly comparable to
more recent data using the 1975 FTP.
Although the 1975 FTP is the basis for certification of vehicles in
meeting exhaust emission standards, some effort has gone into characterizing
emissions under other conditions. Thus in more recent programs, emissions
over a wide range of speeds and loads have also been measured for each
test vehicle. As will be discussed later, these modal emission can (with
appropriate assumptions) be used to estimate emissions over driving
cycles different from that of the 1975 FTP. In addition, some effort has
gone into investigating the effects of vehicle loading, air conditioner
usage, and ambient temperature. More recently, highway fuel economy testing
(HwFET) has been added, and key mode and various short test cycles have been
investigated in an attempt to find a less expensive way of measuring
emissions.
_____
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Table 1
Past and Ongoing Emission Factor Programs
Year Program Title No. of Type of Test Test
Vehicles Vehicles Sites Procedures
FY 68 Rental Vehicle Survei- 1968 and 1969 Los Angeles 7 X 7 FTP
ilance Program 705 automobiles Detroit
FY 69 The Great Plains Sur-
veillance Program 2029 1968 and 1969 Houston 7 X 7 FTP
light-duty Kansas City
FY 70 The National Surveil-
lance Program-Phase I 2101 1970 light- Houston 7 X 7 FTP
duty Kansas City
Los Angeles
Detroit
Denver
Washington
FY 70 The National Surveil-
lance Program-Phase II 369 1971 light- Houston 7 X 7 FTP
duty Los Angeles
Detroit
Denver
FY 70 A Surveillance Study
of Smoke from heavy-
of Smoke from heavy- 64 1970 and 1971 San Antonio Chassis Dynamometerduty Diesel-Powered heavy-duty adaption of 1970
Vehicles-Southwestern FTPFTP
USA
FY 70 A Surveillance Study of 145 1970-1972 San Antonio Chassis Dynamo-
Emissions from heavy-duty meter version of
Gasoline-Powered Vehicles- 1970 FTP, Over-the
Southwestern USA road testing
FY 71 A Study of Emission from 1957-1971 Chicago 1972/1975 CVS
Light-Duty Vehicles in light-duty St. Louis FTP, Evaporative
Six Cities, FY 71 1020 Denver Emissions, Modal
Washington Emissions
Los Angeles
Houston
FY 72 A Study of Emissions 1020 1966-1972 Chicago 1972/1975 CVS
from Light-Duty Vehicles St. Louis FTP, Evaporative
in Six Cities, FY 72 Denver Emissions
Washington
Los Angeles
Houston
reproduced from the reference in footnote 2.
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Table 1 (continued)
Year Program Title No. of Types of
Vehicles Vehicles
Test
Sites
Test
Procedures
FY 73 Acquisition of Diesel
FY 73 Acquisition of Diesel 10 1970-1973 San Antonio Chassis Dynamo-Truck Operational meter version of
Parameters and Emissions
1970 FTP Over-
the-road testing
FY 73 A Study of Emissions 1967-74 Detroit B72/1975 CVS FTP,
from Light-Duty 1080 St. Louis Modal Emissions,
Vehicles in Six Cities Denver Evaporative Emi-
FY 73 Newark ssions, Loaded
Los Angeles Vehicle Tests, Air
Houston Conditioning Tests,
Aldehydes and Light
HC, Sound Level
Tests, I/M Corre-
lation Tests
FY 73 Mass Emissions from 10 1965-1969 San Antonio Chassis Dynamo-
Precontrolled Heavy meter version of
Duty Gasoline-Powered 1970 FTP, Over-
Vehicles the-road testing
FY 73 Ambient temperature 26 1967-1975 Bureau of 1975 FTP
and Light-Duty Mines
Vehicle Emissions
FY 74 A Study of Emissions 1965-1975 Chicago 1975 FTP FTP,
from Light-Duty 1968 Denver HWFET, Modal,
Vehicles in Seven Houston Key Mode, Two
Cities Phoenix Short Cycles,
Washington Two Other Tran-
St. Louis sient Cycles,
Los Angeles Aldehydes and
Light HC
FY 74 Heavy-Duty Emission 30 1965-1975 San Antonio Steady State,
Factor Testing Program Sinusoidal, Tran-
(Gas and Diesel) sient Cycles, FTP
FY 75 Study of Emissions from 1972-1976 To be deter- 1975 FTP, HwFET,
6000-8500 pound GVW 250 mined Modal
Vehicles
FY 75 Study of Emissions 200 1973-1976 To be deter- Proposed FTP,
from Motorcycles mined HwFET, Modal
FY 75 Study of Emissions from
Light-Duty Vehicles in 2220
Seven Cities
1968-1976 Chicago
St. Louis
Phoenix
Houston
Denver
Washington
Los Angeles
1975 FTP, HwFET,
Modal Tests,
Short Cycles
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This continuing program, involving only a few thousand vehicles
each year, is the primary basis for monitoring progress in meeting
emission goals. The following section will look at the accuracy of
estimation of current emissions from light duty vehicles and the
limitations inherent in the test program.
2.2 Uncertainties in Current Aggregate Emissions
EPA has set forth a straightforward and logical methodology for estimating
aggregate emissions from light duty vehicles. The methodology takes
as its starting point measured emissions, using the certification test
procedure, from in-use vehicles of various model years. It is explicitly
recognized that emissions in the field will differ from those of the
test procedure due to differences in operating patterns and ambient condi-
tions. Thus, there are a number of "correction factors" which are used
to modify the basic "emission factors." The various data used can be
summarized as follows:
1) base exhaust emission factors, disaggregated by model year,
calendar year, altitude, and location (California vs. U.S.)
2) base evaporative and crankcase HC emissions, by model year and
location
3) correction factors for average driving cycle speed, by model
year, altitude and location.
4) correction factors for average ambient temperature
5) correction factors for cold/hot start weighting
G) data on age distribution of vehicles and average mileage
accumulation rate of vehicles by age of vehicle
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Data are readily available to estimate the uncertainties in base
exhaust emission factors. Table 2 shows the large variability of measured
emissions among individual vehicles of a given age and model year. In
some cases, the sample standard deviation even exceeds the mean, indicating
a highly skewed distribution since emissions must be positive. In calcu-
lating aggregate emissions, however, average emission factors are used,
and these will both have a smaller sample variance and be more symmetrically
distributed about their respective means.
Table 2 shows the uncertainties in base emission factors (i.e., emissions
over the 1975 FTP, averaged over all vehicles of the same model year) for
each model year, as measured by two times the sample standard deviation s
(approximate 95% confidence intervals) and expressed both in absolute terms
and as a percentage of the corresponding average, e. These differ systematically
for each pollutant, are most stable when expressed as a percentage of the
corresponding mean, and are strongly affected by the sample size. It is
worth looking at the resultant uncertainty in aggregate emissions, setting
all correction factors to 1.0 (i.e., no correction), and this is done for
CO in calendar year 1975 in Table 4. The weighting factors represent the
fraction of total vehicle miles travelled attributable to autos of
various ages; they were excerpted from the reference given in footnote
3, and are roughly correct for this application. As can be seen, the
uncertainty stemming from emission factor uncertainty is rather small--about
4% for CO. It is slightly higher for HC and lower for NO .
Buried in this analysis, however, is an implicit assumption that
base emission factors are the same for all non-California non-high-altitude
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Table 3: Uncertainty in Base Exhaust Emission Factor in 1975
All cities except L.A. and Denver 4
2s/e (%)
Year
65-67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
N
126
77
88
99
113
176
128
193
587
N
126
77
88
99
113
176
128
193
587
Year
65-67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
HC
15
23
13
29
22
16
9
10
8
HC
1.34
1.53
.776
1.54
1.17
.678
.314
.341
.085
CO NO
x
9
12
10
10
13
14
16
9
8
2s (g/mi)
CO
9.32
10.2
8.21
6.40
7.06
7.34
7.14
3.70
1.94
9
11
9
7
7
6
10
7
3
NO
x
.257
.406
.365
.267
.250
.223
.286
.201
.083
-
-
.C- ---- ·--·------"·---"-·...-----------r`-· 
- ---- -- ---1-11---- 

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Table 4: Sample Calculation of Uncertainty for CO in 1975
Due to Base Emission Factor Uncertainy
.155
.072
.083
.086
.106
.122
.125
.135
.116
e
109
82.6
78.5
63.9
52.7
51.8
45.3
41.8
22.9
2 S (e)
9.32
10.2
8.21
6.40
7.06
7.34
7.14
3.70
1.94
W (2S(e))
2.08
.539
.464
.302
.560
.801
.796
.250
.051
2S (e) = 2.42 g/mi
2 S(e)/e = 4.0%
Year W
pre 68
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
e = 60.7 g/mi
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cities. This assumption has not been verified; the data are insufficient
to either accept or reject it as a statistical hypothesis. There are
reasons to expect that "city effects" do exist. For example, air
conditioner usage is probably much higher in Houston than Seattle, and
vehicle maintenance is presumably better than average in places which have
mandatory emissions inspection and maintenance programs. City effects
could be quite large and still remain undetected, since the number of
vehicles tested in any one city is relatively small. If the possibility
of city effects is allowed, then uncertainty in aggregate emissions
for any given city is probably two to four times the figure originally
calculated.
Data for base evaporative emissions are somewhat sketchier, and so
warrant a crude approach here. Reference 5 gives data for diurnal and
hot soak evaporative emissions, and the respective standard deviations,
for 126 Los Angeles vehicles. For this pooled data, using the method
of AP-42 supplement 53 to convert to g/mile figures, the uncertainty in the
average is about .14 g/mi or 6%. This is for an average evaporative
emission rate of 2.35 g/mi, and so adds a few percent to uncertainty
in aggregate HC emissions for uncontrolled and partially controlled vehicles.
Fuel tank running losses add uncertainties of the same order.
Crankcase HC emissions are usually estimated to be eligible for
post-1967 vehicles (post-1963 for California). For uncontrolled vehicles,
emissions are about 4.1 g/mi, but it is not clear how accurate this number
is--it is referenced in AP-42 to an unpublished internal EPA report. It
is possible only to speculate about the merits of the assumption that
current crankcase HC controls are completely effective; there is evidence6
that many PCV systems are partially or fully clogged on in-use vehicles,
but no measurements of resultant emissions could be found in the
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literature. If the average effectiveness were 90% instead of 100%,
this would result in HC emissions as large as the statutory exhaust
standard.
In recognition of the fact that emissions in normal operation
differ systematically from those measured by the 1975 FTP, several
"correction factors" have been developed. These are applied as
multiplicative factors to modify the base emission factor and, as
currently used, attempt to compensate for deviation from test proce-
dure values of three parameters: average driving cycle speed, ambient
temperature, and proportion of starts from a fully-cooled down
state.
Uncertainties in speed correction factors can arise in several ways.
7
These factors are derived by using the modal emission model and a number
of representative driving cycles at various average route speeds to cal-
culate what the emissions would be over that cycle. The calculated values
are fit, for each class of vehicles, to a simple function of route
speed and normalized to form correction factors. It is assumed that the
factors, which strictly speaking only apply to hot start emissions, can
be used to correct cold start values. Uncertanties can arise from this
assumption, from differences in actual and calculated emissions, and from
unexplained variance in the fitting process. The latter is the
smallest source, amounting to only about 3-4% for HC and CO, and 5-6%
8
for NO . This goodness of fit may just be an artifact of the modal
model, however, which would produce numbers lacking the "noise" found in
real data. Unfortunately, discrepancies between calculated and actual
emissions are about the same size as those between replicate testings,
and so it is hard to estimate this uncertainty.
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Temperature correction factors attempt to compensate for the sub-
stantial change in emissions as ambient temperature varies over the range
encountered in use. Current factors are based on only a small number of vehi-
cles--26--and are unreliable at high temperatures. From the raw data9
the uncertainty in the correction factor can be estimated. The uncertainty
in these factors, and the hot/cold start correction, will be presented in the
final version of this report.
2.3 Uncertainties in Predicting Aggregate Emissions
The accuracy with which emission can be predicted for future years
depends strongly on the time period of the forecast. For short run predic-
tions, the uncertainties are roughly the same as the measurement uncertainties,
while for long run forecasts, they become difficult to estimate since the con-
figuration of future vehicles is simply not known. Assuming a given, fixed set
of standards which are met by new vehicles, the following factors (each with its
associated uncertainty) are needed to calculate aggregate emissions:
1) emissions of current cars in future years (i.e., the deter-
ioration of current emissions)
2) base emission factors of future new cars (since they usually will
exceed the standards when new)
3) deterioration of emissions in use of future new cars
4) deficiencies of the 1975 FTP for use with future vehicles (e.g.,
temperature, driving cycle, altitude effects)
5) number of vehicles of each model year in the vehicle fleet;
(characteristic driving patterns for each age of vehicle)
Each of the above factors is uncertain, but lack of data (caused by
a lack of future vehicles in hand to test) makes estimation of the
uncertainties very difficult. In addition, some of the individual uncer-
tainties are functions of the forecast period. Predictions are often made
for 10 to 15 years into the future. Uncertainties in these
_____ __I______
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predictions are strongly dependent on uncertainties about cars which do
not yet exist, and could easily be a factor of two or three. For example,
after less than one year of operation (the average odometer reading was
8,800 miles) 1975 vehicles were emitting 22.9 g/mi of CO on average
(Denver and Los Angeles excluded) as compared to the 49 state standard
of 15 g/mi. Considering that manufacturers normally target low mileage
emissions at about 1/2 of the standard in order to assure themselves
of meeting the durability requirements of the certification test (inten-
ded to insure that the standards are still met after 5(;,000 miles), this
is rapid deterioration. It was not predictable, nor, in the context of
current certification procedures, preventable.
Similarly, there are problems, based on limited data, with the sensi-
tivity of catalyst-based emission controls to ambient temperature, cold
starting, maintenance, etc. In each case, the conclusion would be that
the effects are large but differ among specific systems. What is clear
from this was also implicit in the analysis of current emissions: meeting
a given standard based on the certification test procedure provides only
a limited amount of information about what emissions actually will be
in use. Too many important things happen in the field that are not captured
by the test procedure. It is dangerous to assume that a numerical
standard implies that cars will emit at that level. Though that may
be the best estimate available, it is not likely to be a very accurate
one.
While uncertainties in current aggregate emissions are limited
mainly by the size and scope of surveillance activities, it seems that in
the medium to long run predictions of aggregate emissions are inherently
much more uncertain. When emission standards become fixed and control
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systems settle into a few predictable configurations, this may no longer
be true. However, that day still lies far in the future.
Given the large uncertainty in emissions from future vehicles,
it appears that extensive field surveillance combined with mechanisms
for fast and flexible regulatory response are necessary to assure, on
a continuing basis, that emissions goals are being met in use. A good
portion of the surveillance should be devoted to further investigating
the known weaknesses of the 1975 FTP in reflecting actual emissions.
In addition, an ongoing program of exploratory research should be
established to probe for test procedure problems not now recognized
and to look for unanticipated side effects of the regulations--e.g.,
sulfate emissions.
3. Uncertainties in Measuring and Predicting Trends in Air Quality
This section will investigate uncertainties in measuring and
predicting changes in air quality (links 1 and 4 of figure 1). First,
some of the complications involved in realistically defining "air quality"
will be discussed. Next, some of the general limitations on ability to
measure air pollution trends will be examined. A more detailed case study
of trends at one site is deferred until Section 4. Finally, uncertainties
involved in using models to predict air quality will be investigated.
Since it is by far the most widely usely of these models, the rollback
model will be singled out for detailed study.
3.1 The Definition of Air Quality
Prior to analyzing "air quality," it is necessary to decide what
the term means. Obviously "air quality" is closely related to air
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pollutant concentrations in an area, but it is far from obvious exactly
what characteristic of a set of concentration data one might single
out as directly reflecting air quality. A good part of the difficulty
arises from the fact that there are many questions that one might want
to answer based upon the data, and each kind of question gives rise to
a different summary statistic. For simplicity, attention can be limited
to two questions:
1) What is the estimated rate of improvement (or degradation)
in public health?
2) What is the estimated rate of reduction in emissions?
As was previously noted, the first question gives rise to some
fundamental problems--those of assessing population exposure and dose-
response relationships--for which there is no neat answer. For regulatory
purposes, air pollution standards have arisen as the baseline against
which health impact is assessed. Since the degree of compliance with
the standards is such a widely-used method for summarizing air quality
data, it is important to understand exactly what the standards are and
how data are interpreted with respect to them. The following subsections
summarize this information.
The legal definition of air quality
The Clean Air Act1 0 as amended by the Clean Air Amendments of 197011
required the Administrator of EPA to promulgate, within 120 days, national,
primary and secondary air quality standards for all "criteria pollutants"--
those for which air quality criteria had been previously published. Primary
standards were to be those:1
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"...the attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the adminstrator based on such criteria
and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
requisite to protect the public health."
Secondary standards were to specify a level of air quality1 3
"...the attainment and maintenance of which...is
requisite to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient
air."
On April 30, 1971, the ambient air quality standards were
promulgated. The standards refer to average concentrations over
various time periods. For averaging times less than 1 year, the standards
,,14are "...not to be exceeded more than once per year," while for
annual averages they are presumably not to be exceeded at all. In
these regulations, "ambient air" is defined as:
"...that portion of the atmosphere, external to
buildings, to which the general public has access"
The regulations also specify in detail the acceptable "reference
methods" for measuring pollutant concentrations, while allowing
the administrator to approve "equivalent methods."
To determine compliance with the standards, some form of
monitoring is of course required. Congress left the details up
to the judgment of the EPA and the states, via the state implementation
plan mechanism, requiring that the implementation plan include:1 6
______
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"...provision for establishment and operation of
appropriate devices, methods, systems, and procedures
necessary to monitor, compile, and analyze data
on ambient air quality."
This was spelled out in more detail by EPA in the regulations
for state implementation plans. The regulations set forth
requirements (for each pollutant) for the number of monitoring sites
in a given region, the measurement method, and the sampling frequency.
It was also required that "At least one sampling site must be located
in the area of estimated maximum pollutant concentration." 18 The
clear presumption was still that standards were not to be exceeded
anywhere in a region's ambient air--and that compliance was to be
determined by monitoring at the most highly polluted locations.
As written, the standards seem to provide an absolute level of
protection--no one is to be exposed to levels at which there are
detectable health effects. To the extent that people do not frequent
the most highly polluted areas, the populace enjoys an extra margin
of safety. The thorny problem of estimating population exposure--
how many people get exposed to how much pollution for how long--seems
to be moot. But is it really? The site of "maximum estimated concen-
trations" is not well-defined. Somewhere between, say, the exhaust
pipe of an automobile and a sidewalk or park bench the polluted air
mass becomes "ambient air" as legally defined. But exactly where this
point occurs is primarily a matter of judgment, and in practice a
site would not be placed to near, for example, an expressway on the
grounds that such a site would not be "representative." So, in fact,
the oft-heard remark that "if you can't meet the carbon monoxide
standard at one sation site, try moving it across the street" has some
reflection in practice, and the seemingly simple link between meeting
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standards and achieving public health goals is really not so simple.
Another conceptual difficulty arises in insuring that the standards
are met. Legislative intent here is clear; implementation plans
19
were to:
"...include(s) emission limitations...as may be
necessary to insure atainment and maintenance of
such primary or secondary standards..."
But air pollution levels are governed by both emissions and meteorology,
and the latter is for all practical purposes a stochastic quantity.
It is impossible (short of reducing emissions to zero) to insure that
standards will be met; one can at best make some statistical statement as
to the likelihood of this event.
This is recognized to some extent in practice. Various schemes
exist for estimating how the frequency distribution of pollutant concentrations
will change in response to controls. But once it is recognized that measured
levels represent one realization of a dynamic stochastic process, it is
natural to go one step further and try in some way to estimate the parameters
of the underlying process. While perhaps some statistic such as frequency
of exceedance of the standard can be used to estimate the parameters,
its lack of robustness makes it suspect. Thus, even if the air quality
standards are chosen as the baseline for interpretation of air
quality data, the choice of appropriate summary statistics is worth
detailed consideration.
EPA Interpretation of Air Quality Standards
To complete the discussion of air quality standards, it is
worthwhile to outline the way field data are actually interpreted
· 1 _ ___ __
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with respect to the standards. This operational definition, laid out
by EPA guidelines2 2 forms the real basis for understanding the
detailed significance of meeting or not meeting the standards in
practice, and in it can be seen an attempt to deal with some of the
problems previously mentioned. Since the points are technical and indivi-
dually somewhat minor, they will be briefly summarized.
1) Averaging time. The standards do not specify whether
compliance is to be based upon moving averages, or averages over
specific time intervals. For data processing convenience, guide-
lines specify that the clock hour be the finest subdivision of
measurement, that all 24 hour measurements be computed on the
basis of a calendar day, and that the term "day" refer to a
calendar day, and that the term "year" refer to a calendar
year (both for averaging and for assessing compliance with stan-
dards "not to be exceeded more than once per year"). The excep-
tions to this general principle are SO and CO, which have a
3 hour and 8 hour standard, respectively. For these
pollutants, a running average is used.
2) Scope of compliance. For assessing compliance, the question
arises whether compliance is to be based on each site
individually or on aggregate data from an entire urban area.
EPA bases the assessment on all of the sites in an area,
but "once per year" standards are deemed to be violated only
if a given site has more than one excursion over the standards.
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3) Sampling frequency. Especially for those pollutants
monitored every sixth day, it is possible to predict
(at some level of statistical confidence) that the
numerical standard is being exceeded more than once per
year even though no violation was actually detected. The
guidelines here indicate that, while noncompliance will not
be declared on such a basis, neither necessarily will compliance,
and more frequent sampling may be required.
4) Siting. Beyond the requirement of one monitor at the
site of "estimated maximum pollutant concentration," site
location is left up to the states. In late 1975, EPA
published guidelines,20' 1 which provide a unifying framework
for site selection. The guidelines in general go into the
factors which influence site selection for different pollutants
and different monitoring objectives, and they are not binding
upon state officials. Siting historically has been primarily
a subjective and highly judgmental decisions, and to date there
has been little uniformity in site selection. In general,
monitors tend, however, to be located at "representative"
sites, and care is taken (for long-term monitoring) to avoid
sites which are subject to a heavy "local" influence--such as the
previously mentioned expressway.
The need for better measures of air quality
The intent of this discussion is to show that it is necessary to
be very careful, both in evaluation models and in analyzing trends, in
deciding exactly what is meant by "air quality." Measured pollution
levels will not reflect the worst that can be found or the best, but
1 _ _I __
2-29
some indeterminate middle ground. It is not feasible to provide the
entire population with the level of protection which seems, on the
face of it, to be guaranteed by meeting the air quality standards.
Pollution patterns in a real city are complex, and are not well summarized
by a few peak readings at a handful of sites.
In addition, it should be noted that some confusion arises because
the term "air quality" is often used in different senses when discussing
prediction and measurement. In the former case, air quality is of neces-
sity a statistical quantity, a statement about what the underlying process
governing air pollution levels is like. For the latter case, however,
often the summary statistic chosen as measure of air quality is interpreted
as directly indicating air quality, rather than merely being an estimate
(with its own associated uncertainty) of the parameters of the under-
lying stochastic process. The confusion disappears when air quality is
recognized throughout to have a random component.
Once it is realized that there is a strong random component in
air pollution measurements, it is clear that for a given site the choice
of a particular summary statistic is important. Peak values, even aside
from the danger that they are erroneous (e.g., result from an instrument
malfunction), are probably not appropriate for use in evaluating per-
formance of predictive models or estimating trends. If one were to
propose that air quality be measured by recording ambient pollutant
concentrations for a randomly selected one hour period during each calen-
dar year, most people would reject the proposal immediately. Most
scientists and engineers, trained to work with data have the same
reaction to usage of peak values. In each case the reason is qualitatively
the same--the statistic has a large random component and could be dangerously
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misleading if used uncritically.
3.2 Uncertainties in Measuring Air Quality Trends
Uncertainties in measured air quality trends are a function both of
the data and the methodology used. "Data" here means some summary statistic
used as a measure of air quality, and as previously discussed it is
not easy to determine a realistic measure. A review of the literature,
summarized in Table 5, reveals the divergence of opinion on this point.
A wide variety of summary statistics, with different scales of spatial
and temporal averaging have been used in analyzing air pollution data. In
addition, there seems to be no consensus on the "right" methodology to use;
some authors are content to deal with an annual summary statistic as a
simple function of time, while others use more complicated statistical
techniques.
To examine in general the uncertainties in trend estimation, it is
necessary to pick both a summary statistic and a methodology. The
methodologies used by EPA in its annual trends report2 3 24 '25,26 are
not useful for this analysis, since they are not "statistical"--they neither
provide one with a numerical trends estimate nor with an estimate of
uncertainty in the conclusion about trends. Choice of summary statistic
is difficult; however, since it is deterministic trends (caused by
emissions controls) which are of primary interest, and since under certain
conditions (to be discussed in the section below) concentrations are linearly
related to emissions, the average concentration over some time period is
an appropriate choice. If desired, methods exist to relate this
statistic to the probability of exceeding the standard.
__ ___I_ ______ _
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Estimates of both aggregate automotive emissions and average
emissions per vehicle show that a downward, nearly linear trend is expected
for automotive pollutants for the period 1970-1980. An efficient trend
estimate in such a situation is simple linear regression against time. It
is desirable to eliminate the effects of meteorological variations
(which affect dispersion) from the trend estimate, so that emissions
trends are distinguished from random climatological trends. In what
follows, it will be assumed that this has been done in some appropriate
way (e.g., by regression on principal components).
Assume that by some model, characterized by a goodness of fit R , the
available concentration data has been reduced to the form:
Yi = ati + e (1)
where:
yi = the residuals of the model with E(y) = 0 and V(y) = a
a = the trend term
t. = the time of the i observation, with E(t) = 0
1
e. = a series of independent identically distributed random
shocks with mean zero and variance a2
e
The least squares estimate for a is
A 2
= Yiti/E ti (2)
and the variance of this estimate is
v(a) = a /(n V (t)) (3)
e
where n is the number of data points. If the data are complete for
a time period, T, then it can be shown that
2-36
V (t) (n + 1) (4)
12(n - 1)
Let a measure of significance (i.e., accuracy of trend estimate) be
defined as
2 2
k2 = /V(a) (5)
and note that
V(y) = a V(t) + V(e) (6)
Combining the above four equations and assuming n >> 1 yields:
a ( + (7)T(1 + nk)I/Z
or alternatively,
a= k e (8)
A T
The above equations contain five parameters, --a, k, n, T, and
either or a -- four of which must be specified to solve for the
y e
fifth. In practive, two questions are of interest:
(1) What is the minimum measurable trend, for given
significance level, time period, etc.?
(2) What is the minimum necessary time period over which
data must be collected to measure a trend of the expected
magnitude, all else given?
To facilitate the computation, let two levels of significance be
defined. Let trend detection be characterized by k = 2 -- which corres-
ponds, if the ei. 's are distributed roughly normally, to a trend signi-
ficantly different from zero at the 95% level of confidence. Similarly,
let k = 10 be defined as the desired level for trend measurement -- i.e.,
_____ _
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an estimate accurate to about 20% with 95% confidence. Furthermore,
restrict attention to 24 hr. average concentrations, and assume that all
data are available so that n = 365T with T in years. With these simpli-
fications, it is possible to answer the first question in terms of
the minimum "signal to noise ratio," represented by a/a , required to
either detect or measure a trend. Results of this calculation are shown
in Table 6.
As can be seen, several years of data are required merely to detect
a trend, unless the trend is comparable in size to the variability of
the original data (less that portion due to the trend). And detection, as
defined here, really only amounts to a determination of the sign of the
trends--upward or downward. Of more interest is the size of the trend,
evidently this is much more difficult to determine.
The above discussion can be made more concrete by way of an illus-
trative example. For Kenmore Square in Boston during 1974, average CO
was about 6 ppm with a sample standard deviation (based on 24-hour averages)
of 1.6 ppm. Based upon aggregate automobile emissions of CO, about an
8% per year decline in ambient levels would be expected over this
period, or about .5 ppm. This corresponds to a/a - .3, which, from Table 6,
should be detectable (assuming that it exists) in one year but which would
require over three years to measure to a nominal 20% accuracy.
In general, similar results would be expected for most cities.
(29)Pierrard et al. , in examining CO data from 6 CAMP cities, found that
the sample standard deviation (based on 8-hour averages) tended to
be about one-half of the annual average. Expected trends are rarely
more than -10%/year, and so a typical ratio of trend to noise is .2--
which would imply that at least four years of data are required for trend
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Table 6: Minimum Signal to Noise Ratios for Trend Measurement
* * ** **
T (a/ae ) detect (a/a ) measure (a/a ) detect (a/ ) measure
e e y y
y e a r s -1 -1 -1 -1years (yr- 1 ) (yr ) (yr ) (yr )
1 .363 1.813 .256 1.606
2 .128 .641 .128 .601
3 .070 .349 .070 .334
4 .045 .227 .045 .219
5 .032 .162 .032 .158
from equation (8), with n = 365T
**from equation (7), with n - 365T
----- ·----- ---- --------------pl` ~1~1 11"-- 11111_1__ 
2-39
measurement.
An element not yet considered is the model used to go from the
original data to the Yi. So far, it has been implicitly assumed in
the numerical examples that the model did not eliminate any of the
original data variance, but naturally much more processing could have been
done. This would lead to two effects: a a which is less than that of the
y
raw data, and the possibility of collinearity between time and some
explanatory factors in the model. If the latter possibility holds,
then the confidence interval around the trend estimate will be even wider
than heretofore assumed, since, loosely speaking, explanation of the
trend "signal" would have to be shared among the factors correlated
with time. In addition, the trend estimate would have to be altered.
However, to take all of this into account would require a given model
and some detailed knowledge of the factors, and generality would be
lost. The calculations done here should, therefore, be viewed as generally
indicative, rather than rigorously quantitative. In actually estimating
a trend for a given site, of course, the fitting would be done in a single
stage and all of these effects would be properly accounted for. Section
4 will provide an example of this.
It is instructive to look roughly at how the goodness of fit of
the model affects the accuracy of the trend estimate, since there is
a limit to how well a model can, in fact, fit the data, which is of
limited accuracy. If model fit is summarized by the R2 statistic,
then an effect of removing exogenous influences from the data is to
reduce a by a factor of 1 - R To reduce by half the amount of time
necessary to detect a trend would require that R .75. This i anecessary to detect a trend would require that R - .75. This is a
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fit characteristic of the best current predictive models; actual models
for use in this context are likely to be significantly less good. The
best possible fit is limited by inaccuracies in the measured data,
41
which for CO are typically ± 1 ppm . If this is interpreted as a
95% confidence interval, and taken as applicable to 24-hour average data,
then (a ) = .5 ppm, which for the 1974 Boston data implies (R ) - .9.y min max
Even for a perfect model, a trend is therefore probably not measureable
without more than one year of data.
Another factor which can vary is the averaging time. Use of
daily averages is convenient for data analysis purposes, since systematic
diurnal variations due to, for example, traffic patterns, are suppressed.
The autocorrelation and noise structure of the data are also more
complex at short averaging times, leading to modeling difficulties.
If most of the contribution to variance by the noise were concentrated
at high frequencies, then long averaging times could be advantageous
since sample variance would then tend to decrease faster than would be
the case with independent data points. Unfortunately, the opposite
40is true. Larsen has shown empirically that maximum concentrations
decrease with averaging tine more slowly than would be expected from
serially independent data. Others have found that the noise spectrum
fits a Markovian form, implying an exponentially decaying autocorrelation
function with noise concentrated at low frequencies. Short averaging
times are therefore advantageous, since the improvement in resolution
from use of more data points more than offsets the associated larger
sample variance.
I I_ _· _ ___
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In summary, a record containing several years of data will usually
be required to measure trends of the size expected. Use of a model
relating the data to exogenous factors may or may not reduce this require-
ment. A model is, of course, necessary if the trend is to be interpreted
as due to changes in emissions or due to changes in average meteorology.
There are definite limitations on how well a physically realistic model
can describe measured air quality, since the measurements are themselves
subject to random error. However, this limitation is well beyond the
performance of the best current predictive models, whose performance is,
in turn, better than could be reasonably expected from a simple statistical
model. In principle, use of an averaging time shorter than one day could
allow improved trend estimation; in practice, the drastic increase
in model complexity necessary to eliminate exogenous influences, to deal
with the discrete nature of existing data at short averaging times, and to
whiten the residual series probably makes this option unrealistic.
3.3 Uncertainties in Prediction of Air Quality
There is a multiplicity of models for predicting air quality, and
this is due largely to the multiplicity of questions which the models
address. Several applications can be listed:4 1
1. research
2. environmental legislation
3. implementation planning
4. impact assessment
5. transportation and land use planning
6. episode control systems
Some models are even more specialized, dealing with only a single
pollutant in a specific kind of situation.
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In looking at model uncertainties, it is necessary to be clear about
both the kind of uncertainty and the sources of the uncertainty. For
simplicity, uncertainty can be divided into two kinds: descriptive
and predictive. Descriptive uncertainy is a measure of the error of
a model in estimating pollutant levels for a past year, commonly using
the known metereological conditions for that year and usually "calibrated"
based upon an empirical fit of the estimates to what was actually measured.
Predictive error, on the other hand, is the uncertainty in a prior
estimate of future air quality. Obviously, since future weather, emissions,
etc. are now known with certainty, the forecast error will be larger
than the descriptive error. his is important to recognize, since most
model validation is done in terms of descriptive error.
Related to this is the fact that not all of the error, either descrip-
tive or predictive, is due solely to the model itself. Emissions inven-
tories, the basic input for any model, are far from perfect, either in their
estimation of the spatial distribution of emissions or in that of how
emissions change with time. Meteorological data, used extensively by
some models, do not usually provide adequate resolution and are often taken
at a site outside of the core city, raising questions of their repre-
sentativeness. Pollutant concentration data, used to evaluate the errors,
are not perfect either. Problems arise from instrument inaccuracies,
from changes in calibration and maintenance procedures, from poor choice
of sampling probe location, and so on. Finally, there may be inherent
limits on the accuracy with which pollutant levels can be estimated.
On the theoretical side, pollutant dispersal is governed by turbulence,
which implies that there will be random fluctuations in concentration
at short enough time scales. Only statistical properties of these fluc-
I
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tuations can be estimated, at best. On the practical side, stochastic
variations in source emissions are prohibitively expensive to
monitor, and of course are not obtainable for future years.
All of these sources of error are over and obove the error due to
model deficiencies, and so in a way are inherent to any model. A fair
comparison of models would either account for these influences directly,
or eliminate them indirectly by basing evaluations on the same set of
given data. Although the former approach is the more difficult, the
latter approach has not been attempted on a large scale.
Almost all applications of models to regulation of automotive emissions,
however, have used the rollback model. The original 1975 standards were
based upon it , and it still remains the primary tool for analyzing
regulatory impact4 4 '4 5 . Since it is so widely used, the rollback
model will be examined in detail here.
The basic premise of the rollback model is simple: that the level
of pollution measured in the air is proportional to the rate of introduction
of pollutant emissions into the air. This intuitive approach, however,
fails to totally take into account the many complexities of pollutant
dispersal and transformation--the relative effects of nearby and far
away sources, effects of meteorology, effects of photochemistry, etc.
There is thus some uncertainty in rollback projections, and it is
worthwhile to attempt to quantify these uncertainties to see if they
are indeed important.
A reasonably general form of the rollback equation is usually used.
The resultant model is of the form:
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n
- (K.Q) (G..F.T. )
= (9)
x nX -06 ~=1 (KiQi)
where:
X. is the projected air quality for year j
X0 is the base year air quality
B is the background air -quality
Qi is the base year source strength for source category i;
mass emissions per unit time
K. is the emission source height factor category i, correcting
1
for stack height
G.. is the growth factor for category i in year j, equal to
1]
fractional increase in number of category i sources over
base year
F.. is the emission factor ratio for category i in year j
13
T.. is the transportation control factor (if applicable)
13
for source categroy i in year j, correcting for reductions
in aggregate vehicular emissions resulting from control
strategies aimed at, for example, reduction in total vehicle
miles traveled.
Although equation (9) seems complicated, most of this complication
arises from the explicit calculations on the right hand side of an "effective"
aggregate emission rate from its components. Since this disaggregation
is unimportant for the present discussion, the following simplified
version will be used where possible:
__
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X - = (1 - R) Gj (X - (10)
whe re:
R. is the fractional reduction in emissions per unit source
(from base year values)
gj is the appropriate aggregate growth factor in number of sources
for year j as compared to the base year
X. is the predicted air quality in year j
Of course, X , , and S must be expressed in terms of the same averaging
time. Often Xj is set at the level of the appropriate air quality standard, S,
and eq. 10 is solved for the necessary emission reduction R..
To avoid confusion, it should be noted that several authors4 3 '4 9'4 1
use the formula:
gj X - S
R = X(11)
This equation, while apparently widely used, is not consistent with
eq. 9 and leads to values of R somewhat higher than those derived
from eq. 10. Something like eq. 11 could be derived by assuming
that the background concentration B grows in time in a specific way, but
it seems better to separately examine the undertainty due to the assumption
of a constant background level, and so for consistency this discussion
will be based on eq. 10.
Rollback derives its validity from four assumptions about the situation
to which it is applied. They are:
(1) The relative distribution in space and time of emissions is
approximately constant.
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(2) The pollutant is either inert in the atmosphere or
decays via a first-order chemical reaction.
(3) Background pollutant concentrations are either constant
or negligible.
(4) Important meteorological factors do not vary over the projection
period.
Each of these assumptions will be discussed in turn.
1. Errors due to inadequate treatment of spatial distribution.
If all emissions in an area were reduced by a uniform percentage
then, all else held constant, pollutant concentrations would drop by
a like amount. However, a uniform reduction is not the typical situation,
and so it is necessary to consider the possible effects on a rollback
calculation of a redistribution of relative emissions among sources
at different distances from the receptor and different heights above
the ground.
Carbon monoxide is a good pollutant to use in looking at the
effect of spatial redistribution, since it is primarily automotive in
origin and most of the nonautomotive sources are near ground level.
Many investigators have argued that CO is a "local" pollutant, and measured
levels mostly reflect the influences of nearby sources. They usually
argue that the growth factor g in eq. 10 should be adjusted downward
to reflect the fact that traffic is saturated in the core areas of cities,
where the highest CO levels are measured. Pierrand et al. suggest
a constant value g=l should be used in place of the usual assumption of
a 5%/year (noncompounded) growth rate based on vehicle registrations.
Chang and Weinstock, based on a mesoscale diffusion model and a simple
growth model, suggest a worst-case growth rate of half that of the aggre-
_ _____ ·
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gate growth rate. A National Academy of Sciences panel report5 7 recommends
a growth rate of 3%/year (noncompounded) for the period 1970-1988.
44
The Federal task force report uses a value of 1%/year for light
duty vehicles; EPA4 5 uses city-specific values ranging from .5% to
3% per year.
It seems reasonable to consider separately the uncertainties due
to uncertainty in the aggregate growth rate--which are reflected in
uncertainties in the aggregate emissions estimate--and those due to
effects of spatial redistribution of relative emissions. The latter
uncertainties will be examined in three stages. First, an illustrative
calculation will be done to show the size of the error incurred by not
correcting for redistribution. Next, the uncertainty in a typical
calculation with this correction will be estimated. Finally, the
complications introduced by a "street canyon" situation will be discussed.
An estimate of the error resulting not accounting for spatial
redistribution can be obtained using the simple model of Gifford and
39,52
Hanna . For a receptor interior to an area source of constant
source strength, their model can be expressed:
X = (2 /Tr) rlb {a (l-b) } Q/u + B (12)
where:
X is pollutant concentration at the receptor
r is the distance from the receptor to the edge of the area
source
a,b are constants, which may vary somewhat with atmospheric
stability
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Q is the area source strength
u is the average wind speed
0 is the background air quality
A simple approach is to approximate the city as circular, with
two zones: a high emitting central core (with radius l) and a lower
emitting suburban ring (with radius r2). The base year area source
strengths are designated as Q1 and yQ1 respectively. If growth were
to occur uniformly throughout the city, application of eq. 12 would
result in the ordinary rollback equation eq. 10. The opposite case is
that of all growth occuring external to the central core. In that
case, application of eq. 12 yields
X-B 21 ( 1 ( -1) [1 + (a. -1.)
(1-R1) x [1 + y(da-l)] (13)
where
= r2/r1 (14)
k = 1-b (15)
To apply this formula, some typical numbers are needed for y, a,
gj, and k. The following statistics were extracted for Boston in 1970:53
Study Area EmissiQn Density Area
(kg/mi /day) (mi )
Boston Core 19,269 5.18
East Boston 16,186 .47
Inner City 4,206 48.38
Inner Suburbs 3,508 195.76
______ .____ .
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Lumping together "Boston core" and "East Boston" to represent the core
area, and "inner city" and "inner suburbs" for the surrounding area
39
results in y .192, a - 6.65. Gifford and Hanna give values for k
which vary with meteorological conditions as follows:
Meteorological k
Conditions
very unstable .09
unstable .14
neutral .20
slightly stable .25
stable .29
The choice of a value for g depends upon the time scale of the projec-
tion. For 10 and 20 year projections, values of gl - 1.5 and g20 -2.0
are appropriate Table 7 shows the results of evaluating eq. 13 for
various values of a, g, and k.
As is evident, "local" emissions are the most important in determining
air quality at a central business district (CBD) site. Growth in surrounding
areas cannot be neglected, however, even under assumptions most favorable
to that simplification, without incurring an error of roughly 5% - 10%
in the direction of underestimating ambient concentations. Ignoring
the correction for source-receptor distance would lead to much larger
errors in the other direction, of about the same size as g-l (50%
and 100% roughly for 10 and 20 year projections).
It is clear that to be accurate rollback calculations must complement
site-specific measure of air quality used in the formula with a site-
specific emissions inventory at a sufficient level of disaggregation to
permit correction for source-receptor separation. The early calculations
upon which the auto emissions standards were based did not account for this
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Table 7: Worst Case Evaluation of Effects of Nonuniform
Growth for Typical Parameter Values
growth
deflator*
.045
.045
.123
.123
.038
.038
.099
.099
effective
growth factor**
1.023
1.045
1.062
1.123
1.019
1.038
1.050
1.099
* equal to the coefficient of (gj-1) in eq. 13
** equal to the right hand side of eq. 13
y
.2
.2
.2
.2
.2
.2
.2
.2
7
7
7
7
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
k
.1
.1
.25
.25
.1
.1
.25
.25
g
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
___ 
__._
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effect; more recent ones do to some extent. The size of the correction
depends upon meteorological circumstances and so t appropriate choice
of correction factor depends upon the base statistic chosen to represent
"air quality" (e.g., maximum concentrations or long term averages).
In the simple example given, a variation of about a factor of 3 in the
correction resulted in only about a 10% change in effective growth rate,
so uncertainties in the size of a similar correction using more detailed
data are unlikely to result in errors of more than about + 5%.
A complicating factor which has not yet been touched upon is the possible
existence of a "street canyon" effect. The argument is that the trapping
effect of tall buildings along an urban street result in street level
concentrations much higher than would be predicted by assuming unconstrained
diffusion, and so measured concentrations at street level strongly reflect
emissions that are "local" on the scale of a few blocks. Ratios of
47
"rooftop" to "curbside" CO concentrations of 10% - 40% have been cited.
Other investigators have found that the relationship changes with
time and meteorological conditions and that, based on limited data,
no gradient of CO concentration with height existed at the time of highest
CO readings. On the other hand, more extensive measurements in St. Louis
street canyons 5 have shown that quite high (20-30 ppm) street level
CO concentrations can be associated with low (.4-7 ppm) levels at
115m, but that the relationship changes from day to day. Several
mathematical models55 '56 '5 7 predict a substantial impact on street
level concentrations due to the canyoning effect, with the size of
the effect directly related to meteorology and details of sampling
probe locations.
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The significance of this street canyon effect depends on the specific
site and on the particular statistic used to characterize air quality.
Typical urban sites at which high levels of CO are measured often will
reflect this effect, however, and so the question is how to compensate
for it. If the air quality statistic to be projected is a long term average
or the like, the effect of canyoning is to reinforce the notion that
only local emissions matter, where local is now defined as a region of
a few blocks around the receptor rather than a few miles. Then, to
the extent that long term meteorology fluctuates little and that
local traffic growth is the same as that in the rest of the CBD, a growth
factor the same as that of the CBD is appropriate. Emissions from sources
outside the CBD, when corrected once for distance and again for the
canyoning effect, are negligible for most realistic cases, and the correction
can be roughly estimated.
A crude estimate of the uncertainty in projected air quality resulting
from the uncertainty in the size of the street canyon correction can be
obtained by going back to the distance corrections and factoring in an
additional street canyon correction. If the effect of growth outside
the CBD is to increase projections based upon the CBD growth rate by
4% to 12%, and if average rooftop to curbside concentrations range from
.1 to .4 then the net correction would range from .4% to 4.8%. This is
a high estimate of the effect of ignoring emissions outside the CBD;
if the correction is made, uncertainty in the predicted air quality due
to uncertainty in the correction factor should not exceed + 3%.
If a short term statistic such as maximum 8 hour concentration is
used as the measure of air quality, then the uncertainty in correcting
for source-receptor distance and street canyon effects becomes greater.
______
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The appropriate correction factors for a short term measurement are specific
to the meteorological conditions existing at the time of the measurement,
and are inherently more uncertain than average corrections. While in
principle the requisite detailed measurements and modeling could be done
to estimate the correction, it is unrealistic to suppose that this will
ever be done on a routine basis. As a result, it is difficult to say
just how much a high concentration is reflective of purely local conditions
(e.g., a traffic tie-up caused by streetwork), how much is due to core
city emissions (e.g, as a result of a low level inversion lasting
several days), and how much is due to regional emissions (e.g., from a
shopping mall which happens to be directly upwind of the site for a
full 8 hours).
There are really three separate factors at work here. The first
is that the appropriate corrections themselves are more uncertain in
this case. If this extra uncertainty were a factor of 2 for each of the
corrections, then the resultant uncertainty would be roughly +12%
(based upon the previous estimate of +3%). The second factor is the
autocorrelation of pollutant concentrations over short time periods (less
than a few days). In simple terms, this just means that pollutant levels
at short averaging times are related not only to emissions at that time
but to pollution "left over" from previously. (Other factors also
contribute to the autocorrelation). Rollback can be derived in a number
of ways from the physics of pollutant dispersal, but always with the
proviso that the averaging time be "long enough." Averaging times less
than a few days probably are not; and so it is not clear conceptually
how to account for the influence of the spatial distribution of sources
on the size of a short term air quality measure.
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Another problem with using a short term statistic such as a maximum
value to respresent air quality is the lack of robustness. A given reading
may be high simply because of instrument malfunction, or because of
an abnormal traffic situation, or due to any of a number of mistakes or
unusual circumstances which make the statistic an inappropriate one for
use in projecting air quality. There is no way to tell how often high
measurements are in fact erroneous, and so this uncertainty cannot be
quantified. It is widely acknowledged, however, that quality assurance
is currently a significant problem at many existing monitoring sites.
The third dimension in the spatial distribution of sources is the
height of the source above the ground. Emissions from smokestacks are
diluted considerably before reaching the ground, and do not have the
same impact on street-level air quality as a similar amount of emissions
at ground level. These emissions are characterized as "point source"
emissions rather than the more continuous "area source" emissions appro-
priate for describing vehicular emissions in an urban area. The air
quality impact for point sources can be estimated by a Gaussian
model:
Qi exp ( -H ) ( - ) (16)
~X ~exp 2 exp7r a U 2a 22
y Z z z
where:
Qi is the source strength
u is the wind speed
a is the horizontal dispersion coefficient
a is the vertical dispersion coefficient
z
H is the stack height (plus plume rise)
y is the distance from the plume center line to the receptor
__ I I· ______
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Equation 16 has implicit many simplifying assumptions. It is
also not of a form which permits direct comparison with previous
results, which were based on area source models. However, it seems
plausible that for most cases the proper approach is to ignore the
impact of smokestack emissions on street level air quality. The parameters
a and a are dependent both on meteorology (stability) and source-
y z
receptor distance r. From reference 58, it can be seen that both are
(very approximately) equal to r/10. If this is true than height correction
becomes unimportant for 50 H 2/r 2 << 1 or r >> 7H. At smaller values
of r, the effect is to discount the impact. At large values of r, the
distance correction is large. In either case, the impact is much less
than that of a nearby, ground level source emitting at the same rate.
2. Errors due to inadequate treatment of pollutant reactivity.
Additional errors can arise from rollback because of the implicit assump-
tion that the pollutant does not react in the atmosphere. For CO, this
assumption is generally acknowledged to be a good one; however, it is
less so for NO and HC and obviously inappropriate for 0 .
NO poses a problem for a variety of reasons. First of all,
the ambient standard is for N02 rather than NO (NO + N02 primarily)
and so it is N 2 that is reported as monitored in ambient air. However,
most of the NO emitted from vehicles is in the form of NO, which is then
x
converted in the atmosphere to NO2 in a characteristic time which is
highly variable with circumstances. Both the NO and NO2 then can
further react to form various nitrated compounds. The ratio of NO to
:59
NO2 varies both diurnally and seasonally, and so one cannot be
used as a proxy for the other.
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If rollback calculations are based on total NO , rather than just
NO2, than all of the comments about CO apply with almost equal force
to NO . Though stationary sources are more important for NO than
x x
CO-- accounting for roughly half of the NO emissions nationwide--the
spatial distribution of major stationary sources is such that, in the
central city, vehicular sources dominate. The dispersion of nitrogen
compounds as a class from vehicular sources should be exactly similar
to the dispersion of CO, including street canyon~ effects. Therefore,
it would be expected that observed NO could be almost totally ascribed
x
to nearby vehicular sources, as was the case with CO. Of course,
this conclusion would have to be examined on a site by site basis, but
it would generally hold true for most CBD sities. Inspection of
CAMP data tends to confirm this. Peak concentration of NOX usually
coincide with or follow shortly after hours of peak traffic; the
diurnal pattern shows little variation among weekdays but is different
on weekends and holidays.5 9
If projections of air quality in terms of NO2 are desired, based on
emissions of total NO and measured NO2, then there is an additional
level of uncertainty arising from the implicit assumption that the
ratio of NO2 to NO is constant. Since the NO2 standard is in terms
of an annual average, rollback calculations would ordinarily be based
on this averaging time, and so the seasonal and diurnal variations
in the ratio would be averaged out. In order to investigate the
remaining uncertainty, NO and NO2 data from four arbitrarily selected
CAMP sites were examined, as shown in Table 8. It can be seen there that
the ratio of NO2 to NO is reasonably stable for each site, with sample
standard deviations ranging from roughly 5% to 10% of the respective
mean.
I_ _ _______ __ I ______
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This does not mean, however, that the ratio can confidently
be expected to stay constant in time. For example, if new car emission
controls for NO substantially altered the NO/NO2 ratio in the exhaust,
then conceivably the effect of the controls on NO would not be
x
reflected in ambient NO2 levels as measured at street level. Basically,
this is another reflection of the problem of how to weight the impact
of nearby versus distant sources, with the added complexity of needing
detailed information on the NO/NO2 ratio of emissions from each class
of sources and on the chemistry of NO oxidation and other reactions
as it travels from distant sources. Without such information,
projections are uncertain by some additional amount which, though--
probably substantial, is not readily estimable. That it is risky
to assume this problem away, on the other hand, can be seen from Table 8--
Philadelphia and Chicago both seem to exhibit a consistent trend in the
NO2/NOx ratio, in opposite directions, and in contrast to Washington
DC and Cincinnati where the ratio seems stable.
In summary, for central city sites reasonably far from major point
sources of NO , rollback projections of total NO should be as accurate
x x
as those of CO, all else equal. Since most of the NOx in this case
is attributable to automobiles and has had a short residence time
in the curbside atmosphere, total NO can be approximated well by
NO2/NOx ratio. The former uncertainty can be as large as + 20%
for annual averages (based on 95% confidence limits of + 2 standard
deviations); the latter depends on details of the future control
strategy, and so cannot be estimated in a general way.
Another problem with NO is that different measurement methods
x
for NO2 give different results. Reference 20 shows results for several
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Table 8: NO/NO Ratios at Several CAMP Cities
x
x is the average ratio, s is the sample
standard deviation
WASHINGTON DC
NO
.030
.039
.034
.032
.036
.047
NO2
.030
.034
.037
.035
.035
.043
NO2/NO
.50
.47
.52
.52
.49
.48
x = .50, s/x = .046
CHICAGO
NO
.104
.097
.100
.096
.101
NO2
.043
.041
.046
.043
.057
NO2/NOx
.29
.30
.32
.31
.36
.39
x = .33, s/x = .12
Year
62
63
64
65
66
67
Year
62
63
64
65
66
67 .077 .050
Ug --· ·s 3-. .---L Ll-L ---- ·L·--UIII·IU··(-L·i·1··-·------
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Table 8 (continued)
CINCINNATI
NO2
.031
.030
.032
.035
.036
.028
PHILADELPHIA
NO2
.039
.039
.038
.037
.039
.043
NO 2/NOx
.49
.48
.46
.53
.46
.47
x = .48, s/x = .057
NO2/NO X
.49
.46
.46
.43
.40
.41
Ye ar
62
63
64
65
66
67
NO
.032
.032
.038
.031
.042
.032
Year
62
63
64
65
66
67
NO
.041
.046
.045
.049
.059
.063
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cities where annual average NO2 was measured by the Griess-Saltzman
Method and the Jacobs-Hochheiser Method at the same site. On the average
the former were three times as large as the latter even though "[b]oth
methods have been carefully checked under laboratory conditions and are
internally consistent." The Jacobs-Hochheiser method was originally
chosen as the reference method for NO2; it has sine been found to be
in error in the direction of overestimating ambient NO2. Chemiluminescence
techniques are likely to become the replacement measurement method, with
the added advantage of ability to measure NO and NO2 with the same instru-
ment. However, the accuracy of this technique is about + 10%, and inter-
ferences with peroxyacetyl nitrate and other nitrates do occur. To the
extent that these interferences are not proportional to total NO , an
error of uncertain magnitude is incurred.
The last problem with NO is that it is of interest for two reasons:
for its direct health effects and for its relation to oxidant formation.
The former effect is represented as well by curbside concentrations as
any other pollutant is, but the latter is an entirely different effect
from the one which has been discussed so far. Data do not commonly exist
for other than ground level or near ground level sites. If projections
are based on ground level measurements, the implicit assumption is that these
are proportional to levels in the urban airshed. This is unlikely to be
true; without street canyon effects or height corrections to lessen their
apparent impact, stationary sources are likely to be much more important
in determining levels in the air shed than those at street level. Also,
removal mechanisms are more important for NO in the airshed, since the
residence time is longer. It is not clear how to estimate the resultant
uncertainty, however.
____
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Hydrocarbons are reactive to varying extents, depending on the
particular species. Methoane is virtually inert in the atmosphere,
while other compounds react quickly in the presence of sunlight and NO
to form ozone, PAN, and various other compounds. Transportation sources
account for about 45% of total nationwide anthropogenic HC emissions,
and a larger proportion in many urban areas. Based on the same reasoning
used for CO and NO , local and street level sources would be expected
to dominate measured HC at most CBD sites.
There is an air quality standard for hydrocarbons, but, since they have no
known health effects at the levels normally encountered in urban air,
ambient HC is important for its relation to 0 formation. In the past,
this problem was dealt with by assuming a simple relation between rollback
projections of early morning ambient reactive hycrocarbon levels and
ambient oxidants, using for example the "Appendix J"17 curve. However,
such an approach is inherently limited in that it ignores both the basic
nonlinearity of the oxidant-forming reactions, the role of NO in the
formation process, and the long range advection of oxidant precursors.
The importance of the latter effect is commonly recognized today; for
example, one study in performing aerial measurements of oxidants in
the air entering the New Jersey-New York-Connecticut area found that
ozone at levels exceeding the federal standards was occasionally
being transported into the tri-state area. Thus it seems that long range
transport and perhaps natural production mechanisms are important in oxidant
formation, and little confidence can be placed in modified rollback predic-
tions for this pollutant.
--------- _  ~ ___
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3. Errors due to improper treatment of background levels.
The third assumption made in the derivation of the rollback equation
is that background pollutant levels do not change in time. To some extent
this is a matter of definition--background levels should reflect primarily
emissions from non-anthropogenic sources that may be expected to change
little over time. As a practical matter, some background levels are
low enough in general to make the rollback calculation insensitive to any
reasonable variation in their magnitude. Table 9 compares commonly accepted
values for background concentrations with the air quality standards.
Except for hydrocarbons and 0 , background levels are roughly an
order of magnitude less than their standards.
Background level uncertainty is evidently important for HC and 0 .
For HC, much of the problem could probably be avoided by measuring both
methane and non-methane HC--most of the natural background is methane,
and would be expected to fluctuate seasonally. 0 "background" levels
are highly variable, and can approach the level of the standard. The
relative roles of long range transport, stratospheric transport, and
formation from non-anthropogenic HC are still areas of active research.
4. Errors due to meteorological fluctuations.
The final rollback assumption is that meteorological factors do
not shift over the projection period. Table 10 shows several years of
CO data for the Washington DC CAMP site. Even the annual average, a
statistic which would be expected to be stable over years with near
constant aggregate emissions, seems to vary randomly from year to year.
It is 'hard to ascribe this to anything other than meteorology. To estimate
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Table 9: Comparison of Background Levels
with Air Quality Standards
Air Quality
Pollutant Standard Background
CO 9 ppm 1 ppm
NO2 .35 .03 ppm
HC .24 ppm .1 ppm
0 .08 ppm* 0-.1 ppm
x
* 8 hour average
** Estimated4 1 1 hour average based upon air quality standard
of .05 ppm annual average.
*** Average 6 A.M. to 9 A.M. (guideline only).
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Table 10: Washington D.C. Emissions Inventory and Air
29,60
Quaiity Data
Aggregate Annual 24 hr. 1 hr. 5 min.
Year CO Emissions Average CO Max CO Max Co Max CO
(KT/yr.) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
1962 1596 5.3 15. 25. 3Q
1963 1629 6.9 23. 41. 44.
1969 1638 5.7 13. 32. 37.
1965 1626 3.7 10. 31. 49
1966 1617 3.3 15. 38. 47.
1968 1538 3.4
1969 1479 3.0
1970 1387 3.8
combined 1565 4.41
1620 - 15.2 33.1 40.6
C - .255 .257 .157 .159
* Q and X as discussed in text
___
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the magnitude of this variability first appropriate "average" values
for air quality and aggregate emissions over a period of years are
needed. The method should account for changes in aggregate emissions
from year to year, so that averaging is performed only over different
weather patterns. The following statistics to aggregate yearly
data were selected:
X = nE ( (17)
and 1/Q = 1 1 (l/Qi) (18)
n
where:
X. is the air quality in year i
Qi is the aggregate emissions in year i
Q is the harmonic mean of aggregate emissions over the
years considered
X is the average air quality corresponding to Q
n is the number of years
An appropriate measure of dispersion is the weighted sample coefficient
of variation C:
C = (Q/X) (1/n (Xi/Qi - X/Q) ) 1/2
This statistic is independent of aggregate emissions and so measures
dispersion due to meteorological effects alone.
Values of X, Q, and C for the Washington data are also given in
Table 10. It can be seen that, for example, + 25% variations in annual
average CO concentrations would be expected despite constant aggregate
emissions. This is a fundamental limitation on the accuracy of air
quality prediction, since future weather is not predictable. How many
years of baseline data are needed to achieve this sort of accuracy?
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Assuming that each year's weather is independent of the previous
year's (perhaps a strong assumption) then:
a = a (1 + 1/n) /2 (20)
min
where:
a is the standard deviation of the rollback projection error
amin is the standard deviation of air quality (for constant
aggregate emissions).
n is the number of time periods for which data has been collected.
Table 11 contains a comparison of /c . versus n. It can be seen
min
that, for the given assumptions, three years' worth of data provides
a reasonably good baseline.
Table 11
n a/a .
man
1 1.41
2 1.22
3 1.15
5 1.10
10 1.05
This section has looked at the various uncertainties in roll-
back prediction over and above those due to uncertainties in emissions.
Obviously, most of the estimated uncertainties must be viewed as
illustrative rather than rigorously correct, since each site in each city
faces a different situation. In addition, for different pollutants
different sources of error are predominant.
For CO, a nonreactive pollutant with low natural background levels,
rollback works best. The major sources of uncertainty, namely uncertainty
-· I I -· ---
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in emissions and uncertainty due to future meteorological fluctuations, lie
outside the model and apply equally to predictions of any model. A major
source of error within the model is the use of measurements of air pollutant
concentrations, which are stochastic quantities, as the estimate of
air quality. Since almost all present day models are "calibrated" based on
same kind of data, this source of uncertainty is also shared by these
models. To calculate the total uncertainty requires detailed specifications
of the source distribution, local topography, air quality statistic.:
used, etc. If air quality is defined as the concentrations ultimately
measured, though, it appears that the inherent limitations alone make
predictive uncertainty (measured by 95% confidence limits, say) in excess
of +30%--perhaps considerably in excess.
NO , a combination of pollutants, should behave very much like
x
CO. While non-automotive sources contribute a larger portion of
aggregate NO , they are for the most part power plants, with large
smokestacks, situated far from the city center. The impact on ground
level concentrations is thus substantially diminished. The street
canyon effect, a fluid mechanical phenomenon, must apply to automotive NO
just as it applies to CO. The extra uncertainty for NO comes from using
it as a proxy for N 2. Since the ratio of the two is not constant, an
extra 10% or 20% of uncertainty is added.
HC is of interest only for its role in 0 formation. Like CO, measured
HC at CBD sites should often reflect street canyon effects. 0 , on the
other hand, seems to be transported for great distances at concentrations
approaching that of the standard. The relation between HC and 0 at a
given site is tenuous, and still a subject of active research. Little
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confidence can be placed in the accuracy of predictions of future 0 .
4. Analysis of Air Quality Trends at Kenmore Sqaure, Boston
The general analysis of uncertainty in measurement of air quality
trends, given in section 3.2, left several issues unresolved: how
much data variance could be explained by exogenous factors, how inclusion
of exogeous factors would affect accuracy of the trend estimate, and how
reasonable is the assumption that the noise structure of the data is
well behaved--i.e., consists of independent, identically distributed
normal shocks. To investigate these issues, a trend analysis was
performed6 4 for an existing series of air quality data, and is summarized
in this section. Though not conclusive, since it is based on a single
site, the analysis is illustrative of the problems involved in obtaining
a statistically sound measure of air quality trends.
A review of the literature6 4 revealed little consensus about appro-
priate methodologies for trend analysis or about an appropriate summary
statistic for air quality. In addition, little attention seems to have
been given to the problem of distinguishing between deterministic trends
(due to changes in emissions) and nondeterministic ones (due to, e.g.,
random climatological trends). Surprisingly, despite the substantial
reduction which should have already occurred in automotive pollutants
such as CO (see figure 3), no convincing demonstration was found that
the expected improvement in ambient CO has actually happened.
In light of this, an attempt was made to devise an improved trend
analysis methodology and apply it to data from a real monitoring site
Daily average CO was chosen as the summary statistic, since daily
_ _____ __ ·__ _ __ _··__ ____ __
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averages eliminate the problems associated with the diurnal variation of
shorter time averages. CO was chosen because it is primarily an
automotive pollutant, and because good quality data spanning many years
are available for this pollutant. The choice of a site in Boston was
based simply on convenience in obtaining data.
The data used have three sources. The air quality data were
supplied by EPA, and are available through the agency's SARDAD computer
system. The meteorological data came from the National Climatic
Center, U.S. Department of Commerce, and are published as monthly summaries
entitled, "Local Climatological Data." The former data were obtained
for a fixed site in Kenmore Square, Boston, and for CO, are available as
hourly averages from June, 1969 (with numerous gaps). The latter were
recorded at Logan Airport, Boston, and are available as ten minute averages
for each hour of the day, though only published, by international conven-
tion, for every third hour. Stability was calculated for each hour using
62
the method of Turner and summarized as a daily statistic by converting
to the equivalent standard deviation of wind direction5 8 and geometrically
averaging over the daylight hours (arbitrarily defined as 0700 - 1900 LST).
Nighttime stability was excluded since it is virtually always neutral
or slightly stable.
The last meteorological factor considered was mixing height.
Calculated mixing heights for Boston were also obtained from the National
Climatic Center, but were the result of a special study, and so are not
routinely available at low cost. The mixing heights were based on 1200
GMT (0700 local time) balloon soundings at the Chatham, MA station
combined with surface data from Logan Airport. The morning mixing height
was estimated from the intersection of the measured temperature profile
_
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with the potential temperature profile based on surface pressure and a
surface temperature 50 higher than the minimum from 0200 through 0600
LST. Maximum mixing height for the day was extrapolated based on
the maximum surface temperature from 1200 through 1700 LST.
For the purpose of the exploratory development only a subset of
the data--arbitrarily chosen as that for the year 1974--was used.
This reduced the clutter on many of the graphs, and allowed aberrant
points to be more easily identified. Also, use of a period too short
for significant trend effects allowed easier identification of purely meteoro-
logical influences. Finally, it allowed the resulting tentative model
to be validated over the full set of data.
Figure 4 shows the CO data plotted against time. It reveals no obvious
trend and perhaps some seasonal effects. The logarithm of CO appeared
to have roughly a normal distribution, with some discrepancies at the tails.
The lack of fit at the lower end appeared serious, but was probably due to
the lack of a "continuity correction" in combining and rounding measure-
ments at the discrete (0, 1, 2 ppm) end of the instrument scale. Air
pollution data often fit a lognormal distribution, after correction for
continuity and for background levels.
The CO data were also autocorrelated. Although the autocorrela-
tion seemed to persist beyond lags of one day, they were not significant
at the 95% level. Inspection of the partial autocorrelations revealed
that, as a pure time series, the data could be modeled as a first order
autoregressive process. Correction must be made, however, for the fact
that weekends (Fri. - Sun.) differ from weekdays due to the different
traffic pattern. Monday through Thursday exhibited the behavior expected
due to diurnal traffic variation, with morning and afternoon rush hour
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evident. Friday was similar, with a higher afternoon rush hour peak
and a buildup in the evening. Saturday and Sunday exhibited a different
pattern, with pollution slowly building up through the day and reaching
its peak at night.
Based on these observations, a simple linear model was fit to the
data, as shown in Table 13. The weekend effects were approximated
as simple shifts in expected CO, and so could be handled with dummy
variables for those three days. The Saturday effect was not significant
at the 95% level, since Saturday average CO happened to be about the
same as that during the week. As expected, no trend could be detected.
About 28% of the data variance was explained by this simple model; not
all of the variables were significant at the 95% level.
To proceed, the CO data were plotted versus various meteorological
factors. No clear patterns was evident in any of these graphs, but the
following observations were made:
(1) There was some correlation between CO and inverse wind speed,
as expected. However, there were also several outlier points
which did not seem to follow this relationship.
(2) The expected downward trend of CO with temperature did not
seem to hold at low temperatures. This may be due to the
higher average wind speeds in winter, however.
(3) There was a slight wind direction effect with high values
for easterly winds and low ones for northrly winds. This
is consistent with the geography of the Kenmore Square monitoring
station, which has the Charles River basin about 100 meters
to the North and a long, straight section of a major thorough-
_·_·· I ... .....
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Table 12:
Symbol
NOB
RSQ
F (n,m)
SER
DW(n)
COEF
VALUE
T-STAT
MEAN
AO, Al, A2
B1, B2, B3, B4
C1, C2, C3
Nomenclature for Tables 13 to 17
Explanation
Number of data points used in the regression
The R statistic for the regression (square
of the correlation coefficient between pre-
dicted and observed)
The F statistic for the regression, with
n and m degrees of freedom
Standard error of the regression
Durbin-Watson statistic
Label for column of estimated coefficients
(by name)
Label for column of estimated coefficient
values
Label for column of coefficient t-statistics
(estimate divided by standard error of
estimate)
Label for column of average values of explanatory
factor associated with the coefficient
estimated coefficients
(continued)
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Table 12 (continued)
DefinitionSymbol
CO
TIME
CO(-1)
FRIDAY, SATURDAY
SUNDAY, MONDAY
U
UINV
THTIL
T
T.DEV
Observed daily average CO (ppm)
Elapsed time from start of data series (years)
Previous day's CO (ppm)
Dummy variables, equal to 1 if the corresponding
observation took place on that day; 0 otherwise
Daily average wind speed (mph)
100/U
0, as defined in eq. 21
Daily average temperature (F)
T - MEAN (T) (F)
_· ^111_1__1_·_111_11__LLIYI ·-- ·  -- ·II----- -I--
2-76
1l' CO AO+AI*T'IME
t40B - 72
. -" 4 27E-04
DJ(2a ) 1.05
COEF VALUE
F1/270) 0.115
T-STAT
SER 1 .5840
MEAN
6.07977
-0.11099
31.12730
-0.33714
2, C - P(O+A1*TIrE+A2*CO( - )+B1*FRIDAY+B2*SATURDAY+B3*
StUDNY+SB4 iONDAV
NOB - 50
RSQ - 0.284
DUJ(19) - 1.88
COEF VALUE
F(6/243) - 16. 064
T-STAT
SER - 1.363G
MEAN
3.24175
-0.08016
0.47310
0.62574
-0 . 7235
-0 .99619
0.46652
8 0EOS8
-0.26345
8. 4569
2. 44524
-1. 05-32
-3.66353
1.70143
Table 13 Top: simple regression of 1974 data versus time.
Bottom: simple linear regression of 1974 data against
endogenous factors.
1. 00000
0.51661
.Al
A2
B1
B2
B3
: B4
1.00000
0.52045
6 04560
0.15600
0. 15200
0. 13200
0.13600
IXI ___ I · _ ms s IP_
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fare (Commonwealth Avenue) to the East.
(4) A tendency toward higher CO levels at low mixing heights
also seemed to exist.
For the first two of these effects, physical reasoning leads to
an expected form of the relation. For the wind direction effect, a
crude piecewise linear function of two parameters was defined as
follows:
(l- (1 2 1 <0<02( = 1)/( 2 -01) 1 - 2
0 = (01 - 0 + 36)/(1 - 02 + 36) > 02 (21)
(O1 - )/(O1 -02 + 36) <
where:
0 = the wind direction effect term, 0 < 0 < 1
O = the wind direction (tens of degrees)
1' 2 = parameters (in tens of degrees)
The parameters 01 and 02 were estimated by eye, and assigned the
values 0 and 10 respectively.
Two models were fit to the 1974 data, as shown in Table 14. A linear
model was fit first, to provide a benchmark for comparing the performance
of the nonlinear model. Estimation of linear models is easier, both
operationally and in terms of the theory, so a linear model which "works"
almost as well as a nonlinear one is a useful thing. The linear model
took the form:
COt = a + alt + a2 COtl + blFri + b2 Sat + b 3 Sun +
-1 -
b4 Mon + clu + c20 + c3T + t (22)
__ _____________1_1 · · __
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3, CO - AO+A1TIME+A2*CO(-1 )+B1*FRIDAY+B2SATURDAY+B3*
DA +B44*MO0NDA'+C 1 /U+C2*THTI L+C3*T
06 -" 250
RSQ - 0.42641
DU(19) 1.73
COEF
F (9240) -
UALUE
19.824
T-STAT
SER - 1.2281
MEAN
3.04111
-0 07922
0,40193
0.44629
-0. 50521
-1 07144
0.39111
15.57060
1.52061
-0.02582
6 01615
-0.28637
7.71274
1. 92568
-2. 14479
-4. 371 5
1 .562074. 7330
4 .5263
-4.94573
1 .00000
0. 52045
6. 045G60
0 15600
0. 15200
0. 1320O
0. 13600
0. 08695
0. 44366
50 .90400
4 CO AO+A2*CO-(- )+C1*( l+RAITII9E )*(I +BI*FRIDAY+B2*
,SATtU"D'+D3*SUr4DAY+B4*MONDAY )*( 1+C2THTIL )*( 1+C3*T. DE )*
UlItJ
NOB - 250
RSO - 0.4621
DWJ(19) - 1 67
COEF VALUE
F(9X240 ) 28 909
T-STAT
SER - 1.1893
MEAN
2 .74803
0,34572
0. 05630
0. 24535
0 22392
-0.31872
-0.78341
0 .09735
3.44437
-0.02469
7.00414
6 78426
1.99001
1. 10294
1.37928
-4. 337950. SSo
1. 8018
-5. 12621
1 .00000
6. 0456
21.30260
0.55487
0.22470
0.25793
0.17317
0.17492
0. 20931
2.95460
Top: Estimates for Linear Mode (eq. 22)
Bottom: Estimates for First Form of Multiplicative
Model (ecf. 23)
AO
A1
A2
B1
B2
!'. B3
B4
Cl
,C2
. C3
*: 1
: Al
3 B
C2.
C3
Table 14.
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4 C0O AO+A2*CO(-1 )+Ci*( I+AI*TI1E )*( 1+B2*SATURDAY+B3*
SUcDv' )*( I+C2*THTI L )( I+C3*T. DEV )*UINU
NOB - 25 0
RSO - 0. 45687
DW(19) " 1.66
UALUECOEF
F(7/242) 29.081
T-STAT
SER - 1.1901
MEAN
2.79463
0.33863
0. 0576G
0.19869
-0. 37654
-0.79932
3.91634
-0. 02566
7.36556
6.79006
1 92897
0.9G771
-3.89309
-4.76557
1.71741
-5 31080
1. 00000
6. 04560
20. 9a100
0.56597
0. 27872
0. 18513
0. 19245
3.14275
Table 14 (continued). Estimates for Final Form of Multiplicative
Model
AO
A2
CI
'. B2
-B3
C2
C3
· I _IIII--ii·li-·IIL·---L- -I -- .-- 1111 1-· 
-- 11111^111111_.111·--L- 1_^ 
-- 
--
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The nonlinear model was of the form:
Cot = a + a2 CO + C(1 + b 1 Fri + b2 Sat + b 3 Sun +
(23)
-1b Mon) (1 + c20 ) (1 + 3T) (1 + at)u + t4 2 3 2 t
where:
COt = the daily average CO on day t
Fri, Sat}
Sun, Mon = dummy variables for Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday
u = daily average wind speed (mph)
e = the wind direction effect term [eq. 21]
T = the daily average temperature (F)
t = time (years)
It = the residual noise
The dummy terms for Friday and Monday were later dropped due to lack of signi-
ficance.
The nonlinear model was found to fit the data slightly better, and
so residuals from this model were plotted against explantory factors to
explore the possibility of further model refinement. The residuals
were well behaved; they were roughly normal, were not significantly
autocorrelated, showed no tendency toward heteroscedasticity, and no longer
showed discernible seasonability. In fact, examination of the residual
plots revealed no further structure at all--not even the expected weak
relation to stability and mixing height.
To complete the exploratory analysis, a set of regression diagnostics
was performed for the linear model, following the techniques set forth
by Welsch and Kuh. These techniques allow one to identify specific
_ ________ ·
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data points which are "outliers" in any of a number of senses--in their
effect on the overall fit, in their influence on the estimate of a para-
meter or on the variance of the parameter, or in their deviation from the
fitted value after correction for the expected variance of the residual.
Application of the diagnostics to the model turned up several aberrant
points corresponding to holidays--Thanksgiving, Christmas, Labor Day
weekend, and Easter weekend. Several other points were also identified
as having an undue influence by all of the above mentioned criteria. However,
neither removal of the holiday points nor removal of the additional
suspicious points significantly altered either the fit or the parameter
estimates, and so it was concluded that there was no need to continue
the analysis using robust estimation techniques.
The next step was to fit the two models to the full range of data,
which extended from June, 1969 through February, 1975. As a preliminary
step, the raw data was plotted versus time (Figure 5) and a simple linear
regression versus time was performed (Table 15). As is evident
both visually and from the regression, there is a distinct upward trend
in this data, of about .5 ppm per year.
Both models were then fit to the data, aS shown in Table 16, and
each seemed to explain the observations equally well. All fitted coeffi-
cients were easily significant at the 95% level, and had the expected
signs. It is necessary to do some additional arithmetic to go from
the coefficient of the time variable to an actual estimate of trend, due
to the presence of the autoregressive term in the linear model and the
additional necessity of scaling to proper dimensional units in the
multiplicative model. When this is done, both models give similar trend
estimates: .44 ppm/year (linear model) and .39 ppm/year (multiplicative
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2 CO - AO+AI*TIME
4NOB - 127
RSQ; 0 20GS7
1.633 
COEF
AO
Al
F(1/1525) -
DW(ll) - 1.01
VALUE
3 9832
0. 49457
T-STAT
44 23860
19.92530
Table 15. Simple Regression of CO Versus Time, All Available
Data June 1969 through February 1975.
397. 023 SER -
1.00000
2.81033
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3 C0O - A+Al*TIME+A2*CO(-1)+B1*FRIDAY+B2*SATURDAY+B3*
SUNDAV+C 1 *UINU+C2* THTIL+C3*T
NOB - 1384
RSQ 0.53428 F(3/-1375) -
1.2414 DW(102 ) 1.58
COEF VALUE
197 176
T-STAT
SER -
MEAN
1.30114
0.26160
0.40901
0.33603
-0.65957
-1.04430
12.66680
1.46231
-0.01462
8.28602
11.51040
19 54290
3.3SS365
-6 .68726
-10.7220
12.46990
10 .030
-6.73142
1 . 00000
2.82890
5.02514
0.14234
0.14740
0.14884
0.09445
0.46040
52 .6610
4' CO - A+A2*CO(-1)+C1*<(+Al*TIME)*(l+Bl*FRIDAY+B2*
SATtRDAY+B3*SUNDAY )( 1+C2*THTIL ) ( 1+C3*T .DE) *UINV
NOB - 1384
RSQ - O.52351
1.Z 556
COEF
F(8/1375) -
DW(102) - 1.64
VALUE T-STAT
1.38934
0.43348
0. 06511
0.24657
0.16275
-0.28269
-0.55628
1. 22726
-0.01586
10.11350
21. 17720
5.98663
5.19964
2.81746
-5.31477
-10.12700
5 06201
-11.68550
1.00000
5.02514
21.85590
2.39174
0.22743
0.23236
0.23454
0.42179
5.60014
Table 16. Top: estimates for linear model, all data
Bottom: estimates for multiplicative model, all data
AOAl
A2
*B 1
B2
C1
·C3
188.835 SER -
MEAN
C1i
A1
. B2
' B3
C2
C3
1___11_ _ gl ---- --1..1 1-_1_1_1·1·11·-·-----^llli--·l·PI _
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model).
Inspection of the residual plots revealed no serious deficiencies
in the treatment of explantory factors, but they did show significant
problems with both the sample probability distribution of the residuals
and their autocorrelations. Though the problem of a "heavy tailed"
noise distribution can be handled by merely altering the estimation
technique to a robust one or by suitable transformation of the data,
the small but persistent autocorrelation of the residuals was a more serious
problem, :since it indicated that the model was misspecified.
To diagnose the problem, the model was refit without an auto-
regressive term and the time series nature of the resultant "corrected"
CO data was reinvestigated. The differences residual series did not
have significant autocorrelations beyond lag 2 and so a moving average
process of order 2 was indicated.
Based on this noise model, all parameters were again estimated,
as shown in Table 17. For simplicity, only the linear model was used;
the resultant model was of the same form as eq. 22 (without the auto-
regressive term), but with the noise model
(l-B)Et = (1-0 B-0 B)a (24)
where:
B = backshift operator, B at = at 1
at = a series of independent, identically distributed random
shocks
a), ,0 = parameters to be estimated
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148
8' CO - AO+A1*TIME+(1-TI )*(CO(-1 )-AO-A*TIME(-1 )-BI*FRIDAY(--)-82-BSATURDAY( - )-B3*SUNDAY(-I )-Cl*UIN(-1 )-C2THTIL(-1 )
-C3 ) T ))+( Tl*( -TI )-T2 )* (CO(-2)-AO-A4*TIE (-2)-Bl*FRIDAY (
-a )--Bi2*SATURDA Y(-2 )-B3SUNDAY(- )-CLX:U I (- )-CETHT I ( --
C3TE(- -2) )-TlTl*(l-Tl )-2*TlSTE+T2)( CO(-3)-AO-Al*TIME( -3 )-
1 FRIDAY( -3)-B*SATURDAY( --3 )-B3SUtDAY( -3)-Ci*U It(-3 )-C2*THTIL-3 )-C3T(-3 ) )+(TI*T*Tl* ( 1-T1 )-3TlTlT +2*Ti *T-T2:t
T )(Co( -4 ) O--A TIME (-4)-B FRIDAY(-4)-BaESATURDAY (-4)-B3
*JUNIA(AY-4 )-Cl*UINV(-4)-CTHTIL(-4 )-C3T(-4 ) )+( T l**I ( 1-T1)-4*T1*Tl*T1*T2+3*Tl1*Tl*T2-3*T*T2*T2+TZ*T2)*(CO(-S)-AO-A1*
TIME ( -S )-B l* FR I DAY( -S)-B*XSATt-'DA Y(-5 )-B3*SUNDAY(-S )-C l*
UINV( -S)-C0ZTHTIL(-S)-C3*T (-5) )+ ( TlS* ( 1-Tl )-S* (Tl 1*4ST2)+
4*T T 1 T*Tl T2-6*T T *T*T2+3 T1 Tl*T-T **3)*(CO (-6 ) --AO-A 
*TIME(-6)-Bl*FRIDA (-6)-B2*SATURDA (-3 -B3*SUNDAY (-G)-Cl*
UINV -S )-C2*THT IL ( -6 ) -C3.T ( -6 ) )+ T l*Z ( -T 1 )-GT1 *STl *T+S,
Tl**4*TZ-10*Tl**3*T2*T+6T 1*T*l T2T2-4TR*T2*T2*Tl1+T2**3)*
; (CO( --7)-AO-A*1 TItE ( -7)-Bl XFRIDAY(-7 ,-EB*SATURDAY (-7)-B3*
-.SUNDAY ( -7 ) -C UINV(-7)-CETHTI ( -7)-C3tT(-7 ) )+BIFRIDAY+B2*
SATURDAY+B3*SUNDAY+C1 *U INVt+CC*THTIL+C3*T
-E 10. 59 TO 61. 100 TO 101. 111 TO 185, 194 TO
MOb. Z59 TO 277. 291 TO0 97. 311 TO 319, 334 TO 346.
3S4 TO 38. 381 TO 392. 402 TO 408, 419 TO 421. 441 TO
471. 481 TO 487, 501 TO 523. 538 TO 545, 556 TO 568,
577 TO 583, 619 TO 67. 636 TO 639. 650 TO 756, 766 TO
774. 783 TO 805. 824 TO 827. 836. 920 TO 927, 1021 TO
t0t. 1077 TO 1080, 1089 TO 1099, 1110 TO 1126. 1179
TO 1193. 1202 TO 1208. 1217 TO 1220. 1230 TO 1237,
1247 TO 1254. 1266 TO 1297. 1306 TO 1312. 1332 TO 1333
1342 TO 1350o 1383, 1408 TO 1412, 1463 TO 1496, 1508
TO 1521. 1540 TO 1579, 1593 TO 1598. 1615 TO 1620,
1630 TO 1645, 1673 TO 1678, 1718 TO 1722, 1737 TO 1790
1803 TO 1813, 1832 TO 1841, 1869 TO 1911. 191., 1961
TO 1963, 1991 TO 2022, 2031 TO 2043
RSQ ' 0.65011 F(9892) - 184.1S6 SER - 1.0400DL(S?) a 1.S95
COEF VALUE . T-STAT MEAN
AO 0.46125 0. 8754 0.16179
Al e.40725 3.11520 0 45802
TI 0.60757 19.19760 -0.15602
B1 0.54570 S.79028 0.02333
· -0 .33046 -3. 33033 -0.02690
B3 -0.97900 -10 32380 0.02325
Ci 0.22378 17.67180 1.47956
C2 1.50942 10.17610 0.07358
*C3 0.01083 1.90794 8.64730
-. TZ 0..1404 4.84010 -0. 15961
Table 17. Approximate Fit of Linear Model with MA(2) Noise Model
_______________ ._ __
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This upgraded model fits the data significantly better, accounting
for about 65% of the variance of the CO data. The residuals (except
for two points) followed a normal distribution reasonably closely,
and were not significantly autocorrelated. Inspection of residual
plots revealed no model deficiencies, although the wind direction effect
term could perhaps be slightly improved.
Although the trend estimate of .41 ppm/year obtained from this model
is consistent with earlier results,. it is interesting to note that
the accuracy of this estimate, as indicated by its t-statistic, is
substantially less than would be expected based upon the previous
discussion of data requirements for trend measurements, and it is
worth further investigation. The basic structure of the final model used is
(l-B) (Y -a -a t) = (1-e B- B )at (25)tol( 1 2 5)
It can be shown that, for the maximum likelihood estimate al, and for
large samples:
2 2
V(1l) (1-81-82) /n (26)
where a1 implicitly has the dimensions of yt divided by the time between
observatons. Defining an accuracy factor K similarly to eq. 5, and
converting to a time dimension in years (assuming daily data) for
compatability with eq. 8, the above equation becomes:
.... .I .- 1 ...
a1 = 3bDK aa II-vl- 2 1 /¢n yr (Z7)
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The major difference between this calculation and that leading
to eq. 8 is the noise model. If 01 and 02 were zero, then the model could
be interpreted as predicting that observations will exhibit a random
walk about the trend line. It is well known that random walks are
characterized by long excursions from the expected value, which can lead
to an apparent, nondeterministic trend when no deterministic trend
exists. With independent noise, trend estimate accuracy increased with
time period due to two effects--increased number of data points,
which increases accuracy like T 1 /2 , and change in mean level of the series
with time, which contributes a factor like T. Since a random walk
is nonstationary in the mean, this second effect in not seen in eq. 27,
and so accuracy increase like T1 /2 instead of T3 /2
Equation 27 is disturbing, because it seems to imply that a very
high signal to noise ratio is necessary to detect a trend. With K,
aa, 01' and 02 taken from the regression of Table 17, the result is
l)min = 9.2 ppm/year. This is not what is observed, and the reason
is that the derivation of eq. 27 is extremely sensitive to the assumption
that the process is nonstationary. If instead it is assumed that:
(l-OB) (Y -ao -l t) (1-OB-0 B 2)at (28)
then: 2
oa (1-01-02 )2
~~~a 1 2 ~(29)
V(al) =
n (1-0) V(t)
2 2
aV~ ) a (30)
(a"o0 2 ,(1-()2
n (1-)
_ I __ _1_11_1_ ______
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where it has been implicitly assumed that E (t) = 0.
Both of these variances become larger as approaches 1, and
eq. 29 does not approach eq. 26 in the limit. The reason is that the
maximum likelihood estimators are different in the two cases--in eq.
26 the estimator is a function of the differenced series. There is,
of course, no analogue of eq. 30 for the nonstationary case, since
the mean is undefined.
This explains why it was not possible to obtain a good estimate
of a , but not why an apparently significant value was found for al1
The reason is that the approximate fitting technique used is not so
strongly sensitive to the assumption that =1. Putting eq. 29 in the same
form as eq. 8 gives:
(K A- |jl-e l-e 2 1 a (31)a -
1 w; T II -
and this is obviously very sensitive to the exact-value of ~.
For the Kenmore Square data, a value of ' .95 would be sufficient
to explain the estimated t-statistic of the final model. Inspection
of the truncated autoregressive series used for the estimation shows
that the weights change slightly for * f 1 but retain the same pattern;
this small model misspecification is probably counteracted by adjust-
ments in 081 and 082 in the fitting process.
At the Kenmore Square site, carbon monoxide is clearly increasing.
It is possible only to speculate about the reason for this, other than
to note that it is a deterministic trend and it does not seem to be due to
climatological factors. Some aspect of the local traffic pattern,
such as increased congestion resulting in a larger proportion of time at
idle, could perhaps account for the trend. That emission controls could
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perform so badly in use that emissions actually increased is not
plausible, but if in fact the trend is due to traffic variables then
apparently traffic control is more important than emission control in
affecting air quality (at least for this pollutant). This approach to
air pollution control has been little used to date, but may be the
key to improving air quality at CO hot spots like Kenmore Square.
There is clearly room for improvement in the model developed
here. That the residual series from the corrected, detrended CO
data should be so close to nonstationary is unsatisfying and has no
apparent physical basis. One approach to solving this would be to
perform a full cross-spectral analysis with the exogenous explanatory
variables, in the hopes that a transfer function model will eliminate
the problem. For this it will be necessary, however, to find ways
to cope with the numerous gaps typical of air pollution data. Another
possible avenue of investigation is better modeling of the meteorological
influences. Under some inversion conditions, for example, pollutants
will accumulate in the airshed and so build up from day to day until
the inversion is broken up. Under other conditions, there is essentially
no carryover from one day to the next. This kind of effect can't
be captured well be a time series model; some exogenous summary
measure closely related to the expected effect is needed, and that in
turn is best devised based upon physical reasoning and models. Lack
of detailed and comprehensive meteorological data, however, limits
the potential of this approach.
The interesting point to be made from all of this is that it is
very difficult to demonstrate, in a statistically sound fashion, that the
__
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calculated air quality trends are actually occurring. For at least this
one site, the expected substantial decline in CO from 1969 to 1975 does
not seem to have occurred. Though of course not conclusive, these results
also seem to indicate that a substantial period of time--more than a
decade--may be required to get a good measure of trends at a given site.
This is clearly unsatisfactory, and indicates a pressing need for improved
methods for analyzing air quality data.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the uncertainties which exist in regulation
of automotive emissions, and the ways in which regulation in the presence
of uncertainty should differ from regulation where there is no uncertainty.
Two kinds of uncertainties were identified: predictive uncertainty, which
is the limitation on ability to accurately forecast the future effects
of regulation, and measurement uncertainty, which is the limitation on
ability to accurately determine the present and past effect of regulation.
The two are not totally independent, since often measurements are the
basis for updating and improving predictions.
Given that uncertainty exists, there are a variety of ways of dealing
with it. The ability of a regulatory structure to adapt flexibly
in response to new knowledge is important, as is a mechanism for gathering
information on the progress being made in achieving regulatory goals.
For a risk-averse society, it is appropriate to incorporate a safety
margin into regulations like numerical emission standards to account
for the possibility of unforeseen problems. Finally, research can often
be a useful response to uncertainty.
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The gathering and analysis of data relating to progress in meeting
regulatory goals plays a central role in regulation under uncertainty,
since without such feedback, effects far different from those intended
could occur undetected. This, in addition to the coupling between
predictive and measurement uncertainty, is the reason that feedback
is the most important of the responses to uncertainty. Feedback can
be very useful, but is limited by several factors--measurement uncer-
tainty, time lag for feedback, and relevance of the quantity being
measured. These are interrelated, since time and measurement uncertainty
can sometimes be traded off against one another (as in measuring trends
in air quality) and since the time delay tends to become longer and
longer as information gathered becomes more directly relevant to
ultimate goals. For example, for automobiles, assembly line audits
provide some information about emission performance, with a lag time
of order one month. Field surveillance can provide better information
on actual emissions, with a lag of several years. Analysis of air
quality trends provides an even better indicator, but can require
many years of data to provide meaningful information. Relating the
trends to improvements in public health would probably require considerably
longer.
Two forward links and two associated feedback links were examined
in detail in this chapter, as indicated by the numbered links in
Figure 1. Ability to predict and to measure both in-use emissions and
air quality was analyzed in terms of the sources and magnitude of uncer-
tainty for each. Since the circumstances of specific real situations
vary widely, these calculations were intended to be more illustrative of
_ ___
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the size of the uncertainties than rigorously demonstrative. The major factor
limiting accurate measurement of aggregate emissions is the number of
vehicles tested. Assuming that current test procedures adequately reflect
emissions on the road expansion of current surveillance efforts should
be sufficient to allow good estimation of exhaust emissions on a city-
specific basis. This expanded surveillance should include tests for
evaporative and crankcase emissions. The current test procedure is
not, however, a good direct measure of in-use emissions. Ambient conditions
and, to a lesser extent, vehicle operating patterns, have strong effects on
emissions. There is a need for expanded exploratory surveillance to quantify these
effects accurately, to better relate the test results to in-use emissions.
Prediction of future aggregate emissions is more uncertain than
measurement, since it is based in part on future emission from vehicles
which exist now. Long range predictions are very uncertain--by a factor of
2 or so--since they depend heavily on estimates of emissions from
vehicles which do not yet exist, even as conceptual designs. This is
true even when it is assumed that the standards are met in certification
testing. The test procedure simply does not indicate well what in-use
emissions will be and it is necessary to apply large corrections to measured
emissions in order to estimate actual emissions. The corrections are
empirical and not well tested, and so much of the uncertainty can only
be resolved by feedback.
Since there are uncertainties in predicting changes in air quality
which are over and above those due to uncertainties in emissions, it
is desirable to be able to directly measure changes in air quality.
This is a statistical problem which has received little attention to date,
and so most current methodologies for measuring trends in air quality
are crude. Compounding the problem is the general lack (except in California)
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of more than a few years of acceptable quality data. It appears that,
for data with a well behaved stochastic component, roughly three or four
years of data are necessary to measure a trend of around the expected
size to within 20% accuracy.
Even given perfect prediction of emissions, it is difficult to
forecast air quality. Air quality models have large uncertainties associated
with their predictions. The rollback model is particularly worth examining
because it is simple and widely used. If proper corrections are used
for street canyoning and for source-receptor distance, rollback should
be reasonably accurate for CO and total NO . This assumes that an
adequate baseline is used to define present air quality, and does
not consider the inherent uncertainty in projections of future air
quality (by any model)associated with climatological fluctuations
or uncertainties in emissions. Projections of 0x depend strongly
on the relation of 0 to the primary pollutants, which is not well
x
known. Little confidence can thus be placed in projections of 0 .
In the final section of this chapter, an attempt was made to develop
an improved methodology for measuring trends in air quality. The intent
was to measure trends in a way which was statistically sound and which
properly separated deterministic trends (due to emissions) from nondeterministic
ones (for example, those climatological variations). Based on analysis
of data from Kenmore Square, Boston, it appears to be feasible to
correct ambient pollution data for the effects of meteorology. However,
the stochastic component of these data have an internal structure which
made it more difficult to measure trends than would be the case with
well-behaved data. If the Boston data were shown to be typical, then
the a priori estimate of 3-4 years of data to measure a trend would have
I __ _ __ _
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to be substantially increased. This is an area where further research
is needed.
Serious problems in our ability to actually know and understand the
emissions of the in-use vehicle fleet and the present levels of pollution
in the ambient air have been identified and estimated, and the even more
serious difficulties in predicting these quantities for future years
have been described and analyzed. Lack of recognition of these
uncertainties can lead to undesirably inflexible regulation, to margins
for error not compatible with the risk of missing regulatory goals, and to
failure to adequately monitor success in meeting long term goals.
The analysis presented here focussed on the last problem, and
the sorts of data collection and analysis which should be undertaken have
been described. Without substantially increased effort to lower the
degree of uncertainty in these areas, the national program for
automotive emissions control will continue to proceed without any clear
measures of its present or future effectiveness.
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Chapter 3
AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS AND THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
by
E. Allen Jacobs and Lawrence H. Linden
1. Introduction
In an effort to lessen dependence on imports of petroleum by
cutting gasoline usage, Congress in 1975 passed the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act, mandating fuel economy standards for automobiles
produced in (or imported into) the United States. This legislation
is unique in the history of federal automotive regulation. It re-
quires that every manufacturer (or importer) meet a specified average
fuel economy for the fleet of vehicles it produces (or imports) in
any model year. The EPCA regulations are in notable contrast to the
regulation of automotive air pollution and safety, where each indiv-
idual vehicle must meet a specified standard. This difference is
important because the automobile is not a homogeneous product. The
principal characteristic which differentiates automobiles among the
various segments of the automotive market is the size and hence the
weight of the car, and weight is the crucial determinant of fuel
economy. Technical changes alone may not bring the average fuel econ-
omy of a firm's production up to the fleet standard; altering the
composition of the sales fleet may therefore become an important
strategy for firms attempting to meet the standard. Thus, not only
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are technical changes called for by the law, but, because of the
flexibility inherent in a fleet average standard, changes in industry
marketing strategies are likely to result as well. This may have
important implications for the prices, profits, and structure of the
industry.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the likely impact of the
new regulations. In particular, we will focus on the industry's re-
sponse to this law and the impact of the law on the structure of the
industry.
It is particularly important that the level of policy discus-
sion in this area be raised at the present time. The recently pro-
posed "National Energy Plan"2 would modify the structure of fuel econ-
omy regulation by imposing a tax/rebate scheme on top of the present
regulatory system. Thus, the structure of the regulatory system it-
self will presumably come again to the attention of policy makers,
and the opportunity for useful changes will arise. The difficulties
with the present system arise in large part because Congress chose to
impose measures only on the automobile suppliers, even though success
in meeting the mandate may require changes in incentives to vehicle
buyers. The tax/rebate scheme may be an important step to rectify-
ing this difficulty.
This paper focuses on the situation where the automobile manu-
facturers are faced with violating the standards if traditional pric-
ing and marketing strategies are used. It now appears that the trend
in consumer purchases toward smaller cars, in combination with the
_ ·_ ___I_ 
__ _
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available technical improvements in automobiles, will very likely not
keep up with the increasingly stringent fuel economy standards, there-
by resulting in violations in the early 1980's. The analysis consists
principally of a simple look at the production incentives in this
circumstance, that is which production possibilities become more
profitable and which become less so. Only the simplest assumptions
about the structure of demands and costs are made. We do not review
all the relevant data, and considerably more analysis would be re-
quired before our conclusions could be written quantitatively. How-
ever, we believe that our simple analysis provides sound evidence that
there will be important and disagreeable incentive effects which were
not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation.
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief review of the
provisions of the EPCA, the paper turns to an examination of the
situation where producers are faced with the possibility of violating
the standards. Five aspects of this circumstance are examined. First,
what are the strategies available to the manufacturers are described.
Second, the simple profit-maximizing response of the firm in this situation,
namely violating the standards and passing through the penalties, is
examined. Third, the reasons why the manufacturers will likely strive
to avoid violations are discussed along with the resulting pricing
patterns. Then the impact of these corporate strategies on the struc-
ture of the industry is addressed. Finally, two possible solutions
to the difficulties in the law are discussed. The paper will also
set forth some illustrative calculations of price changes, fuel saved,
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and the cost of this policy.
2. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act mandates average fuel
economy standards for major manufacturers and importers (above 10,000
cars per year) beginning with the 1978 model year, as shown in Table 1.
The 1978 standard is 18.0 mpg. The standard progressively tightens
until an average fuel economy of 27.5 mpg is required by 1985. The
Secretary of Transportation sets the exact standards from 1981 to 1984,
but within strict guidelines. The standard applies to each manu-
facturer and to each importer and refers to total cars produced or
imported (rather than cars sold). The required average fuel econ-
omy is a harmonic average:
Q1 + Q2 + ' + Qn
M =
Q1 + Q2 + ... + Qn
m1 m2 mn
where
M sales-weighted new car harmonic average fuel economy
Qi= the number of model i vehicles produced
m.= the fuel economy of model i vehicles
n = the number of different models
and each of these is for a given firm in a specified model year.
Alternatively:
QT
M =
n
i= Qli-l
1 1111
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where
n
i=l
= the total number of vehicles (for the given firm
in a specific model year)
The harmonic average fuel economy is the inverse of the (arithmetic)
average fuel consumption:
1
The harmonic average fuel economy is used in the law in place of
the simple arithmetic average because it more accurately reflects the
fuel consumption of the new car fleet. Consider, for example, a fleet
of cars of which half get 50 mpg and half get 15. The simple average
fuel economy is 32.5 mpg ( 50 + 1 15). However, for each gal-
lon of gasoline consumed, the fleet will, on the average (and assum-
ing equal distances driven by each vehicle), get 23.1 miles
. 1 + 2. 1 _ Twenty-three and one-tenth mpg is the harmonic
average fuel economy. While the direct reflection of the national
goals is an appealing feature, we will see below that the nonlinearities
introduced by use of the harmonic average results in some unusual ef-
fects.
Civil penalties are prescribed for a violator of the law --
$50 for each average mile-per-gallon below the standard, multiplied by
the number of cars produced or imported. Credits for production above
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Table 1
Automotive Fleet Average Fuel Economy Standards
under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
Model Year Standard (mpg)
1978 18.0
1979 19.0
1980 20.0
1981-1984 To be determined by the
Secretary of Transportationa
1985 and
thereafter 27.5
Notes:
To be prescribed by July 1, 1977. Must be set at the "maximum
feasible average fuel economy level, and ... [must] result in
steady progress toward meeting the ... standard ... for model
year 1985."
The Secretary may alter this to the "maximum feasible average
fuel economy," but such action may be disapproved by Congress
for levels below 26.0 or above 27.5 mpg.
_ __I_ __ _____
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the standard are calculated similarly, but can only be applied to the
previous year's penalty. The Secretary of Transportation can reduce
or modify the penalty of a manufacturer which applies for relief if:
this is necessary to prevent bankruptcy; failure to meet the standard
resulted from "an act of God, a strike, or a fire"; or the Federal
Trade Commission decides that the normal penalty would lessen com-
petition in the industry. The FTC will make such recommendations
on a case-by-case basis for each firm which applies for relief. Manu-
facturers who make fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles annually
can apply for an exemption from the Secretary of Transportation (the
"Checker Cab provision"); the Secretary of Transportation then sets
alternative standards for such firms but does not alter the penalty
structure.
3. Evaluating Potential Industry Responses
Industry responses to the fuel economy legislation may be
categorized in three sets, depending on the length of time required for
effectiveness, which in turn depends on the degree to which new tech-
nology and changes in vehicle designs and physical plant are required.
Major new technological advances, such as advanced high-efficiency
powerplants, new transmissions, or new lightweight materials, will not be
available in quantity until the late 1980's at the earliest. Advanced
power systems, such as the gas turbine and Stirling engines, have been
under active investigation by the industry since automotive emissions
became a major national issue in the late 1960's, and in some cases
before then. It takes a minimum of 15-20 years for the research,
development, introduction, and diffusion within the industry of such a
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major technological innovation. Medium-run responses, using the
technology available at any given time to modify the vehicle designs
and physical plant, and thus new cars, can be implemented industry-
wide in a period of 3 to 8 years. Massive programs utilizing the
available technology to improve automotive fuel economy were initiated
by the automotive industry in the 1972-74 period, and were accelerated after
the price increases in gasoline in early 1974. They are now beginning
to come to fruition in new automobiles such as the Chevette and the
down-sized standard vehicles introduced in model year 1976. Technical
improvements to the spark-ignition gasoline engine, utilization of the
diesel engine in passenger cars, and various other weight-saving and
minor fuel economy changes are included in this category.
Thus, the fuel economy of the vehicles offered to the American
public is now improving rapidly and will continue to do so. Also over
this period, vehicle buyers have continued their long-established
trend toward the purchase of smaller, more efficient vehicles (although
there are continuing short-term fluctuations).
It now appears that the combination of the available technolog-
ical changes plus the trends in buyer behavior will suffice to meet the
fleet fuel economy standards until about the early 1980s. There now
exists a good possibility that at that time the standards will become
binding on some firms, i.e., that, all else held the same, the stan-
dard would be violated. This circumstance, and the possible short-
run responses of the automobile manufacturers, are the focus of this
study.
___ _· ______
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The manufacturers have essentially two options. One is simply
to treat the fines as added costs, and to absorb them or pass them through
to consumers to the same extent as they would any other increase in
costs. This is the short-run profit-maximizing strategy for either a
monopolist or a competitive firm. There are, however, important non-
economic considerations in the short-run which could have significant
economic effects over the long run; thus a firm might instead try not
to violate the standard.
The alternative to absorbing or passing through costs is to alter
the sales mix between high and low fuel economy cars to raise the
average fuel economy of cars produced, so as to approach or meet the
standard. A firm can produce both large cars (with lower fuel economy)
which fall below the standard and small cars which more than meet the
standard. Switching buyers from large cars to small cars is not al-
ways possible. Real preferences currently exist for both large and
small cars. This differentiates automobile demand according to fuel
economy. Thus, buyers cannot easily be switched from purchasing low
mileage cars to high mileage cars. Therefore, a firm which follows
this strategy of attempting to meet the standard must use some com-
bination of two tactics -- advertising campaigns and pricing decisions
-- to influence buyer decisions. We will focus on pricing strategies.
4. Profit-Maximizing Strategy: Violating the Standards
The simple profit-maximizing response to this law is to treat
the penalty and credits as an extra production cost. This cost will
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vary among cars according to the fuel economy of that car. The penalty
is a civil fine that is assessed from after-tax profits. Thus, the
before-tax cost of this penalty (to be added to all other before-tax
costs) is an adjustment of the actual penalty. The penalty thus is
given by
l_ z K(S - M)Qr M < S
P I
0 M > S
where
P = total penalty
Z = the corporate profit tax rate (.48)
K = the civil fine per mile-per-gallon difference from
the standard,per car produced (set to $50 in the
EPCA)
S = the standard (Table 1)
Then the average penalty (for M < S) on production of any car is
1
AP K (S - M)1 - Z
The marginal penalty for production of an incremental vehicle of model
i is given by:
MP =DP
i Qi
8P dQT ap dM
ag, dQi am dQi=( U- ) ( -- + ( p ) ( -d )
1 1
= [(1 ZK(SM - 1))KQ [ (1 M
= ( K ) [- M 2 M )1-ZK  [S-n(2-XM.
1 _ I _ _ _ _ I_
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It can be seen here that the average and marginal penalties are not
dependent on the production total. The average penalty depends
solely on a constant and the difference between the firm average fuel
economy and the standard; the marginal penalty for a particular model
depends on the constant, the standard, the firm average fuel economy,
and the fuel economy of the particular model.
This marginal penalty will be treated by the profit-maximizing
th
firm as a simple addition to the marginal cost of the i model. Ac-
cording to the usual tenets of economic theory, it will be absorbed
partly by producers and partly by consumers, depending on the elas-
ticities of demand and supply, and the degree of competition in the auto-
motive market. Under perfect competition, firms attempt to pass on the
full amount of the marginal penalty. Demand then adjusts, and prices
follow. If all other costs (per car) are constant, a firm with mon-
opoly power alters price and output until marginal revenue increases
by the amount of the marginal penalty. Since a change in output
changes marginal revenue more than it changes price (average revenue),
the monopoly firm will absorb much of the cost and pass on the rest
to the consumer. A firm within an oligopoly will increase prices by
more than the monopolist but by less than the firm in perfect compe-
tition. The automotive companies will use the additional marginal cost
as a guide for increasing a car's price. The initial price increase
would be slightly less than this amount and would be based on simple
judgment. This reflects confidence in their firms' market power, but
an uncertainty about the extent of this market power. Further price
changes would either be trial and error variations or would be left
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solely to dealers.
The price change dictated by proper treatment of the marginal
penalty may alter the firm's sales mix and bring the firm within the
standard. Then the marginal penalty would be zero. In this case, the
firm would settle on a smaller price change, one which maintains the
firm's average fuel economy just at the standard.
A simple example illuminates the key characteristics of this unique
regulation and its penalty structure. Several assumptions are required.
First, over the relevant period, no (further) technological improvements
in fuel economy are available. Second, the important distinction among
automobiles produced is that some cars more than meet the standard
fuel economy while others fall below this level. Assume that only
two models are produced. Model A is larger and gets 15 mpg according
to the official Environmental Protection Agency measurements used
under the law; Model B is smaller and gets 30 mpg. Third, let the
fuel economy standard be set at 25 mpg.
Now consider the case where the firm produces an equal amount of
both models. Then the harmonic average sales-weighted fuel economy of
this firm is 20 mpg, and the firm will be assessed an average penalty
of $250 per car out of profits, or about $480 per car before
taxes. The added marginal cost in penalty before tax of producing an-
other "A"-type car (MPA) is $1,122. The marginal reduction in penalty
before tax of producing another "B"-type car (-MPB ) is $160. Figure 1
shows how the average and marginal penalties vary with the production
mix between these two classes of cars.
\· __ ____ I I__
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Several results can be gleaned from this example. First, it is
immediately apparent that a very important determinant of the short-
run marginal cost of any one model will be the current overall sales
mix of the firm, as it influences the firm's current average fuel econ-
omy.
An unusual feature of this penalty structure is that the more
a firm is violating the standard the weaker are the incentives, at the
margin, to comply. That is, at higher sales fractions of model A
vehicles, the marginal penalty on model A is lower and the marginal
credit for production of a model B car is reduced. In fact, as shown
in Figure 1, the marginal penalty for the small car is positive under
certain circumstances. That is, production of a car whose fuel economy
is better than the standard increases the total magnitude of the pen-
alty! This occurs when sales are dominated by large cars; the increas-
ingly small improvement in average fuel economy of the firm producing
another small car is offset by the increase in the total quantity of
vehicles produced.
The unusual incentives implicit in this penalty structure may
be seen in one far-fetched example. Assume that a different firm's
harmonic fuel economy average were 15 mpg when the standard was 25 mpg.
If this firm could produce a stripped-down model (or "souped-up" go-
cart) which cost $2,500 to make and got 90 mpg then this firm could
make $100 on each of the first few of these cars that were given away
free! This follows from the marginal penalty being -$2,604 at the
introduction of such a car.
I _IIIIIIY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l___l~~~~~~~~~~~~~l~ ~ ~ ~  l11111 ---- -
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This perverse relationship of marginal penalty to average fuel
economy is due to the use of the harmonic averaging procedure. Had a
simple average fuel economy been specified, then the marginal penalties
would be constant. As previously discussed, however, this would lead
to inaccurate representations of fleet fuel consumption. Another
alternative would have been to place the penalty on the difference
between fleet average fuel consumption (gallons/mile) and a specified
standard (say l/S); this again would give constant marginal penalties.
This simple two-car model offers clues to the law's possible impact
on industry structure beyond the short run. By making several restric-
tive assumptions, possible scenarios for the evolution of the industry
can be examined. First, assume that all firms have similar costs,
other than penalties, and similar product technology. Second, each
firm alters production capacity between the two models in an effort to
increase total profits of the firm, that is, capacity is added where
price is greater than cost and eliminated where price is less than cost.
Third, the rate of production capacity changeover between these two
models is limited to a fraction of total capacity. Fourth, the only
differentiation of automobile demand is among the two sizes, so that a
firm cannot maintain a price higher than a competitor's price on that
model. Fifth, the two types of cars are partial substitutes and the
own-price effect on total industry sales is the normal inverse rela-
tion. Finally, assume that the firm with the lowest marginal penalty
for a given model will set the market price for that model at the level
of normal cost plus marginal penalty. A justification for this behav-
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ioral assumption about the industry is that most firms wish to increase
their market share as long as normal profit margins are maintained.
Alternative approaches might include specifying some degree of oligop-
olistic collusion or monopolistic competition with product differentia-
tion of each model size. These approaches complicate analysis without
adding new results.
It is possible to examine scenarios by assuming the existence of
several firms (with hypothesized production mixes) which are in equil-
ibrium at the initiation of the structure of penalties. Several con-
clusions are evident. Calculations refer to the two-model example dis-
cussed above. First, the firm which is breaking the standard the most
will set the market price for large inefficient cars because their mar-
ginal penalty will be the lowest. This firm would also have the high-
est (algebraically) marginal penalty for small cars and so would begin
to leave that business for increased large car production. Other
firms will continue to get out of large car production, until they
just meet the standard, because they are selling at a price less than
the sum of normal costs, and marginal penalty. At this point, the "law
abiding" firms will take whatever price (above normal cost) enables them
to sell the maximum amount of large cars (Model A) while just meeting
the fuel economy standard (four "B" cars to one "A" car in our example).
This circumstance may permit the existence of a firm producing
all large cars. If the market-clearing price is more than $961 above
normal prices when all firms just meet the standard, then, in this
example, there would be room for at least one firm to produce only large
I _ _____i_____
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cars and to make excess profits. The price of large cars would then be
set by the firm(s) producing large cars and this price would lie be-
tween the full cost including the marginal penalty and the market-clear-
ing price in the absence of this (these) firm(s). The small car price
will be cut enough to maintain the sales mix of the firms at the stan-
dard.
Firms which have a sales mix that brings the average fuel econ-
omy well within the standard will be consistently undercut on small car
prices. (This is not true in the case of a two-firm world, where one
firm builds large cars only and the other small cars. If neither firm
charges monopoly prices then this world is stable). The failure of
such a firm to expand its large car production share until it just meets
the standard will bring continual economic losses until the firm goes
out of business. The latter result is a perverse penalty for spec-
ializing in the production of fuel efficient cars. Ultimately all
firms either exactly meet the standard or produce only large cars.
If the purpose of this standard and penalty is to alter future
gasoline consumption, then this penalty acts as a very erratic charge
or subsidy upon anticipated gasoline use. The penalty may be viewed
as a tax which is shared between firms and consumers. The result is
demonstrated by returning to the initial example where a firm produces
and sells equal amounts of Model A and Model B cars. The marginal
penalty on Model A cars is equivalent to an average charge of 16.8 cents
per gallon over the lifetime of the car. The marginal rebate on Model
B cars is equivalent to an average subsidy of 4.8 cents per gallon.
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5. Pricing to Meet the Standard
The preceding analysis has assumed that the economic incentives
and penalties of this law were the only new influence on a firm's be-
havior. However, the penalties in this law are not taxes but civil
fines which are assessed after a firm has been declared by a court to
be in violation of federal law. In the eyes of many automobile industry
executives, the public relations "cost" of being labeled a law-breaker
dominates any careful consideration of penalty costs.
Another danger to firms which blindly follow the economic pen-
alties and incentives of this law is that the law could easily change.
Judging from past experience with Congress in federal automobile regu-
lation (safety and emissions), automotive firms view future fuel econ-
omy standards with great uncertainty. One response is to design more
flexibility into production capacity, at additional expense. Of more
interest here, a second response is to view government intent as more
relevant than the exact wording of the law. The intent of Congress in
this law is clearly that the automotive companies should adhere to the
fuel economy standard.
Thus, through a fear of bad public relations, or changes in the
law, the largest automotive companies are in fact now planning to
meet the standard in their production, even if this is more costly
(both to themselves and buyers) than paying penalties. Calculating
just what this additional cost is first requires the determination
of the optimal strategy for a firm which constrains itself to meet
the standard in the short run, i.e., given that all reasonable tech-
_ I _ _ ·_·_ I I I _ I I·_I____ _____
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nological improvements have been made.
For a firm constraining itself to meet the standard in the short
run, the optimal strategy is given by the results of the following simple
constrained maximization problem. When the standard is constraining,
the firm will want to meet the standard exactly (no safety margin is
required in this simple model with no uncertainty). The constraint
implied by exactly meeting the standard is given by:
M= S
or
(S 1) Q = 0
i=l
For the simple example used earlier, this yields the requirement that
the firm should produce 80% model B and 20% model A vehicles. Profits,
to be maximized over all possible vectors [Q1i Qn] are given by:
n
= QiRi - Ci]
i=l
where ( {..} refers to functional dependence):
R.= price of model i cars
1 2 n
=R.i{Ql Q2' Qn
C.= total cost of producing model i cars
= C. {Q , Q2 ''' Qn}
R = profits of a given firm
1 2 ... Qn
3-20
If it is assumed that for one firm purchases of a given model
depend only on the price of that model, profit maximization takes
·the following form, where X is a Lagrange multiplier:
n
a Q ( Qi (- ))] 
i=1
or
__ S M)
M.Qi 1
In this very simplified case, we see that the marginal profit (or
loss) from production and sale of a given model must be proportional to the
fractional amount by which that model's fuel economy is exceeded by (or
exceeds) the standard. That is, when the firm is just meeting the stan-
dard the incremental production of a profitable large car must be
countered by appropriate incremental changes in production of other cars;
if the firm is at a profit-maximizing production mix, the marginal
changes in profits will be in the same proportion as the differences
between the model fuel economies and the standard. With a specifica-
tion of market structure (e.g., perfect competition or monopoly as
indicated in the demand function faced by the firm), this set of
equations yields a single set of prices and quantities. It is extremely
unlikely that any firm would attempt to calculate the optimal pricing
and output strategy using this formula. The structure of demand is
____ _ I _____
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volatile and estimates are very uncertain. However this framework con-
ceptually expresses the pricing and output strategy that is implicitly
sought by the firms through guestimate, trial, and error.
With reasonable assumptions on demand -- that the
price elasticities of each model and the cross-price elasticities be-
tween models are finite and of the expected signs -- then the solution
to this problem is a strategy of cutting small car prices and increas-
ing the price of large fuel inefficient cars. The impact on the in-
dustry structure of this behavior is clear. The sales mix of all firms
will gravitate toward the point where each firm just meets the fuel econ-
omy standard. With similar technology, this means a similar mix by model
size among all firms. Otherwise, firms selling more large cars would
violate the standard, and firms selling primarily small cars would be
undercut in price by firms subsidizing small cars in order to meet the
standard.
The magnitude of possible price changes in this situation can be
estimated by considering the necessary change in the sales mix for the
industry as a whole. A fuel economy improvement in the neighborhood of
15% (3 mpg if current fuel economy is 21 mpg) may be achieved by increas-
ing the small car production share by 50% (e.g., 40% to 60%). Using
one recent set of estimates7 this might be done by dropping the price
on small cars by 10% and increasing the price of large size and midsize
cars by 25%. These data are very crude because the estimates used
are based upon present market shares and not increases from some future
arrangement of shares. Also, the cost of technological improvements
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is very uncertain at present.
A crude estimate of the welfare cost to society that results
from having prices altered from present prices is approximately $1.7
billion annually. The largest share of this loss occurs from the
increased purchases of small cars made when their price is cut below
cost. The relevant model vehicles would consume something like 6 bil-
lion gallons less than otherwise over their normal lifetime of use.
The average cost of reduced gasoline consumption would then be about
29¢ for each gallon saved.
6. Impact of the Law Upon the Automotive Industry
The likelihood that the standard will constrain production some
time before 1985 is very great. Therefore, the average fuel economy
standards now mandatory by law could dramatically alter the structure,
sales, and pricing of the automotive industry as it has existed since
World War II. We have discussed two possible strategies for the in-
dustry in dealing with the fleet average fuel economy standard. One
would be to ignore the non-economic, or long-run, penalties of vio-
lating the law, and treat the fines as simply as additional costs.
The other would be to meet the standard, at some net cost in profits
foregone relative to violating the standards. Of course, the facts are
most likely somewhere in between the extreme assumptions behind these cases
-- the companies are certainly willing to pay something more than the
amount of the fines in order to avoid breaking the law, but it is un-
clear how much. It also is not clear how much they will have to pay,
_ __ I _____  _______ 
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or when; this depends on changes in consumer tastes, the price of gas-
oline, other government policies, and other variables out of their con-
trol. However, whether or not the companies choose to meet the stan-
dard, the results will be qualitatively the same: the prices of small
cars will be lowered, relative to their cost, and the prices of large
cars will be raised. Thus the qualitative implications of the law
are similar in either case.
Furthermore, this law pressures all firms toward a similar model
mix. The production mix becomes one of the most important determinants
of cost for a firm. Pricing margins which have not been set through
explicit economic calculation, but through years of trial and error,
will be rapidly and continually altered. The survival of small car
producers or importers in the face of reduced prices for their prod-
uct will depend upon their ability to break into the more rewarding
large car market. Yet the barriers to entry into a new sector of the
automotive market are notorious. Unless these firms make this move in
the near future they will be faced with the difficulty of raising
large amounts of capital for a new venture while taking losses on all
small car sales.
The Big Three -- General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler -- have the
most diverse product lines and produce most of the large cars, while
the smallest firms produce mostly small cars. Thus, the pressure in
this law to cut prices on small cars could lead to actions which the
larger firms fear would be labeled as predatory pricing, an anti-
trust violation. Thus, GM will attempt to avoid any quick or large
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cuts in small car prices. The resulting competitive disadvantage might
prompt GM to try a dealer policy designed to increase small car sales.
Quotas based on fuel economy might be allocated to (or "forced" upon)
dealers or incentives offered without significant changes in wholesale
prices. This simply passes the price-twisting incentive on to deal-
ers. However, each of the large manufacturers has more than one dealer
organization. Each organization may sell only a portion of a manu-
facturer's output, making cross-subsidization within dealerships dif-
ficult. For example, Chevrolet sales must be somewhat subsidized by
Cadillac sales, which cannot be done at the dealer level. (This would
be corrected if each dealer organization moved toward selling the com-
plete line of vehicle bodies as to some extent they are now doing.)
One possible outcome of such a situation is merger. Because
each firm's production must meet an average standard there is a great
incentive for firms to sell off the production of certain lines (per-
haps while continuing to market the same cars) or to take over the
production (but not marketing) of other car lines. It is doubtful
whether the Justice Department would approve such activity by Ford
or GM. However, a tremendous incentive exists for trade between a
threatened importer such as Volkswagen and a large car producer such
as Chrysler.
Another result of this legislation will be increased production
costs for all American producers. The situation described in this paper
implies a more volatile and unpredictable automobile market. Unfore-
seen actions by the government, consumers, and rival firms bring great
U__·lll___ll___lll__q__------··lll---l . -----^1111^ -1 · ^1_ 1_11______
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uncertainty for an individual firm. A more flexible and adaptable
firm has a competitive advantage. Production facilities will be de-
signed for quick changeovers or varied production at the expense of
higher cost plants and slower production. Also, the installation of
fuel-consuming extras -- such as air conditioning -- will likely be
shifted from the factory to the aftermarket, so that the manufacturers
would avoid the attendant penalties which apply only to automobile
producers.
However, it is the impact on pricing, and thus profits, which
will be the most important. The shake-up of the industry structure
resulting from these standards may bring the end for companies recently
in trouble, such as Chrysler. Industry observers predict that Chrysler
would receive an exemption from these standards, were its existence
truly threatened. The law permits (with no Congressional veto) the Sec-
retary of Transportation to drop or modify a firm's penalty if this is
necessary to prevent bankruptcy. This exemption along with Chrysler's
current size might insure a permanent niche in the automobile market
as a predominantly large-car producer. The Secretary can also reduce
or drop a firm's penalty if the Federal Trade Commission rules that
competition would be lessened otherwise. A manufacturer must first
apply to the FTC for such relief. It is obvious that, even though
it will not incur any penalty, American Motors Corporation is the com-
pany most seriously threatened by this legislation. Incredible as it
may seem, it would be in AMC's interest (and would certainly be a leg-
itimate complaint) to apply for penalty exemptions for Ford and General
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Motors, so that the pressures on these large firms to reduce small car
prices are alleviated. However, relief is only provided to violators
who apply for it.
Finally, it should be noted that we have assumed implicitly that
the present firms have similar access to new product designs and new
product technology. In the dynamics of the adjustment to the standards,
differences in these fronts could be crucial. In fact, it may well be
the case that General Motors and Ford can adapt their product lines
more rapidly and more effectively than Chrysler or American Motors, as
the larger firms' greater profitability allows more and superior
technical resources to be addressed to the problem. Thus either American
Motors and Chrysler would be threatened, or Ford and General Motors would
keep prices high relative to cost.
7. Possible Solutions
There is at least one policy action which would maintain the struc-
ture of the present law and its incentives for the industry as a whole,
yet would mitigate the changes in the structure of the industry. This
would be the creation of a market in the rights to produce fuel-inef-
ficient cars, where the production would be counted in the average fuel
economy of the buyer of the rights but not the seller. A firm such as
American Motors could sell rights to produce fuel-inefficient cars up
to the point where it still just meets the standard. A firm which
will not meet the standard could either buy rights from a firm making
efficient cars or pay the penalty. A firm which produced primarily fuel-efficient
____
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cars then would not suffer losses. In fact, its competitive position
would be better than the present situation. The real return of produ-
cing an incremental small car would be the price for which it can be
sold plus the price of additional fuel economy rights which the firm
could sell. Using the example cited earlier, assume that a second firm
makes only model B cars (30 mpg). Producing one more B car would en-
able it to sell rights to the first company considered (firm average
of 20 mpg) worth up to $160.25.
Such a plan would tend to equalize the marginal penalty of the
same car between the firms. That is, the marginal penalty or extra
marginal cost would be less dependent on the production mix of any
one firm and more dependent on the industry's production mix. Thus
this plan would distribute the incentive across the industry. The
perverse incentives faced by some firms and the extreme incentives
faced by other firms would be "averaged." All firms within the industry
would face the same incentive, yet fuel savings would be similar.
This market might resemble the "entitlements" market for price-
controlled oil where manufacturers can buy and sell rights to lower-
priced oil. However this market for fuel economy rights is not allowed
within current law and would require action by Congress before the
industry could engage in such activity.
Another possible solution is for the government to take over the
cross-subsidization between model lines. This would require an explicit
recognition that the present law places the burden for reducing gasoline
consumption entirely on the vehicle producers. In fact, price controls
--------- -
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on crude oil encourage the purchase of relatively inefficient vehicles.
Thus the government could impose a tax/rebate scheme, whereby efficient
vehicles are subsidized and inefficient vehicles are taxed. The system
could be arranged so that the net take to the government is zero. This
is essentially the scheme proposed by President Carter. The analysis
presented above has not been extended to this case, but a few simple
conclusions are nevertheless quite apparent.
Most importantly, a tax/rebate scheme alleviates, in principle,
the grossest of the industry impacts discussed above -- the pressures on
producers to separate prices from costs, with a difference that depends
on the model mix. A well-specified tax/rebate scheme would permit prices
to producers to remain near production costs, while altering prices to
consumers to reflect the social cost of gasoline consumption. In terms
of the present structure of the industry, the larger firms would feel
the burden of change, while AMC would have its vehicles subsidized. In
essence, the government would take over the cross-subsidization, be-
tween vehicle classes, which will likely be handled very awkwardly by
the automotive firms under the standard.
Of course a major difficulty is the determination of the tax/
rebate schedule. The setting of prices -- and their tuning to fluc-
tuations in the market -- is the forte of industry, relative to govern-
ment, and results of a misplaced schedule may be severe. Given the
present standards, the key parameter in the tax/rebate scheme is the
degree of "tilt." If it is too low, the problems discussed above will
be only partly eliminated. If it is too high, the present fuel
economy law would be completely superfluous, because consumer buying
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decisions would bring average fuel economies above standards.
An important issue raised in connection with the proposed tax/
rebate scheme is its effect of subsidizing imports, since imported cars
are presently more efficient, in average, than domestically produced
vehicles. We have not analyzed this issue. It appears that the choice
is a fundamental one, between free trade and aggregate gasoline con-
sumption. However, it should be noted that the present system puts
importers at a disadvantage relative to domestic manufacturers as
prices to producers on small cars are forced down relative to costs.
As discussed above a well designed tax/rebate scheme would merely cor-
rect this.
There are many other issues associated with the proposed tax/
rebate scheme, but the first-order considerations discussed here would
indicate that it is a useful supplement to the fleet average standards.
However, further analysis is required.
8. Summary
Fuel economy regulations in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
of 1975 are a unique attempt to establish average standards across
slightly differentiated markets. This law could dramatically alter the
structure, sales, and pricing of the automotive industry as it has
existed since World War II. It is likely that there will be some period
(between technical improvements in present cars and major technological
changes in the design of cars) when firms in the automotive industry
_·___1_·1·__1_·_
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will be constrained by the increasing fuel economy standards. Indica-
tions are that this will occur in the early 1980s.
Various strategies of passing through penalties, altering prices
and production mixes will be tried by the companies. One strategy is
to treat the penalty and credits as extra production costs. The mar-
ginal penalty will vary perversely among firms according to a firm's
production mix (lower for firms the more they break the standard).
Another response is to use pricing and output strategies to meet the
standard. All reasonable responses to this regulation include increas-
ing the price of large fuel-inefficient cars, whose increased profits
subsidize price cuts on small fuel-efficient cars which more than meet
the standard.
This has wide-ranging consequences for the structure of the in-
dustry. Firms producing primarily small cars would tend to be under-
cut by others and would suffer losses -- a perverse incentive for pro-
ducing small cars -- unless they expanded into at least some large car
production. Most firms will face incentives to gravitate toward the
same model mix. However, under certain situations, there will be an
incentive for one firm to specialize in large car production. Also, a
long list of inefficiencies result from this law.
One possible solution within the framework of this legislation
would be to create a market in rights to producing fuel-inefficient
cars. However, this option is not consistent with the present working
of the law. It appears that a tax/rebate scheme whereby a tax on
inefficient cars subsidized the purchase of efficient cars, could re-
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tain much of the regulatory force of the present law while vitiating some
of the negative features.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This point is explored in detail in Chapter 1 of this report.
2. "The National Energy Plan," Executive Office of the President,
Energy Policy and Planning, April 29, 1977; pp. 35-40 deal
with automotive fuel economy.
3. Title V, Part A; 15 USC [2001-12].
4. See J.B. Heywood and L.H. Linden, "Alternative Automotive Power
Systems and Energy Conservation," in Energy and Transporta-
tion (Society of Automotive Engineers, Warrendale, Pa., Feb-
ruary 1976) for a discussion of the process by which major
technical changes to the automobile are introduced into the
passenger car market.
5. See H. Kahn, "Makers Uncertain if They Can Achieve 27.5 MPG by
1985," Automotive News, May 23, 1977, for a survey of submis-
sions by the automobile manufacturers to the Department of
Transportation and the Congress describing their strategies
for meeting the standards through technical changes and their
indications that they do not believe these changes to be ade-
quate.
6. This was indicated to the authors in conversations with automo-
bile industry executives.
7. Difiglio, C. and D. Kulash, "Market and Mobility," Report. of a
Panel of the Interagency Task Force on Motor Vehicle Goals
Beyond 1980, (U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington,
D.C., March 1976).
8. This is simply a rough estimate of the normal welfare loss in
economic theory, approximated by:
(-)(.25) / avg. price of a large car size of annual reduc-
2 under normal conditions tion in big car sales
+ 1) (.10) avg. price of a small car (size of annual increase
2 \ under normal conditions \ in small car sales
= $1.7 x 109.
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Chapter 4
STANDARDS VERSUS TAXES: THE POLITICAL CHOICE
by
Frank Lerman
The growing concern for the environment in the 1960s and 1970s has
produced a large increase in activity not only in the political arena but
in the political science arena as well. Concomitant with the growth of
environmental teach-ins, environmental lobbies, and environmental
legislation has come an increase in the volume of scholarly writings on
the politics of the environment. Some of this writing has been polemical
and hortatory in nature, urging its readers to create new life-styles and
new laws and political institutions; other works have been more analytical.
In the latter category, scholars have examined the growth of environmental
interest groups, the passage of environmental legislation by Congress, and
the implementation of that legislation (or lack thereof) on the state and
local levels. Students of the policy process have attempted to discover
the relationships between the rise in public concern over the environment
and the response by our executive, legislative, and judicial institutions,
and the extent to which policy outcomes have reflected the strengths of the
several interest groups concerned with this issue area.
Most of this analysis of environmental policy has treated the type or
strength of the policy as the dependent variable, either explicitly or
implicitly. In other words, policy analysts have attempted to use their
knowledge of congressional behavior and interest group theory to explain
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why a particular piece of environmental legislation was or was not enacted,
or how effective the provisions were. But political scientists have ignored
another equally important issue in the analysis of environmental policy--the
question of why we have chosen to regulate the environment as we do. On the
whole, the U.S. has chosen a regulatory policy based on the establishment of
a system of standards of environmental cleanliness, and a system of penalties
to enforce compliance with these standards. Of course, this is not the only
solution to the problems of environmental regulation, either in theory or in
practice. For example, economists who have long been concerned with the
problems of regulating economic activity, often argue that market-type
solutions, such as effluent taxes or the establishment of a pollution
rights market, would achieve the goal of pollution reduction more
efficiently (i.e., at less cost to society) than a system of standards
and penalties. This method of regulation exists not only in the realm of
theory; a number of European nations, both in Western Europe and in the
Socialist Bloc, have made use of effluent taxes in their pollution control
3
programs.
The question thus arises: Given a large body of opinion in favor of
the use of market incentives to attain environmental goals, and given that
the experience of other nations has shown that these methods attain some
degree of success, why has the U.S. almost completely ignored market solutions
in favor of a "standards and penalties" approach? Here we do not argue that
the market solution is better than the regulatory solution or vice versa.
This ground has been extensively covered by other professionals, and need
not be rehashed one more time. Rather, the purpose here is to explore why
we have chosen the approach that we have.
__
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The exploration of this topic is divided into three sections. First
will come a short description of the two methods of regulation--standards
and penalties on the one hand, and market incentives on the other. Next I
will develop several explanations for our choice of regulatory over market
solutions, referring to a number of attempts to develop a system of market
incentives. Finally, I will offer some conclusions about the most important
factors in the regulation of environmental activity in the United States.
1. Methods of Control--Standards vs. Taxes
The argument for the use of some kind of emission tax to regulate
pollution rests upon the analysis of the operation of competitive markets.
If the industry is competitive and a few other conditions are satisfied,4
it can be shown that each firm in the industry, and the industry as a whole,
will produce its output efficiently (i.e., at the lowest cost). But the
appearance of externalities upsets this happy outcome: industry still
produces at the lowest cost to itself but not at the lowest cost to society.
For example, let us say that the production of some good entails air and
water pollution. This pollution is certainly part of the cost of production;
individuals suffer decreases in their welfare. But until recently the costs
of pollution have not been paid by the polluting industry but by the general
public in the form of reduced environmental quality. Because of this
divergence between private and social costs the competitive firm will have
an incentive to use production techniques that are inefficient from the
standpoint of society; the firm will be economical in its use of those
resources which it must provide, and profligate in its use of those
resources--like air and water--which society provides at no cost.
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In order to rectify this situation we need some method of forcing
firms to internalize their externalities, i.e., to treat social costs in
the same manner as private costs. This can be done by establishing a
set of pollution taxes equal to the marginal social cost of each
pollutant. This will force the firm to pay the true social cost of
production, and production will once again be efficient.
The use of standards to regulate pollution is not based on any such
elaborate chain of reasoning. If society decides that the present level
of pollution is undesirable, it can set up a system of standards which will
require economic actors to limit their output of pollution to whatever level
is desired. This method seems much more simple and direct than a tax system,
and it can achieve the same end--a reduction of pollution. In fact, in a
world of certainty and perfect information the choice between standards and
taxes is unimportant. Under these conditions society can attain any desired
level of pollution and efficiency using either taxes or standards. With
less ideal conditions, the choice is much more complex. We live
in an uncertain world with imperfect information, and under these conditions
it is often unclear whether taxes or standards will produce a better result.
Proponents of standards argue that the uncertainty of the linkage
between the tax and pollution output makes a tax system too undependable.
It is argued that even in a competitive industry, in which all firms respond
immediately to price signals, we will be unsure of the actual amount of
pollution reduction, since our information on the costs of pollution reduction
will be scanty. The problems are multiplied when we consider that the connection
between a tax system and pollution reduction is much more tenuous if the firms
do not respond immediately to price signals. For example, under a condition
of oligopoly rather than competition not only the tax system but the anticipated
responses of all other firms in that industry would effect the behavior of
each firm, leading to an indeterminate result.
_________________________
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Proponents of pollution taxes argue that a system of standards gives firms
the opportunity to evade the pollution controls. One example frequently given
is that of the auto industry. In 1970, Congress set tough auto emissions
standards for 1975 and 1976, with a $10,000 fine per car for failure to meet
the standards. In addition, Congress, recognizing that the development of
the necessary technology was uncertain, gave EPA the power to grant a one-
year extension in the deadline. But the importance of the auto industry
to the American economy made it highly unlikely that the fines would ever
be imposed; the imposition of the fine would certainly result in a shutdown
of the penalized company, producing disasterous consequences for the economy.
As a result, opponents of the standards approach can argue that the auto
companies had incentives to delay implementation of the necessary technology
as long as possible, forcing the extensions to be given. And the extensions
have been given--first by EPA in 1973, then by Congress in 1974, and again
by EPA in 1975.
The purpose of this discussion is not to argue in favor of one method
or the other, but merely to illustrate some of the arguments that are made.
Actually, as people on both sides of the argument are now beginning to
recognize, there is probably no general solution to the question of which
regulatory instrument is best. The choice depends on the particular
characteristics of the problem, the structure of the industry, the
availability of information, the state of technology, and the losses
incurred if regulation is too stringent or not stringent enough.6 The
evaluation of these factors is quite a complicated undertaking and,
a priori, one might expect that environmental policy would often be best
implemented by a combination of taxes and standards. The choice of
regulatory instruments in any given case would depend on the particular
characteristics of the situation. But the empirical evidence contradicts
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our a priori expectations. If we examine the methods which Federal and
state governments have used to regulate pollution, we find that they
consist almost exclusively of standards and penalties. Certainly policy
analyses of the type described above have not been completely lacking,
and the results have not been completely ignored, but even a cursory
examination of the record reveals that often political decision-makers
have used other criteria in developing environmental regulations. It is
useful, then, to examine the values and attitudes of key environmental
decision-makers to try to determine why we have chosen standards over
taxes in regulating environmental pollution. The answer to this question
should shed light on current difficulties in auto regulation, and provide
some perspective regarding the changes that are likely to prove feasible
in the future.
2. Alternate Theories of Societal Choice
Thus far, two methods of regulation of economic activity have been
presented. Economic theory often leads in the direction of tax systems
but, as pointed out, our choices in this area do not seem to revolve
around economic models. Instead, we must look elsewhere for our
explanations. The choice of standards over taxes in any particular
instance might be explained by the way transaction costs happened to be
distributed, or by analysis of interest group activity or the particular
stakes of key Congressional leaders. But the topic of interest is not why
a particular piece of legislation was passed or rejected. Rather, we should
seek to explain the paucity of attempts to tax pollution and the general
lack of receptiveness of members of Congress, environmental interest groups,
and the public to the attempts that have been made. The intent here is to
___ ____I __ __ ___ _ I I __
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move away from explaining policy decisions by factors unique to a particular
piece of legislation, even though these unique factors will not be ignored.
Instead the focus is on factors that seem to apply across the entire policy
arena. Using this approach we can examine how the beliefs and attitudes of
decision-makers have been affected by professional background and training,
prior regulatory experience, relationships with constituents and interest
groups, and basic notions of equity and fairness.
2.1 The Perception of Pollution as a Health Problem
If one examines the origins of our current concern with environmental
pollution, one sees that it first came to public attention as a health
problem. Any polemical speech or tract on the subject is likely to
mention the 1948 Dononra smog which killed twenty people, or the 1952
London smog which killed over 4,000, as prime examples of the dangers
of pollution. This orientation can be clearly seen in the speech made by
Senator Ribicoff in introducing the Clean Air Act. While he makes reference
to the economic damage caused by air pollution, he overwhelmingly emphasizes
the health effects of pollution. Certainly Senator Ribicoff's concern for
health had a basis in his crusade against traffic deaths while Governor of
Connecticut and in his tenure as Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. But the primacy of health effects in his speech was probably
due to the general perception of the problem rather than idiosyncratic
factors, as is made clear by numerous other references to air pollution
from that time.8
The fact that environmental action had its origin in a concern for
public health had several consequences for environmental regulation. First,
the regulations were developed with the primary goal of protecting health,
not of achieving economic efficiency or any other objective. Since it is
____
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usually quite difficult to attain two distinct and sometimes conflicting
goals with the same piece of legislation, it is not surprising that economic
considerations were downplayed. Witness Senator Muskie's response to
Senator Griffin's question about the cost of the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments:
Mr. Muskie: No. I said in my statement--I have not hidden
anything--that our responsibility is to tell the industry
what the public health requires.9
Second, since the intent of the regulatory effort has been to prevent
damage to health, a large proportion of the expert witnesses who developed
the regulations were doctors or other health professionals. The extent
of the role of health professionals can be seen by examining the lists
of witnesses at Congressional air pollution hearings. The 1963 Clean Air
Act hearings were dominated by politicians and interest group representatives,
but most of the expert witnesses who testified were health professionals,
joined by some engineers. No economists, or others with a general concern
for broad cost-benefit tradeoffs, were present. The same held true in
hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Public Works Committee (the Muskie subcommittee) in 1964 and 1966. By 1967
the list of witnesses called during hearings on the Air Quality Act included
one economist, representing the UAW, but he testified as an interest group
representative rather than as a professional commentator on issues of
efficiency, equity, and regulatory policy. One economist testified in
1969, but again he was called not as an expert witness but as an interest
group representative. It was not really until the hearings on Water
Pollution in the Spring of 1970 that economists were called as witnesses
to present professional opinions on the costs and benefits of alternative
regulatory instruments.
_I _ __ I _ _____
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The strong association of pollution with health tends to place the
issue in a well-defined historical context. Traditionally, health hazards
have been regulated by determining their effects on health, then setting
standards which, if followed, would render the hazard no longer dangerous.
What is more, this approach seems intuitively desirable. If a small
concentration of a toxic chemical in water or food can cause permanent
injury or death, we must take special precautions to ensure that safe
levels are not exceeded. It would seem that we can achieve this goal
with far more certainty by mandating the level that is not to be exceeded,
rather than by relying on the uncertain connection between financial
incentives and the resulting level of emissions. As noted earlier, if
we were in a world of certainty it would not matter which approach we
used; the desired level of pollution could be obtained by either taxes
or standards. But in the real world, we must examine the consequences
of mistakes in setting the level of taxes or standards.
But when the danger from emissions is less immediate and the chances
of economic dislocation due to improper control is greater, the pendulum
begins to swing from standards to taxes. Certainly the danger from air
pollution is not as acute as the danger from the chemicals in the example
above. A detailed analysis might have shown a tax system to be more suitable
than standards for the regulation of air pollution. But detailed analyses
of this question were not done; rather, certain similarities between the
regulation of pollution and the regulation of toxic chemicals became
obvious to the health professionals involved in the development of
regulation, and existing regulatory form was transferred from one field
to the other. Other similarities that might have emerged from economic
analysis were not brought to the fore, partially because economists were
not prominent in policy debate before the Congress.
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Certainly, then, this is one explanation (albeit a partial one) for
the use of standards rather than taxes to regulate pollution: we regulate
not so much by analysis as by analogy.
2.2 Professional Outlook--Lawyers and Economists
One explanation for the use of standards rather than taxes that seems
plausible a priori is that lawyers dominate the policy process, both as
members of Congress and committee staffers, and they would naturally tend
to rely on regulatory instruments familiar to the legal profession. This
is not to imply that such a choice is a deliberate attempt to create more
jobs for lawyers. But a lawyer's professional orientation will probably
lead him to look for solutions in certain directions rather than others;
it is the extent of this effect that needs to be understood.
If one had to briefly characterize the central concerns of conventional
economic analysis, then one could say that they are first overall productive
efficiency, and second the broad distributional implications of each
alternative action. Lawyers, on the other hand, are concerned with the
rights of individuals. The primary focus of the legal profession is not
upon determining the rational choice for society as a whole, but on those
rights a person has and the enforcement of these rights through the legal
system. As one lawyer puts it, "The basic priority is recognition by our
courts that the public has a right to a salubrious environment."
Thus, if we recognize the regulation of pollution as a matter of
individual rights, the proper way to enforce these rights is through the
court system. But as has been shown in countless environmental cases, it
is difficult for the courts to force an agency to enforce some kind of
vague right to a healthful environment. In order for a right to be
enforceable in court, ordinarily the violation of that right must involve
srr m~~~~~rrrrr~~~~ur~~~-·~~~-- ·~~ -· ·- r ~·---~~~~-slr^·  ~ ~ ~ ~ --
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measurable (though not necessarily quantifiable) harm to some identifiable
individual. If some measurable harm is required to be found in order to
enforce individual rights, it would seem that the logical procedure is to
determine the level of pollutant necessary to cause harm, define in law
the level of pollution that is harmful, and give the individual standing
to sue in case he is harmed. In other words, use the standards and
penalties approach. Thus, the logical process which the lawyer encounters
during his training and throughout his professional life, and his natural
focus on individual rights, lead to standards rather than taxes.
2.3 The Congressional Process--Symbolic Politics
Despite the origin of pollution regulation as a health question, and
the dominance of the policy process by lawyers, by 1970 the tax approach
had become embodied in laws introduced before Congress. In the spring of
1970 hearings were held on S. 3181, a bill sponsored by Senator Proxmire
and a bipartisan group of nine other senators which was designed to put
into effect "a schedule of national effluent charges for all those substances
other than domestic sewage which detract from the quality of the water.. ,,14
Then in May 1970 the Nixon Administration proposed a tax of $4.25/lb. on
the lead additives in gasoline. This tax was designed to increase the
price of leaded gasoline until it was greater than the price of unleaded
gasoline of the same octane rating. Presumably oil firms would then have
an incentive to produce unleaded gasoline and the consumer an incentive to
buy it, significantly reducing the level of lead compounds in the atmosphere.
Yet both of these measures went down to defeat, as did the sulphur tax of
1972 and a number of other proposed pollution taxes since that time. In
order to understand the lack of acceptance of effluent taxes, it is helpful
to examine the Congressional process through which this legislation passed.
____________·_·I
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Since its publication, Edelman's The Symbolic Uses of Politics has
provided a guide to political scientists studying the regulatory process.
Given its importance for a thorough understanding of the politics of the
regulatory process, it is worthwhile to present his argument at some length.
Edelman first observes that tangible benefits are usually not distributed
to the general public as promised in the debate surrounding regulatory
legislation. Edelman finds an explanation for this curious state of
affairs in the observation that the population can usually be divided into
two groups with regard to any given regulation. The first is a small
collection of individuals and groups directly concerned with the regulated
activity, for whom the consequences of any regulation are likely to be great,
while the second of these is composed of the great bulk of the citizenry,
for whom the costs and benefits of regulation are likely to be quite small.
A citizen not directly concerned with the regulated activity has many more
important things to which he must give his attention--his family, job, etc.
To the extent he pays any attention at all to government activity in the
policy area under consideration he will attempt to conserve his limited
information-processing capability by looking for cues, for rules of thumb
by which he can evaluate government regulatory policy.
In such a situation a politician can pursue a policy that will satisfy
everyone. He can provide both the tangible benefits desired by those
directly concerned with the regulated activity, and the rules of thumb
needed by the mass public by providing strong, tough laws which are
abrogated in practice to the benefit of special interests. The tough-
sounding laws themselves stand as symbols of the government's concern for
the well-being of its citizens, as evidence that the government is "doing
something" about the problem, while appropriate administrative and budgetary
Illlll··lllll·rrrrllrarr-rmr-la ______________i___________
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policies insure that the intentions expressed in the law are thwarted and
the special interests are satisfied.'6
It is important to note that it would not be possible to simply pass
laws favoring special interests without providing symbolic reassurance to
the public. The "tough" laws are necessary for the maintenance of stability
in the political system. Edelman states:
There is, in fact, persuasive evidence of the reality of
a political interest in continuing assurances of protection
against economic forces understood as powerful and threatening.
The most relevant evidence lies in the continuing utility of
old political issues in campaigns. Monopoly and economic
concentration, antitrust policy, public utility regulation,
banking controls, and curbs on management and labor are
themes that party professionals regard as good for votes
in one campaign after another, and doubtless with good
reason. They know that these are areas in which concern
is easily stirred. In evaluating allegations that the
public has lost "interest" in these policies the politician
has only to ask himself how much apathy would remain if an
effort were made formally to repeal the antitrust, public
utility, banking, or labor laws. The answer and the point
become clear at once.
The laws may be repealed in effect by administrative
policy, budgetary starvation, or other little publicized
means; but the laws as symbols must stand because they
satisfy interests that are very strong indeed; interests
that politicians fear will be expressed actively if a
large number of voters are led to believe that their
shield against a threat has been removed.1 7
Edelman portrays politicians as Machiavellian manipulators, but it
is not necessary to accept this characterization in order to recognize
the importance of symbols for the electorate. Even when a politician is
genuinely interested in working for the public interest, the adoption of
policies of benefit to the mass public might still arouse opposition if
the policies did not appear to be in the public interest. Thus, a
requirement for any policy instrument, whether intended to benefit the
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mass public or special interests, is that the public perceive it to be in
the public interest. The form of the law must provide symbolic reassurance
to the electorate that the government is doing good.
One quality of effluent tax policies is that they appear not to
provide the necessary symbolic reassurance, especially when compared to
standards and penalties. First, there is a general perception of effluent
taxes as an indirect solution, and standards as more direct. This attitude
is not an isolated one, but often appears in the speeches and writings of
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environmental bureaucrats, lobbyists, and Congressional staffers. This
perception on the part of those active in environmental affairs seems to
have two components. First, many people are personally skeptical of taxes
as being too indirect. In this view, the uncertainties of the tax-effluent
level linkage, added to the uncertainties of the effluent level-health
linkage, makes it far less likely that the policy will achieve its ultimate
goal--the improvement of public health. Since it is difficult enough to
determine what levels of pollution control must be attained if any given
public health effect is to be achieved, we do not need to add the complexities
of tax structure and the vagaries of polluter response.
Second, even those who intellectually accept the idea of a pollution
tax, and admit that it may be a useful instrument, tend to agree that the
public will not accept it. The concepts involved are simply too difficult
to explain, and the level of economic sophistication among the public is
too low for the case for pollution taxes to be made plausible.
Another, and perhaps more important symbolic barrier to the adoption
of effluent taxes, is the notion of the tax as a "license to pollute."
Once again there seems to be no survey data to show that this idea is
widely held by the general public, but it is certainly present among the
_ -· L_ ______-· ---
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elites who write articles, testify before Congress, and serve in the executive
and legislative branches. The phrase "license to pollute" appears quite
often in environmental rhetoric.
The idea behind the slogan is that if pollution taxes instead of
standards are used the rich will be free to continue to pollute as they
wish, while the poor will be forced to stop. This stage of affairs is
held to be wrong, since all citizens should share equally in the fight
against pollution. At first glance it is difficult to understand why
many people would support this concept. It is doubtful that many would
be in favor of rationing food or clothing or land or Cadillacs in order
to ensure that the rich do not have the ability to obtain more of these
goods than do the poor. An economically rational person might reply that
if the rich are able and willing to pay the true social cost of their
pollution, society should be quite willing to let them pollute--just as
society should be quite willing to let them have any quantity of any good
as long as they are willing to pay the price. As is evident, the ability
to pollute occupies a different place in the public mind than do those
other goods.
Certainty there are other goods and services which cannot be bought
and sold in our society, even if buyer and seller are in agreement.
Individuals cannot sell themselves into slavery, nor can they sign
restrictive covenants which forbid the resale of property to blacks.
Perhaps more to the point, the sons of the rich who are drafted into the
military cannot pay the poor to fight in their places, even though this
practice was legal until after the Civil War. In each case an economic
rationalist could well argue that the transaction should be permitted to
take place, unless one of the parties could be shown to be mentally
incompetent. After all, both parties are willing to enter into the
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transaction, and economic theory tells us that society as a whole will be
better off if all such transactions between willing parties are allowed.
Of course, it is doubtful that many citizens, even those who are most
scornful of the "license to pollute" argument, would wish society to
permit the transactions outlined in the sentences above.
Clearly there is something other than notions of efficiency that enter
into our judgments on the matter. Considerations of equity and morality
are equally if not more important. If one feels that pollution is a
threat to survival, one might then classify pollution abatement as a
duty for all members of society, no matter what their station in life.
In summary, standards provide the public with symbolic reassurance
that action is being taken to fight pollution, while taxes do not.
Standards seem more directly connected to the problem than do taxes, and
do not bear the stigma of providing the rich with "a license to pollute."
Not only does a tax system fail to have the positive symbolic content of
a system of standards, it has the negative connotations described above.
If we examine the period 1969-1970, when anti-pollution fervor was at its
peak, we can see that symbolic reassurance through forceful action seemed
to be the primary demand of the public; given the importance of symbolic
action, we would expect the public to receive standards more favorably
than taxes.
It is clear that the public wanted "tough" action taken against
polluters at that time: "public demonstrations and opinion polls projected
a clear message to decision-makers: Do something about pollution." The
demand was for dramatic action, action that would provide the cues, the
symbolic reassurance the public needed. Unfortunately, while many
arguments to support the effectiveness of pollution taxes can be made,
U I I_ I I
4-17
even their strongest supporter must admit that a proposal to establish a
set of pollution taxes that would achieve economic efficiency is hardly
dramatic or symbolic of "toughness."
Another explanation of the importance of symbols for the electorate
is given by Mayhew. Mayhew's argument is similar to Edelman's: the
electorate pays little attention to most government activity, and responds
to political figures and events by looking for small amounts of information
which serve as indicators of government activity. As a result, congressmen
enhance their chances for re-election by concentrating on the provision of
cues for the electorate rather than on the shaping of substantive public
policy. One of these types of cue-giving activity is position-taking,
defined by Mayhew as "the public enunciation of judgmental statements on
anything likely to be of interest to political actors." In other words,
congressmen are judged by their positions on issues rather than the effects
of their actions, and one type of position that will attract the attention
of the electorate is the support of a simple, direct action that conforms
to popular perceptions of effective public policy.
This is not to say that congressmen have no concern for substantive
policy. Rather, the argument is that the provision of effective policy may
conflict with the generation of electoral support; effective policy-making
may call for indirect, complex solutions while electoral concerns may call
for direct, simple solutions. If this conflict does exist, congressmen
concerned with re-election have a powerful incentive to support legislation
that provides symbolic cues for the electorate rather than legislation
that produces effective policy.
Another incentive for congressmen to support policies that are effective
symbolically rather than substantively comes from the desire of congressmen
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for public prestige. Many congressmen are continually searching for issues
with which they can become personally identified, and which can become the
basis for increased political influence. According to Wilson:
Regulatory proposals emerging from this process are likely
to have certain distinctive features. First, in order to ensure
vital publicity and develop political momentum in the competition
for attention in and around Congress, the bills will focus
attention on an "evil," personified if possible in a corporation,
industry, or victim. Second, the proposal will be "strong"--
that is, there will be little incentive in the developmental
process to accommodate conflicting interests and thus little
incentive to find a politically acceptable formula which all
effected parties can live with. (To compromise the proposal
would be to sacrifice the capacity of the bill to mobilize
support by its moralistic appeal.) Third, though few
substantive bargains will be struck many procedural ones
will... 22
Thus, the desire of Congressional leaders to enhance their careers produces
the same kind of legislation as does the need to symbolically reassure the
public--legislation that is tough, moralistic, and dramatic, but that
mollifies special interests through procedural concessions that are not
noticed by the electorate.
2.4 The Congressional Process--Interest Groups
Another factor in the failure of effluent taxes has been the behavior
of interest groups. It would not be too great an error to say that the only
interest group that has consistently supported the effluent tax approach has
been academic economists, a group whose political influence is minimal.
Business and labor have opposed effluent taxes, while the support of
environmental groups has been mixed. Thus the preponderance of pressure
on this issues has come on one side only--against effluent taxes.
__
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For example, an examination of the record shows business consistently
opposed to the use of effluent taxes. The list of businesses and business
groups opposing the 1970 lead tax proposal is a lengthy one: U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, American Petroleum Institute, Standard Oil of Ohio, the
National Petroleum Refiners Association, Independent Refiners Association
of America, the Lead Industries Association, DuPont, the Ethyl Corporation,
and others. In arguing against the tax, these parties attributed to the
tax almost every ill effect which they felt would arouse Congress and the
public against it. They argued that the tax would be inflationary; that
it would discriminate against poorer people, who could not afford to buy
new cars that did not need leaded gasoline; and that it would discriminate
against independent refiners, who could not afford the new equipment necessary
to make high octane, unleaded gas. Some groups argued that no definite
connection had been made between health effects and lead in the atmosphere,
while others admitted that regulation was necessary but urged that it be
done through standards rather than taxes. Labor has shown a similar lack
of enthusiasm for this approach to pollution control.
It is not the purpose here to analyze the motives of business and labor
in opposing effluent taxes. We have no knowledge of the deliberations in
corporate board rooms and union headquarters preceding the decisions to
oppose emission taxes. However, it may be useful to indulge in some
speculation about these motives. It is possible that business believes
that the use of standards would result in less cost to them than would
pollution taxes. They may believe that the stringent penalties often
associated with standards are unlikely to be used, and the standards
poorly enforced. They also may fear that pollution taxes would quickly
change from an instrument for reducing pollution to an instrument for
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raising revenue. By this reasoning, politicians would always be tempted
to raise the taxes on a particular emission far above the social cost,
forcing the industry to invest much more in pollution control equipment
than necessary in the long run and in the short run increasing pollution
tax payments. The labor unions apparently see a threat to employment
and workers' disposable income.
Another, perhaps more important, reason for business opposition has
to do not with possible economic damage to the firm but with symbolic
damage. It has been suggested that companies feel they are being branded
as criminals without due process of law if they are forced to pay pollution
taxes; they look on the tax as a fine for violation of the law instead of
25
a morally neutral incentive to promote a cleaner environment. Moreover,
some tax is likely to be due even after the firm's effort to control
pollution. Standards, on the other hand, allow relaxation if it is
demonstrated that the company is trying as hard as it can but still
cannot comply. In this case the stigma is placed on the unreasonable
law rather than the violating firm.
This argument about symbolic damage may be nothing more than rationaliza-
tion, but there is evidence that supports it. In late 1974 U.S. Steel took
the unusual step of closing down one of its older, dirtier facilities in
Gary, Indiana rather than pay a court-ordered $2,300/day fine to keep it
open. It seems improbable that the payment of such a small fine would make
the facility unprofitable and, at any rate, U.S. Steel did not cite financial
pressure in its decision to close the facility down. Instead, U.S. Steel
stated that it did not intend to pay "a daily tribute to the government"2 6
in order to keep the steel mill open a little longer. What the firm seemed
to object to was not the amount of the fine but the label of "lawbreaker"
that went along with it.
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If anything, business is exceeded in its opposition to emission taxes
by labor. An example of labor's position is provided by the testimony
from Andrew J. Biemiller of the AFL-CIO on the 1970 lead tax proposal:
The administration's request for a tax on lead additives
should be rejected.
We are convinced than an excise tax is the worst way of
raising tax revenues and probably the least effective way of
reducing air pollution.
The tax would be paid by the consumer who feels that
nonleaded gasoline might damage his automobile engine or
cannot afford or would not wish to buy a new automobile.
In other words, consumers forced to use, or choosing
to use, leaded gasoline could continue to pollute the
atmosphere. It is clearly a license to pollute, if you
pay the price.
Moreover, on the basis of past performance it is likely
the oil companies would raise prices on all grades of gasoline
and realize windfall profits.
We are flatly opposed to the use of leaded gasoline
and any other atmosphere polluting additives. And the
way to achieve that goal is through the air pollution
legislation now before Congress... . This legislation
would, in particular, enpower the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to remove from sale and interstate
commerce all gasoline additives, including lead, which
cause or contribute to air pollution which endangers
the health and welfare of any person.27
This statement is especially interesting because it includes many
of the themes discussed earlier. Biemiller refers to the license to
pollute argument, and seems not to believe that the economic system
really works in the way described by economic theory. The references
to health effects are there, as well as a strong statement in favor of
the direct controls provided by standards.
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Environmental groups have been divided in their approach to pollution
taxes. Some have seen taxes as a device to allow pollution and its ill
effects to continue, while others have seen them as a useful device for
controlling pollution, given the imperfect world in which we live. Their
division of opinion can be seen in their responses to proposals debated
before the Congress. The 1970 lead tax proposal saw only one environmental
group testifying before Congress--the Sierra Club. Though the Sierra Club
representative supported the lead tax, he seemed to have little impact on
the Committee; he was not asked a single question. But it was the absence
of environmental support more than the presence of environmental opposition
that hurt the proposal. In the presence of unified business and labor
opposition, the lack of countervailing pressure doomed the lead tax.
By the time the 1972 sulphur tax proposal emerged, many environmental
groups had changed their minds. A number of local, state, and national
organizations formed the Coalition to Tax Pollution in order to coordinate
efforts in favor of the tax. The support was lukewarm, however; environ-
mentalists could simply not bring the same passion to an argument for
effluent taxes that they brought to other fights such as that against the
SST. Two characteristics differentiate pollution taxes from these other
issues. First, environmentalists have tended to become most aroused over
negative proposals--to stop the SST, or a dam or airport. In these cases
there is specific damage to some area or group and it is clear how that
damage can be prevented; it is much easier to focus attention than it would
be if the benefits were more diffuse and the action less visible. Second,
as noted earlier, it often is difficult to trace the connection from a
tax proposal through the economic system to its ultimate effect on the
level of environmental damage. As a result, it is difficult for people
· I I _ _ _ _ _
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to convince themselves that pollution taxes will be that much better than
standards or the status quo. This lack of a clear focus and lack of belief
in the efficacy of pollution taxes has led to a less intense effort by
environmentalists in this area than in other areas of environmental concern.
As a result, though many environmental groups have come to look
favorably on the pollution tax approach, they have not exerted themselves
in its favor. In general, environmentalists have taken the position that
pollution taxes may be useful as a supplement to standards, but not as a
replacement for them. An example of this position can be seen in the testimony
of Richard Ayres of the Natural Resources Defense Council in support of the
Brown-Ottinger Bill, which proposed a system of emission fees on all
emission of pollutants in excess of present state standards:
Such a proposal would supplement the present regulatory program
rather than replace it. It would deprive those who have refused
to comply of the unfair competitive advantages they have gained
over those who have complied. It would reverse the present
financial incentive for noncompliance, exerting substantial
financial pressure to comply. The penalty would not be a tax,
since it would apply only on emissions in excess of the legal
limits, and would cease once the source had complied. Its
purpose is to produce compliance, not raise revenue.2 9
Thus, the support of environmentalists for effluent tax legislation is
mixed. Most probably would rather rely on standards, since they seem
a direct and more certain way of reaching environmental goals, but they
recognize that standards have run into the problems described earlier.
Of course, the reluctant commitment to pollution taxes on the part
of environmental groups means that they are far less effective in obtaining
them than they are obtaining other goals to which they are more passionately
committed. And clearly their commitment to pollution taxes is not strong
enough to overcome the opposition of business and labor.
I__ _
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2.5 The Congressional Process--Other Factors
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, a number of other factors
have contributed to the failure of the lead tax in particular and the
effluent tax approach in general. Referring back to the statement by
Richard Ayres quoted above, it can be observed that he takes pains to
emphasize that the proposal is not a tax but a penalty. This, in all
probability, reflects the desire of environmental groups to keep juris-
diction over pollution taxes out of the hands of the Senate Finance
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee, which are not considered
30to be dominated by interests favorable the environmental cause. Note
that this opposition is not based on philosophical disagreement with the
concept of pollution taxes; rather, it is based on the realization that
the implementation and administration of such a law are important features;
to leave them in the hands of interests regarded as opponents of pollution
control would be folly. In contrast, standards at least have the virtue
of being implemented by their proponents rather than their opponents.
To be fair, congressmen are subject to limitations specific to the
job. They must develop mechanisms which enable them to evaluate the vast
flood of information on a myriad of issues that pass their desks. Not
surprisingly, these cues are essentially the same as those used by their
constituents: symbolic language, both in the law itself and in the
public speeches and Congressional debate accompanying that law. Not only
do Congressmen depend on symbolic language to reassure their constituents
they also depend on it to reassure themselves.
The statements of individual Congressmen reveal the importance of
pre-existing beliefs and values, and of the symbolic aspect of legislation.
As discussed earlier, the perception of pollution as a health problem led
__ I · _ 
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regulators in the direction of the standards used to regulate other health
problems, rather than the taxes which might be more appropriate for this
particular health problem. In fact, in the early stages of the environmental
movement, activists often explicitly rejected the idea that economic and
technological considerations should be a factor in setting pollution
standards. In many cases Congressmen shared these opinions; to quote
Senator Muskie at the time of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendment Hearings:
"Here we have learned that the tests of economic and technological
feasibility applied to these standards compromise the health of
our people and lead to inadequate standards."31
In addition, the views of Congressmen on pollution taxes are often
influenced by mistrust of the economic system. As examples of some of the
opinions about effluent taxes held by influential Congressmen, three
excerpts from the hearings on the lead tax are presented here. The
first is from a statement by Representative William F. Ryan of New York,
the second is from testimony by Representative Paul Rogers of Florida, and
the third is an exchange between Representative Al Ullman of Washington and
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Nolan:
My support for the President's proposal is qualified
because I have two chief reservations as to the taxation
vehicle for ending the use of leaded additives. Firstly,
I do not have the same faith as that registered by the
Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy in his letter of
July 30, 1970, to Speaker McCormack that the pressures
of economic competition will suffice to achieve the
desired goal of cessation of the use of leaded additives
in sufficient time...
My view of the responsiveness of American industry to
the public's needs is far less sanguine, to say the least.
Competitive pressures will only work if there is, in fact,
adequate competition. If all producers merely pass on the
__I__
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tax to the consumer--and consumers are not sufficiently responsive
to the added costs of leaded gasoline over the of nonleaded
products--leaded gasolines will persist...
I do not believe that taxation is any more than a half-step
to the action that is required--total abolition of leaded
gasolines.32
Therefore, we reached the conclusion in the committee that
lead in gasoline should be removed as quickly as possible to
eliminate first, health hazards of particulates, and secondly,
to allow new and innovative devices to reduce other pollutants.
Because I feel lead should be eliminated from gasoline, I
appear here to voice my concern over the administration
proposal to tax gasoline...
What this recommendation represents, as has been stated
to this committee, is a license to pollute. The administration
is saying that you may pollute with lead as long as you pay
the government a certain amount...
In addition, I think we have faulty logic when we think
the petroleum companies are going to pay the tax alone. It
will simply be passed on and it will be the drivers who will
be paying the taxes.3 3
Mr. Ullman. There is nothing in this proposal to keep the
petroleum companies from spreading it across leaded and
unleaded gasoline, so they can pick up revenues from their
total sales to cover this additional tax?
Mr. Nolan. There is nothing contained in our proposal to
prevent that legally but it simply has to be the fact that
if a company can make more profit on one product than
another--and they will make more profit on the sale of
unleaded gasoline after the imposition of this tax--it
is going to emphasize the production and sale of that
product. 34
These statements reveal the attitudes and beliefs of the Congressmen
involved, and bring to mind many of the themes discussed earlier. Health
is given absolute priority over economic effects. The "license to pollute"
argument is cited, again without any accompanying analysis, the intonation
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of the ritual phrase apparently being enough to arouse the desired emotions.
The statements also reveal a disbelief of the economic system and a mistrust
of the motives of producing firms. According to the Congressmen, firms seek
to maliciously thwart the goals of the legislation even if it would cost them
less to comply.
Certainly, this is not to argue that every Congressman has opinions
similar to those displayed above. But the support from Congress, like that
from many environmentalists, is lukewarm. The issue of taxes vs. standards
does not seem to arouse the public's interest, so there seems to be little
incentive for a political leader to seize upon this issue as a means to
greater influence. Even those congressmen who do understand and support
the concept of effluent taxes do not see it as be--all and end-all, but
merely as another useful tool in the fight against pollution. They simply
do not bring the same passion, the same involvement to their cause as do
those congressmen who oppose pollution taxes as the devil's work.
Another reason for the failure of the lead tax was the confusion
caused by the Nixon Administration's presentation of it. Ostensibly, the
major purpose of the tax was to provide financial incentives to encourage
refiners and consumers to gradually make the transition to unleaded
gasoline. But the tax also took on the appearance of a revenue-raising
measure, partly because it was introduced at the same time as several other
revenue measures and was coupled with them during hearings, and partly
because the Nixon Administration explicitly presented it as a revenue
measure as well as an anti-pollution instrument. Consider this dialogue
between a House Ways and Means Committee staff member and Treasury Secretary
Kennedy:
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Mr. Watts. What I had in mind or what I thought you might have
in mind anyway would be to set up an upper limit on the content
in lead in a fuel and give the companies a reasonable number of
years to reach that limit if that is what you claim again you
hope to do with the tax.
I don't see any difference in doing it directly or
indirectly by the tax.
Secretary Kennedy. We have the revenue item which will bring in
$1.1 billion in revenue at a time it is needed. This amount will
phase out as lead disappears from gasoline.
Mr. Watts. Which is your principle interest to raise more
revenue or to get rid of pollution?
Secretary Kennedy. Both. 35
The presentation of the lead tax as a revenue-raising device created
a dilemma which was immediately recognized by Congress and repeatedly brought
up throughout the legislative deliberations: if the tax were high enough
to significantly reduce the use of leaded gasoline there would be little
revenue, and if the tax were low enough to allow significant amounts of
leaded gasoline to be consumed there would be more revenue but less
reduction of pollution. The result was confusion among Congressmen as
to the real intent of the tax and a belief that the proposal was not well
thought out. Another problem was that many Congressmen as well as others
concerned with the environment felt that even if the tax were intended
solely as a device to reduce pollution, the availability of revenue would
encourage the Administration to eventually look upon it as a revenue measure.
Even Congressmen who were favorably disposed to the idea of pollution taxes
were alienated by this confusion, thus putting one more nail in the proposal's
coffin.
- -- ---
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3. Conclusion
As we have seen, the consistent choice of standards over taxes to
regulate pollution has a variety of causes. The health professionals and
lawyers who have dominated the policy process are influenced by training
and experience to look toward standards rather than taxes. Interest group
activity and inadequate presentation have helped kill effluent taxes, as
have the unfavorable attitudes of many congressmen. But in many of these
respects emission taxes are no different than other innovative public
policies that are adopted. Certainly the regulation of pollution by the
standards and penalties approach has had to overcome opposition by business
groups and the ingrained attitudes of many congressmen, and the struggle
has not been an easy one. But standards have had one large advantage over
taxes--the support of a large, vocal collection of groups and individuals
who are passionately committed to that policy. In general, this difference
in support does not appear to be due to a rational calculation of the costs
and benefits of each approach, but to differences in their symbolic content.
Taxes are seen as an uncertain method of regulation that fails to take
tough action against those who despoil the environment, while standards
provide the symbolic qualities necessary to arouse support in their favor.
_ · _·_ _I__··__ ^_ _ ___ __
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Chapter 5
ANOTHER VIEW OF THE POLITICS OF AUTO EMISSIONS CONROLT
by
Howard Margolis
There is a distinctively "American way" in the business of requ-
lating automobile emissions, followed in no other country.1 Six years
ago, Congress wrote into the law very tough standards, to be met on
a very tough time schedule, and did so explicitly without regard for
cost or technical feasibility. nce the standards came into effect,
the automakers were to be subject to fines of up to $10,00 for each
car not meeting the standard, should they produce any such cars. This
was known as "forcing technoloq," and "holding industry's feet to
the fire."
Since one can guarantee that "holding industry's feet to the
fire" will produce cries of anguish, hut one cannot guarantee that
the desired technology will be forced to emerge, an escape clause
in necessary. The details of the escape clause have varied from year
to year. But the basic scenario has (through 1976) remained unchanged.
After a suitable period in which changes of bad faith and incompetence
are exchanged among industry, environmentalists, Congressional com-
mittees, and the EPA, the standard is delayed once again. No one
is happy with this outcome. To industry it is a continuation of a
disruptive and inefficient way of handling the problem. To environ-
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mentalists it is an annual sellout to industry pressure. But to each
side the stand-off has been preferable to a clear-cut victory for
the other.
It is possible that this pattern will be broken in the coming
year. The situation was left in an exceptionally confused state when
Congress adjourned in October 1976, without acting on a bill providing
a further extension of the standards. A new Administration now is
in office, with a generalized environmentalist commitment, but without
any specific commitment to or need to defend past policies. Meanwhile,
industry has proceeded with plans to produce 1978 autos to 1977 standards,
on the grounds that it is too late to do anything else--as it seems
to be, though this presumption that the law will be bent to meet indus-
try's dilemma does not sit well with the Congress.
So the 1970 Act may face a critical turning point in the coming
year. Something must happen to resolve the confused and untenable
position left at the end of 1976. One can sense a certain amount
of hope, possibly justified, that a solution will be found that will
end, in one way or another, the annual battles over delay. It is
a good time, therefore, to look back and try to understand what has
been going on.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a view of what we may
call the "social politics" of this recurrent battle. That is, we
are directly concerned not with the details of particular decisions,
but with the broader social/political context which produced what
is, after all, a very peculiar way of handling the problem of auto
emissions controls.
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We will see that the key to understanding what has happened is
in one's view of how the original legislation came to be written in
a way that virtually guaranteed the confrontations that have followed.
Naturally, there are parallels between the handling of auto emis-
sions and the treatment of other environmental problems, and (only
partly overlapping) parallels with the American handling of business
regulation generally. But it will be convenient to defer comment on
these parallels until the concluding section of the chapter.
1. A Conceptual Framework
It is a fact of political life that (other things equal) a small
number of people, each of whom has a substantial stake in the outcome
of a political decision, will commonly exert more political influence
than a large number of people, each of whom has but a small stake
in the decision. So if a particular choice will bring $1 worth of
benefits to a million people, but will cost one thousand people $1,000
each, we ordinarily have no doubt about how the decision will go.
Indeed, even if there is a large excess of concentrated benefits over
diffused costs, or the reverse, we still are not surprised to learn
that the concentrated interest has won out over the diffused interest.
The principle exception to this rule occurs when an issue has been
made dramatically prominent. Scandal (as in GM's investigation of
Ralph Nader's private life) or tragedy (as in the recent Kepone epi-
sode) often plays a precipitating role. Then the weight of numbers
of an aroused public can override the concentrated interest.
James Q. Wilson has used these familiar observations to frame
a simplified but useful typology of business regulation.2 We can
summarize his analysis with the use of Fiqure 1.
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What of Case IV in Figure 1? This case, in which both benefits
and costs are widely diffused, is not one that seems to have been
much discussed in the political literature on business regulation.
COSTS
Concentrated Diffused
I II
Affected parties Regulations serve
compete for influence Industry's interest
over the regulatory with minimal (esp.
Concentrated policy. symbolic) concessions
to broader interests.
E.g., TLRB
E.g., CAB, Texas RR
Commission
BENEFITS
III IV
Aroused public
Diffused demands reform.
E.g., FDA
Figure 1 Wilson's Typology of American Business Regulation
For it is very generally assumed (as in Wilson's article, for example)
that the regulated business activity either enjoys concentrated benefits
or endures concentrated costs. Wilson lists the auto legislation,
along with other environmental laws as examples of Case III. But
in the case of auto emissions (and typically, though not always, for
other environmental programs) we are really dealing with a Case IV
situation in which the great bulk of the costs are as widely diffused
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as the benefits. There are concentrated costs, of course. It is
not hard to understand industry's unhappiness with tight regulation
against tight deadlines; the howls we hear from the auto industry
are motivated by real pain. Further, although it is hard (or impos-
sible) to clearly identify these concentrated costs, there are presum-
ably real dollar losses (or foregone opportunities for profit) that
have accompanied the program. But from the point of view of overall
impact of emissions controls on society, the costs concentrated on
the industry are quite trivial compared to those dispersed among the
users of automobiles. (Whatever the impression the general public
may have had, the legislative history leaves no room for doubt that
everyone directly involved understood this.3)
None of this argues that industry ought to pay, or could afford
to pay, any substantial fraction of emissions control. It is the
use of automobiles that creates emissions, and it seems appropriate
that the users of automobiles should pay the costs of control. But
clearly, the "concentrated costs/diffused benefits" model is an inac-
curate description of the real situation, and (unsurprisingly, there-
fore) might lead to incorrect inferences about the effects of the
legislation, and the interests of the various actors.
Now on the face of things, the law has conspicuously failed to
do what, by its own language, it set out to do. We have not yet met
the standards specified for 1975/6; and there are grounds to doubt
that we will ever meet them. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, we have
not yet (except in California) met the standards which were scheduled
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for 1975 before the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act were passed.
Some other U.S. and foreign standards are included for comparison.
Of itself, the failure to achieve these legislated standards
is not sufficient to deny the soundness of the effort. In the first
place, it is hard to doubt that deficient as the result has been in
terns of the legslated objective, nevertheless emissions are lower
today than they would have been in the absence of the 1970 legislation.
In any event, the concern with fuel conservation that arose so dramati-
cally following te oil embargo in the fall of 1973 cut sharply against
tiE? single-minded concern withl controlling emissions.
But it is hardly credible to place all, and perhaps unrea-
sonlle to place most of the blarme on the unforeseeable problemns of
carrying out the program. What we will try to explain is how a policy
likely to rove either unnecessarily expensive or ineffective swept
through Washington with the near unanimous support of conservatives
and liberals alike in the Congress, and with the effusive endorsement
of a conservative, business-oriented administration. wle will do so
largely in terms of the interests of the active participants (politicians,
environmentalists, and the industry).
Ae will stress two factors that facilitated this outcome.
First, there is the variety of grountds on which a policy choice of
this kind can be rationalized, so that misunderstandings could easily
arise, and so that in any event, no one had compnelling reason--or
need have corpelling reason today--to feel that his actions were selfish
or stupid. Second, iwe will stress the fragmentation of expertise,
authority, and responsibility which left the public at large, and even
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those closely involved, confused about what was happening; and which
assured that everyone had someone else to blame if things went badly.
Table 1. Selected Auto Emission Control Levels
Standard (gms/mi) HC CO NOx
'63 (pre-control) actual 8.7 87.0 4.0
'65 (initial control) 6.5 65.3 not
controlled
'68 (initial federal) 5.9 50.8 "
'70 (federal) 3.9 33.3 "
Nixon '75a .93 16.2 1.4
California '75 to date .9 9.0 2.0
Actual '77b 1.5 15 2
Muskie '75/'76c .41 3.4 .4
Canada (thru 1980)d 2.0 25.0 3.1
Notes:
a) Announced, February 1970 (includes upward adjustment for changes in
federal test procedure);
b) Actual '75/'76 was identical for HC & CO, but higher (3.1) for NOx.
c) Statutory standards, drafted August, '70 by Muskie Subcommittee.
HC and CO intended for '75; NOx intended for '76.
d) Similar to those of Sweden and Australia. Common Market is sub-
stantially less stringent. Japan is numerically identical to
U.S., but differences in test procedure make exact comparison
difficult.
Especially in such circumstances, we can expect that those wit"
an active role in shaping the decision would tend to follow a course
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which fit comfortably with their private preferences. We need not
assume that those private interests were purely selfish; indeed for
the purpose of the argument of this paper, we need not assume they
were selfish at all. But they were never identical to anything that
could be mistaken for the interests of the broad public which would
both pay the vast bulk of the costs of the program, and receive the
bulk of the benefits. In particular, the mixed bag of elements which
finally became law (it would imply much more conscious bargaining
than actually took place to call it a compromise) is easy to question
as the wisest public policy choice that could have been made. But
once it did become law, new kinds of vested interests were created
which made it difficult to change.
So, we will argue, what might casually appear as an example of
Case III (concentrated costs, dispersed benefits: the auto industry
vs. the public) resolves itself into an example of Case IV (dispersed
cost and dispersed benefits), with the actual choices made under the
conditions of Case I (concentrated costs; concentrated benefits).
Bureaucrats, environmentalists, politicians, and to some extent even
auto industry managers had substantial grounds for feeling satisfied
with the outcome-diverse and conflicting as their interests were.
What is most in doubt was how well the interests of society at large
were served.
2. Reviewing the History
At the turn of the century, three powerplants were contenders
for the dominant position in the infant automobile industry. Of the
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three leading competitors (steam, electric, and gasoline) the gasoline-
driven internal combustion engine had by far the most serious potential
for emissions problems. For only in this engine did the motive power
come directly from the fuel combustion chamber. Hence the designer
could not optimize the burning of the fuel for low emissions without
penalizing the design of the balance of the engine for the performance
and cost features which more directly affect the car owner.
But for the infant auto industry--and indeed for a long time
after infancy--emissions were not an issue. Half a century passed,
during which facilities and know-how for designing, manufacturing
and maintaining this engine steadily grew. Only then would question
be raised as to whether the engine that dominated the industry was
the one that would have been chosen if emissions control were a con-
sideration. It would be an overstatement to flatly assert that,
had emissions been a concern from the outset, then the ICE would not
have been chosen. All we can flatly assert is that by the time ques-
tions were raised about emissions, a vast infrastructure, reaching
from the top management of the automakers to the corner garage mechanic,
had been built around the conventional ICE engine.
On the other hand, the absence of prior concern meant that, until
significant pressure for controls began to develop in the 1960s, only
incidental attention to emissions had gone into the design of these
engines. We thus entered the period of major concern about emissions
in the following mixed situation:
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1. Substantial (on the order of 60%) reductions in emissions due
to the incomplete burning of fuel (HC and CO) were possible
at very little cost: on the order of $25 per car.4
2. The situation would become more complicated to the extent it
was necessary to control NOx, as well as emissions of incom-
pletely burned fuel. (NOx comes from heating the air during
combustion, not from incomplete burning of the fuel, so that
steps to decrease HC and CO often increase NOx.
3. In any event, at the margin, tighter standards become increasingly
difficult and expensive. At some levels of emission-control
stringency, therefore, it would presumably become more efficient
to change the basic technology of the industry than to try to
meet the requirements. (But whether the Muskie '75/Nixon '80
standards reach that breakpoint is in dispute. Both in 1970
and today, there are knowledgeable observers on both sides of
the question.)
Now by 1970, the strategy implicit in point 1 had been exhausted.
Model Year 1970 cars (which had gone on sale in the fall of '69) met
federal standards which reduced HC and CO emissions by about 60%. Indeed,
by the summer of 1970, when the Muskie subcommittee began to write its
bill, public policy had already moved well beyond the "easy cleanup"
strategy.5
In February, the Nixon Administration had proposed regulations
(see Table 1) for MY '75 cars which extended the controls to NOx, and
which simultaneously sharply tightened the existing standards for
HC and CO. Further, goals for 1980 emissions had been published, and
the Administration had proposed an R&D effort to develop an inherently
clean engine technology by 1975. This set of proposals was a hedge
against the dual possibility that (a) stricter standards would be
desirable for the 1980s, and (b) these stricter standards could not
be realistically met with the clean-up of the conventional engine
which industry leaders openly treated as their preferred alternative.6
__ sPQII_______YI_____Iqll^l-Q·CI·I_ ..____ ·1I 1 -- lI11111
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All of this was described in Nixon's February 1970 message to
Congress. The only aspect of the program that was in any way controver-
sial was the proposal for controlling fuels--in particular to provide
no-lead gasoline. A month before the Nixon program was formally an-
nounced, the President of GM had described the forthcoming emissions
standards to the Society of Auto Engineers, and said that the industry
could meet them, provided the oil companies supplied gasoline which
did not damage the devices (for GM, the catalytic converter) which
industry planned to use. Since the oil companies were asserting that
conversion to the new fuels would cost them (and eventually, the public)
around $5 billion, the auto companies would appear to have committed
themselves to tight emissions controls in a most unambiguous way.7
For, having made their intent to meet much tighter emissions standards
the basis for the Administration's proposal to control fuels, the
auto companies had no basis for then arguing against the installation
of the control devices.
Against his background, consider the projected impact of various
emissions standards and timetables. The graph on the following page
projectsthe impact of the Nixon Administration's proposals for 1975
and 1980, as submitted to the Muskie subcommittee in May, 1970.8 The
bill produced by the subcommittee in August essentially moved the
Nixon 1980 goals ahead to 1975.9 Note that Curve B represents both
the Nixon proposal for 1975 standards and the standards in effect
in 1975 (and since extended at least through 1978). In other words,
the standards in effect today are approximately the standards for
1975 that the industry it could and would meet before the new legis-
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Fig. II Projected effects of various Hydrocarbon Emissions Standards
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Source: Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Vol. 1I pp. 1083-1087
lation produced by the Muskie committee was ever conceived. Since
this may strike some readers as surprising, it is worth emphasizing
that the noint is in no way controversial. As will be illustrated
later on, everyone who has been close to the matter understands that
this is how things have worked out. (More specifically, the current
standards almost match the Nixon '75 proposal for HC; but fall short
on CO and NOx, though not by enough to make an important difference
in projections such as that shown for HC.)
Similarly, Curve C in the charts represents both Nixon 1980 goals
and the tougher program actually enacted. Standards are essentially
Z-
0
o
- )
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the same for these two cases, the difference being that under the
program legislated (Muskie 1975 standards), the standards would come
into effect five years earlier than under the Nixon proposal. The
reason the five year speed-up makes little difference in the projec-
tions--so slight a difference that we can let Curve C represent both
programs--is that throughout the 1970's the main factor influencing
aggregate emissions is the gradual replacement of high emissions old
cars (the average life of a car is 10 years) by relatively low emis-
sion new cars. The details of the standards--whether they reduce
emissions by 90% or only, say, by 80% makes rather little difference.
Or, put another way, had the Muskie standards acually been met, then
new cars produced after 1975 would have been much more strictly con-
trolled than under the Nixon proposal. But even under the Nixon 1975
standards, new cars would have had low emissions compared to the cars
typically being replaced, and the difference between the two standards
in terms of average emissions of all cars on the road (hence the dif-
ference in the aggregate level of auto pollution) would have been slight.
In summary, then, although particular dates have taken on great
symbolic importance, the situation has always been that someone just
looking at graphs to see the effects of changing the dates would wonder
why such a fuss was being made.
This does not mean that there was no substantively significant
difference between the Muskie and Nixon programs. The Nixon 1980 program
represented goals subject to further discussion. The Muskie program
made--or at least was intended to make those goals into a strong commit-
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ment. Whether this difference would be worth its cost was open to much
debate.
Thus the 1970 legislation had two quite distinct facets: in terms
of the graphs, (1) firming up the commitment to Curve C (vs. Curve B),
and (2) speeding up by 5 years the effective date of the Curve C standards,
a speed-up with minimal effects on the environment for the reasons we have
now reviewed. But it has been the speed-up in application of the standards,
despite the difficulty of seeing much effect from doing so, that has been
the root of the persistent controversy since 1970, and at the heart of
the unhappiness with the law of both industry (which says the law is
unreasonable) and environmentalists (who think it is the industry which
is being unreasonable). We would like to understand the basis for this
crucial policy choice.
At one point during the debate, the industry's sole defender (Sen.
Griffin of Michigan) asked, "Does the Senator from Maine know what it
would cost?"
Mr. Muskie: No. I said in my statement--I have not hidden
anything--that our responsibility is to tell the industry
what the public health requires.ll
How was it possible to justify this intense commitment? In the
mood of the moment, when cleaning up the environment had very much
the tone of a moral crusade, no analytical defense of the Act seems
to have been required, and certainly none was offered. The important
thing was to get clean air, and get it fast. Doing so was defined
as reducing auto emissions by 90% (from 1970 levels). It was Congress'
role to write into law the kind of strict controls the public was
· · I II _·
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said to be demanding; it was industry's task to "get the job done."
Congress was willing to contemplate the possibility that the job might
turn out to be technically infeasible on the time schedule demanded.
But it was not willing to compromise in advance of a demonstration
of infeasibility. "... we have learned," said Sen. Muskie, who was
merely echoing the language of the committee's unanimous report, "that
the tests of economic and technological feasibility applied to these
standards compromise the health of our people and lead to inadequate
standards. "12
Now, making some allowance for political rhetoric, it might be
possible to frame a strict cost/benefit argument justifying such a
position. For if the health risk to the public were sufficiently
severe, then one might well choose to put the whip to industry, push
emissions down as rapidly as possible, and worry later about moving
to better technology (possibly to a basically different technology)
which could do the job more cheaply.
However, while conceptually one could frame such an argument,
empirically there was no way to justify it. For the fact was, and
remains today, that no one could make a solid scientific case that
even totally eliminating auto emissions (possible only by totally
eliminating automobiles) would have any detectable effect on the na-
tion's health. Nearly all the usually-cited evidence for striking
effects due to air pollution--the London "killer fogs", for example
have no connection with automotive pollutants.1 3 When pressed, EPA
will come up with estimates of health damage due to auto emissions.
But these are hedged by so many caveats, provisos, and qualifications
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that no one can claim they are anything better than a moderately in-
formed guess.1 4
The situation was aptly described by an OECD expert committee
in 1972 (with the U.S. represented by EPA): "Ultimately, the case
for limiting vehicle emissions ... rests not on incontrovertible evi-
dence of physical harm but rather on the growing feeling that it is
in the public interest to minimize all emissions suspected of having
adverse effects on man's health, well-being, and environment."1 5
But since it is always possible to achieve lower emission by paying
a higher cost, "to minimize" emissions means, as a practical matter,
looking at data such as that displayed in Figure 1 in the light of
the costs and such indications of benefits as might be available,
and reaching a judgment on how tightly to set the regulations. In
such terms, it would never be possible to make a rational case for
the crash program the 1970 legislation set in motion.1 6 So it was
not at all surprising that the rationale of the program was framed
in terms of moral imperatives which were presumed to transcend calcu-
lations of costs and benefits. In the process of slipping past the
question of whether the standards were worth their costs, other impor-
tant questiorLswere also ignored: notably whether, given the marginal
effects of changes in deadlines, it made sense to impose deadlines
so tight that the industry would have good reason to feel forced to
do just what it openly preferred to do anyway, namely concentrate
on fixing up the conventional engine rather than aggressively explore
major changes in engine technology.
But if a program provides invisible benefits, it is likely to
go unchallenged only so long as it is paid for by invisible costs.
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In 1970, benefits were highly visible--in the sense that the public
clearly highly valued "doing something" about the environment. But
the costs were invisible; not only did they lay in the future, but
since they would be paid for through unspecified increases in the
cost of owning a car, not through public spending, there was no need
to state what they might be. Quite predictably, over time this balance
shifted: public fervor could not be maintained at the high pitch
of 1970; costs became more visible, while the benefits could be no
more definitely established. (At one point, pushed by an environmen-
talist law suit, the EPA felt it had no choice but to issue regulations
that would have effectively shut down the city of Los Angeles.l7)
The prospective battle over strict enforcement turned most sharply
against the environmentalists when the oil embargo and subsequent
economic difficulties provided reasons, or at least excuses, for de-
lays without directly challenging the wisdom of the basic legislation.
In 1975, the UAW could--without noticable embarassment--join the auto
companies in recommending a prolonged postponement of the standards
which the same UAW had very actively joined the environmentalists
in demanding in 1970.18
To sum up, then, at the time of its passage the program was never
analyzed, much less defended, in terms of the kind of rational balancing
of costs and benefits which some would like to see govern public policy
choices. Hence, it is not entirely surprising that over time, the
costs became increasingly visible to the voting public, but not so
the benefits. Further, the language of the Act, in particular through
the stress on "good faith" of the industry, guaranteed a more than
usual degree of acrimony in the subsequent arguments over relaxing
the standards.
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On top of all this, unforseeable events--notably the oil embargo--
added a heavy burden to the problems of the enforcers. This part
of the complex history is a considerable inconvenience for the purposes
of this chapter, for there is no way to prove that the program would
have run into difficulty absent the embargo. Nonetheless, However,
a listing of some of the peculiarities of the legislation, and comparison
with the procedures in other countries, suggests that a prudent observer
might have suspected that the program would turn out to be hard to
implement:
- Save only Japan (which has particularly acute pollution problems
due to the density of its population combined with its high rate
of economic activity; and which sells roughly half of its total
automobile production to the U.S.), no country in the world has
found it prudent to limit maximum emissions within a factor of five
of those in the U.S.1 9
- No other country has taken the view that cost and technical
feasibility are not to be considered in setting standards.
- No other country has taken standards beyond demonstrated technical
feasibility and known cost and frozen them into law (as opposed
to regulation subject to administration revision).
- No other country has based its policy on the scientific fiction
that a zero effects level of auto pollutants can be identified,20
or on the political fiction that having done so, the public ought
to be willing and will be willing to pay any cost to meet those
standards.
- Finally, in the U.S. all this was done without hearings at which
affected parties and expert witnesses could comment on the proposal
before it was fixed in law. (For the central features of the
bill--for automobiles, the 90% reduction by 1975--emerged from the
committee in August, months after hearings had been held on a far
milder bill, under which auto emissions standards would continue
to be set administratively with due regard for costs and technical
feasibility.)
Yet the Act swept through Congress virtually without debate,
to be warmly embraced by the Administration, which claimed it as the
response of Congress to the President's leadership on environmental matters.2 1
_ 
___ __
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The easy answer to this puzzle is that, in the crusading mood
of 1970, anything carrying the environmentalist banner was politically
sacred. But that answer is not really enough. For the fact is that
the Act is full of compromises. For examples: industry was given
an extra year (to MY '76) to meet the NOx standard; the warrantee
requirement was cut to 50,000 miles only, though the average life
of a car is over 100,000 miles; a provision permitting EPA to consider
a one year delay was added to the bill; the EPA was told to consider
costs in setting an interim standard in the event a delay was granted;
a National Academy of Sciences study of the technical basis of the
standards was ordered; and so on.2 2
There is a certain amount of political naivety in supposing that
any bill would have swept through Congress without even a serious
attempt to fight it. The auto industry was not politically powerless
even in the magic year of 1970. And on this issue, where the interests
of auto dealers--who are politically significant in virtually every
Congressional district--were much the same as those of the automakers,
the industry was not totally lacking the resources to mount a serious
fight. Yet the public support the industry was able (or chose) to
muster in Congress was limited essentially to a single speech by Sen.
Griffin of Michigan. For three months after the initial draft was
circulated in mid-August, the industry was sufficiently muted in its
criticism of the bill for three months after the initial draft was
circulated in mid-August that in mid-November press stories appeared
about the industry's change of strategy when its spokesman began making
some strong statements against the bill.2 3
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So there is a puzzle about why the legislation took the form
it did which cannot be resolved simply by noting that the public mood
guaranteed (as indeed it did) some sort of strong new environmental
legislation in 1970. This explains why there was a bill, but not
why the particular bill, rather than some alternative, swept through
Congress. Nor does it explain why the industry was so quiet in the
face of legislation which appeared to threaten enormous penalities
should the industry fail to do what it asserted it did not know how
to do.
3. Who Got What
We will try to show that the bill which passed did so with little
controversy because it provided each of the groups most centrally
involved--politicians, environmental activists, and the auto industry--
what it most valued within the range of outcomes plausibly consistent
with the political realities of 1970. I will argue that none of the
difficulties described in the previous section received serious con-
sideration because none of the key actors found it in his interest
to press the issue; that, despite all the talk about the forcefulness
and clarity of the bill, it was in fact sufficiently ambiguous in
its likely effects that each could hope for an outcome that he could
live comfortably with; and, further, that the bill had the appealing
character that if the wider public (which would pay the bulk of the
costs) grew disillusioned, everyone would have someone else to blame.
In this context, the incentives faced by two of the principals--
the politicians and the environmentalists--are easily analyzed. We
will consequently focus most of our attention on the auto industry.
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Among the politicians, the two principals were President Nixon
and Senator Muskie, the man expected (particularly after the mid-term
election in November, and the final bill did not emerge from conference
until December) to be the Democratic nominee in 1972. Senator Muskie
was the Congress' Mr. Environment. Nixon had every incentive to try
to seize this issue from him. Muskie then had every incentive to
try to outdo whatever Nixon proposed. There is no need, nor any rea-
son, to deny either man a genuine interest in cleaning up the environ-
ment. We need only assume that, in the course of doing what was right
by the environment, everyone also paid some attention to his political
interests. So we had a strong and, in hindsight, very sensible set
of legislative proposals from the President in February of 1970; a
still stronger bill came out of the Muskie committee in August. (In
the interval, there were several important events: in April, a mas-
sive nationwide demonstration called Earth Day; in May, a stinging
attack on Muskie from the Nader study group; in July, a highly publi-
cized air pollution alert in Washington and other East Coast cities;
and in August, GM's payment of $425,000 to Nader to settle his invasion-
of-privacy suit.24) The President, and Republicans generally, then
declined to be the people who were against cleaning up the environment.
No Republican voted against the bill. (On a technicality even Sen.
Griffin withdrew his negative vote.) Mr. Nixon then presided over
an elaborate bill signing ceremony, celebrating the response to his
environmental initiative.
Various detailed accounts of the history differ in emphasis and
points of interpretation. But the essentials are always very much
as just outlined.2 5
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For environmental activists, the basic politics of the situation
were even simpler. Clearly, 1970 was a year of opportunity for anyone
who wanted to see a major national commitment to cleaning up the environ-
ment. The stronger the commitment, the more clear-cut and ambitious
the goals, the more specific the deadlines, the better the bill would
be. It was perhaps possible to go too far. But if compromises had
to be made, it was tempting to believe that these could be best made
in future years: tempting to believe that any eventual compromises
that had to be made would be more attractive from the environmentalist
point of view, the stronger the commitments that could be gotten across
while popular enthusiasm was at its height. In any event, environmental
activists found it congenial in terms of maintaining their own consti-
tuencies, and entirely reasonable, to suppose that if anything in
the bill was demonstrably unsound, then industry could be counted
on to make that case and lobby for it. Certainly to the environmental
activists, industry neither needed nor deserved help from environmentalists
on that score.
But what were industry's incentives? In particular, what were
the auto industry's incentives in seeking the outcome that was least
disruptive, least likely to involve costs that could not be passed
on to auto buyers, and least likely to add to the industry's public
relations problems?
The outcome which posed the most severe threat on the first two
of these desiderata would be a forced abandonment of the internal
combustion engine around which the entire industry was built. How
difficult the changeoever would be would depend very much on how rapidly
the change was pushed. A crash effort would be difficult and expensive
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indeed. A gradual switch over a period on the order of 15 years would
involve much less in the way of painful readjustment or extraordinary
expense. (That the industry itself undertook exploratory work--even
before strong political pressure arose to do so--on such radical al-
ternatives as the gas turbine seems to show that industry mangement
did not perceive a gradual and unforced changeover as forbiddingly
difficult.)
In this context, one could make some pretty confident inferences
about the industry's policy preferences, assuming no more than that
the auto companies exhibit the usual sort of policy preferences that
we see in large, long-established organizations in every sphere, from
churches to armies. For example, we would expect the industry to
be reluctant to be convinced that auto emissions were harmful; if
emissions were judged harmful, industry would hope that a relatively
cheap cleanup of the conventional engine would be an adequate response;
if a drastic cleanup were unavoidable, we would expect industry to
look carefully for some technical fix that would permit this change
without requiring a basic technology change; and, if a new technology
had to be brought in, then we would expect the industry to be anxious
to avoid an obligation to make the changeover under severe time pres-
sure.
The importance to the industry of the various stages of this
set of choices escalated with the severity of the choice. A minor
cleanup would be a minor matter. Emissions could be reduced by an
impressive percent with almost no effect on car prices. A major cleanup,
but short of drastic technology change, might be expensive enough
to have a nontrivial effect on the demand for cars. It presumably
111___ -11---1111^_--11_ -11111
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would have real effects and industry-borne costs (perhaps quite unequally
distributed among the various automakers). But the effects could be
expected to be too subtle to clearly identify and measure, and comparable
in scale to the kinds of uncertainties and risks managers ordinarily
live with. A gradual change in technology, without severe time pressure,
might be a comparable problem.
But a forced change of technology, under time pressure, presented
risks on an entirely different scale. It presented, as the earlier
alternatives did not, real nightmares for the industry. It meant,
almost inevitably, massive disruptions for the auto-makers, and opened
up some very unpleasant questions. If the government could force
the abandonment of the conventional engine, might it not also insist
on choosing the alternative technology to be used? And would a poli-
tical choice be biased towards "space age" technology without a real
understanding of the practical difficulties of adapting very sophis-
ticated technology to a form suitable for the skills of the corner
garage mechanic?
Might political pressures and price elasticity combine to prevent
industry from fully passing on the costs of forced technology change?
What would happen if the government changed its mind about what should
be done part-way through such a process? What would happen to the
independence of the industry if the weaker companies were unable to
manage the changeover without public subsidies?
Was it reasonable for the industry to actively worry about the
possibility of a forced change in technology under severe time pressure?
Perhaps it was. Consider the events during the first six months of
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1970: the California state senate voted to ban the internal combustion
engine by 1975; legislation was proposed in both House and Senate
to do the same nationally; the President proposed a research effort
to develop a non-polluting engine by 1975; the Senate passed, with
Administration support, a bill requiring the federal government to
pay premiums of up to 100% to purchase low-pollution cars (the bill
was based explicitly on the premise that cleaning up the conventional
engine was an uneconomical way to deal with auto pollution) .26
In general, a perusal of the New York Times Index for 1970 shows
that not only was the automobile the special focus of escalating con-
cern about air pollution, but the industry's commitment to the internal
combustion engine was often perceived as the heart of the problem.2 7
As early as March, the Wall Street Journal was reporting that although
the industry was "bowing to the inevitable" and planned to meet the
Nixon '75 and '80 standards "regardless of cost or effect on perfor-
mance," nevertheless "Detroit wouldn't give up the internal combustion
engine wihout an enormous political and public relations fight."28
In July, the Nixon Administration sponsored a conference on al-
ternatives to the internal combustion engine to kick off its program
to develop a non-polluting engine by 1975. It received extensive
press coverage, and was followed almost immediately by a joint state-
ment by the United Auto Workers and the major environmental organiza-
tions calling on the Muskie committee to adopt "standards so strict
as to ban the internal combustion engine within 5 years."2 9
Meanwhile, in the background, the spectacular landings on the
moon which were then climaxing the Apollo space program not only helped
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stimulate popular concern about the environment of "spaceship Earth,"
but gave enormous political appeal to the notion of setting ambitious
technological goals, to be met within the decade. The Times was very
much in the spirit of the moment when it editorialized, after the
Muskie committee reported its bill, that "a nation that can put a man
on the moon in less than 10 years can clean up its engines in half
that time."3 0
Viewed against this record, the bill that emerged from the Muskie
subcommittee in August was by no means the worst outcome the industry
had reason to fear. That bill merely demanded that industry do what
it felt to be impossible. There is a certain comfort in being asked
for the impossible. You know you will not actually have to do it.
And to the extent that the Muskie standards could in fact be approached,
automobile owners not the automobile industry would have to pay the
price. Far worse, from industry's interests, than taking Nixon's
1980 goals and writing them into law for 1975--a timescale that made
it clearly impossible to push any alternative to maximum clean-up
of the internal combustion engine--would be to take Nixon's 1975 goal
of developing a non-polluting engine, and write into law a national
commitment to replace the internal combustion engine "within this
decade."3 1
So from industry's point of view, the August Muskie draft was
a kind of Pandorra's box. Certainly in an ordinary year, it would
have been an exceedingly vulnerable bill; and even in 1970, it was
far from an obviously invulnerable one. The bill required not only
industry, but localities, to take drastic actions at unknown costs
to meet strict health standards whose basis was exceedingly fuzzy.
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All this was to be done against very tight deadlines. (The deadlines
for implementing local transportation plans, which would have to be
severe in many cities even if the auto companies were able to meet
the emissions standards, were approximately the same as those imposed
on the auto companies.) All of this was being done precipitously,
without so much as a single hour of hearings on the bill. Few people
seem to have had any clear idea of what was in the bill, beyond a gen-
eral impression that the bill was tough and would make the auto indus-
try clean up by 1975.
Simply on the procedural ground that hearings should be held
before passing such far-reaching legislation, one might suppose that
the industry could have won some allies even among those otherwise
wholly unsympathetic. Indeed, in the mood of the moment, the procedural
issue was the only issue on which the auto industry might reasonably
have hoped for a sympathetic hearing. But pushing that issue might
have bought time to make a concerted attack on the rigid standards
and tight deadlines of the bill. So if the industry wanted to openly
fight the bill, the place to start was on the procedural issue. The
industry chose not to press the point. The nly reference to the
lack of hearings in the industry comments on the bill was an unprotest-
ing mention of "time schedules which did not permit open hearings
on new and important provisions in Committee Print No. 1" [the draft
bill].32
It becomes easier to understand this shyness on the part of the
country's largest industry if we bear in mind that the bill could
have been much worse from the industry's viewpoint--and conceivably
might have become so had the issue been thrown open by a major industry
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challenge. One need not argue that this was a likely outcome; one
need only point out that only a few months earlier, the actual Muskie
bill would have been regarded as wildly unlikely--even by Muskie him-
self, in view of the far milder legislation he was sponsoring earlier
in the session.3 3 Even a mildly risk-averse industry manager would
have some doubts about the "unthinkability" of more explicitly anti-
ICE legislation. (What actually happened was that, having passed
a bill which "solved" the problem by mandating a clean engine in five
years, the clean engine program was never funded even up to the inade-
quate levels proposed by the Nixon Administration.)
But the major influence we might reasonably impute to the industry's
concern about attacks on the internal combustion engine comes not
in interpreting its distinctly passive response to the draft legisla-
tion, but in seeing how far the industry had already gone, months
before, towards accepting as reasonable the kinds of standards Congress
now proposed to write into law. The Wall Street Journal article cited
earlier reported that both GM and Ford already had running on their
test tracks cars capable of meeting the Nixon '75 standards. GM's
president, in the January speech cited earlier, had announced that
GM already had demonstrated in its laboratories that the Nixon 1980
standards could be met with the internal combustion engine.34 In gen-
eral, industry sources had taken a quite aggressively optimistic view
of what could be done by way of cleaning up the conventional engine.
It would be far harder to understand this eagerness to please if not
for the growing pressure to phase out the conventional engine, which
gave the industry some incentive to claim that it had the technology
close to hand to clean up without changing its basic technology. These
__
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claims were made early in 1970, when there was no one in Washington
proposing to write the Nixon standards rigidly into law, much less
under a sharply speeded-up time-table. These statements then made
it easy for Congressmen to believe that, with pressure, the industry
might be able to deliver in five years what it had already promised
to deliver in ten.
Seen in this context, the Muskie bill was a good deal less arbi-
trary than it has often been protrayed. For all its strong language,
the bill was open to the interpretation that all that was intended
was to push the industry to move as urgently as possible to meet standards
that the industry itself had claimed that it could meet, and planned
to meet. Indeed, Sen. Muskie repeatedly said as much during the debate:
I think the industry has an obligation to try to meet [the
standards]...
... as one president of one auto company said, 'You can't
put this in the record, but we are that close.' If we are 'that
close' it seems to me we have to set the timetable and challenge
them to meet it. They can always come back to Congress....
It is not necessary to say that any company is going to be
closed on January 1, 1975.... Five years is a long time for the
companies to make their effort, then to make their case, and then
for Congress to consider a change of policy.35
Five years later, Sen. Muskie was saying to the auto company presidents,
who had come to ask for a further five-year extension of the standards:
The fact is that insofar as the automobile is concerned, you
are in no different position as the result of the passage of the
Clean Air Act than you would have been if the Clean Air Act hadn't
been passed. The standards you are now meeting, you agreed to meet
in 1969...So here we have gone through all of this, struggling to
get the law on the books, struggling to get it implemented, yielding
to your appeals that we have asked too much. We have come back to
the point where we started. I am frustrated, frankly. I ask that
not in the sense of putting you on the spot. But how do we get
this thing moving? How do we get it off the ground?"36
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Now the transition from 1970 to 1975 was not so calm as the just
cited set of quotations might (by themselves) suggest. Nor has there
been calm since. But it is fundamental to an assessment of the interests
of the auto companies in late 1970 to bear in mind that the most the
auto companies could gain, even if they could succeed in killing the
Muskie bill, would be a shift from a Congressional mandate to meet
very tight standards (accompanied by repeated admissions that this
might not be technically feasible and therefore might have to be re-
laxed) to a commitment to carry out their own claims that they could
meet those standards on a more relaxed time schedule.
Yet the feasibility of meeting given numerical standards would
depend a good deal on how those standards were operationally defined.
The details of the regulations, and even the details of how regulations
were going to be administratively interpreted, could have large ef-
fects on the feasibility of meeting given standards. For example,
to what extent would field observations on real cars would be fed
back into the certification process? Or was certification as by and
large proved to be the case--to be based only tained by the companies'
own expert staffs, not by ordinary drivers and mechanics? In this
and a dozen other ways, the details of the legislation, and how it
was likely to be administered, were of great importance to the companies.
Moreover, these details were much easier to influence politically than
a change in the basic standards and deadlines which had dominated
public interest in the bill. Meanwhile, several of the key arguments
against strict deadlines and rigid standards--particularly their pos-
sible costs, and the difficulty of assuring that the controls would
retain their effectiveness during the life of the car--were very much
I I _·I I
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the kinds of arguments that could be turned against the industry by
critics of the ICE, or which otherwise could turn out to aggravate
rather than help the industry case.3 7
So there was a real trade off between (1) a challenge to the
basic provisions of the bill (the standards and deadlines), which
even if successful would leave the Congress and the Administration
under great pressure to be tough on the details, and (2) not fighting
the basic standards, but quietly asking for help on the details of
implementation, in view of how tough the basic provisions were on the
industry.
All things considered, it does not seem surprising that the in-
dustry opted for the latter course. And while it did not get all
it wanted, it got a great deal of what it wanted. Perhaps the most
important of these changes were those which cut the warranty require-
ment (hence also the endurance test for pre-production certification)
from 100,000 to 50,000 miles; and the provision giving EPA authority
to grant a one-year extension. The most important failure for the
industry was that, despite support from the Administration (withheld
until after the election), EPA was not given authority to grant a
series of one year delays.3 8 After the first, the industry would
have to come back to Congress. Nevertheless, the fact that the ini-
tial appeals for delays would come in the technocratic forum of EPA
hearings, rather than the political forum of Congressional hearings,
was a relief for industry--and no doubt also for the Congress, which
thereby passed responsibility for the matter to EPA and the courts.
It is instructive to see how readily one finds illustrations
of the propensity of the bill's proponents to value rhetoric, so that
5-32
the effect of changes was often to soften the effect of the bill with-
out softening the declamatory ring of the language. One finds a number
of oddities which are most easily understood on the hypothesis (sug-
gested in Chapter 4 above) that the environmentalists had a particular
attachment to language symbolic of commitments to environmental purity,
while the industry was concerned with what the law would make them
do. Thus the law does not say that cars must comply with the standards
only for the first 50,000 miles (or 5 years) of use. Rather the certi-
fication and warranty clauses specify that cars must conform "for
their useful life." However, elsewhere in the bill, "useful life"
is defined as what, in practice, is half the useful life of the car.
The Senate version of the bill required American cars to meet
the American standards, even if they were not manufactured for use
in this country. This provision was killed in conference, not by the
simple device of deleting it, but in a manner which might earn a "Catch
22" prize. The final bill retains the Senate language requiring that
cars for export meet the standards. But it adds an "except" clause
in the event that the country of export has standards different from
the U.S. The report then completes the matter, by interpreting the
different standards phrase to include the case where the export coun-
try has no standards. Thus the final bill included a provision re-
quiring that cars for export meet the standards, but only in the event
that they would be required to meet the standards in the absence of
this provision.
A more important illustration of the propensities of the drafters
is in a provision increasing tenfold (from $1000 to $10,000) the penalty
for producing a car which violates the standards. At $1000 (effectively
__ __ I · _ _ _ _··
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closer to $2000 on the price of the car, since the penalty would not
be deductible from corporate income tax), the fine was high enough
for every practical purpose. But here was a provision which offered
something for both environmentalists interested in symbolic matters
and automakers interested in practical matters. At the $1000 level,
perhaps some purist would worry that plutocrats buying very expensive
cars might indulge themselves in a "license to pollute." But it was
also possible, with a fine of "up to" $1,000 that fines would be levied
proportionate to the extent to which cars failed to meet the standards,
putting the penalties within the range of the excise tax the industry
had been able to live with for many years. (The excise tax was res-
cinded in 1971, less than a year after the tougher emissions standards
were enacted.) The government could then take a really tough stance
on meeting standards, realistically demanding, comply or pay. But
at $10,000, fines pro-rated to the degree of compliance were certain
to be prohibitive. The alternatives to compliance would be either
to shut down the country's largest industry, or relax the standards.3 9
Now in the light of this excursion into the background and his-
tory of the bill, we can see reasonably well how it came about that the
most serious questions to be asked about the soundness of the 1970
bill were never pressed by anyone. The politicians had no desire
to say a word that might be interpreted as lacking in environmentalist
fervor in a year when environmetnalist fervor was sweeping the land;
the environmentalists themselves wanted the strongest possible commit-
ments (with, dare one say, a certain amount of technical or political
naivety showing up in a tendency to value rhetoric over substance);
the auto companies, faced with the problem of having to get along
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in the mood of the time, had less interest in questioning the intel-
lectual foundations of the policy than in making it easier to live
with. In the political mood of the moment, working quietly to soften
details of the bill and ameliorate its administration could easily
have looked more promising--particularly, given the public commitments
they had already made earlier in the year--than fighting the basic
premises of the bill.
4. What Went Wrong
Let us summarize the argument thus far: The 1970 legislation
was based on a number of premises which were either dubious on their
face (e.g., that it was prudent to pass legislation dealinq with a
complex problem, and certain to cost billions of dollars a year with-
out bothering to hold hearings40 ) or which even a superficial exami-
nation of available information would have shown to be certifiably
false (e.g., that the five year speed-up in the application of the
Nixon 1980 standards, which was the heart of the bill, would actually
have some important effect on air quality). Under these circumstances,
it is hardly surprising that the subsequent history has been marked
by frustration and bad feelings among all concerned. The details
of these difficulties were not predictable, since they depended on
future events--such as the oil embargo. But that an expensive program
based on false premises would somehow or other run into difficulty
is hardly surprising. Nevertheless it is understandable that the
bill passed in the form it did, since each of the major actors did
what was natural, and even rational, from his point of view. That
is, each (including the auto industry) acted to improve his own out-
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come in a way that could seem (to that actor) entirely reasonable--
even shrewdly calculated--given the overall political context.
This last point gives at least a first-order explanation not
only of the original legislation, but of the subsequent controversy
over implementing (or delaying implementation) of the standards. We
have a pluralistic political system, in which no organized entity
has full authority over policy, and under which, therefore, no organized
entity feels fully responsible for the soundness of public policy
choices. The various active forces are constrained by political power
of competitors, and all are constrained by a hard-to-define but never-
theless very real force we call "public opinion"--which all the active
forces seek to influence but none can predictably control. Under
these circumstances, each actor perceives "the best as the enemy of
the good," and works to get a better outcome, as perceived from his
point of view. Indeed, a stronger statement is reasonable: each
actor tends to resolve uncertainties in a way that suits his predilec-
tions, so that the preceived conflict between what he is doing and
what, in an apolitical world, he ought to be doing, is minimized.
This process of agreeable simplification is enhanced by the effortless
device of not doing the work (and it would require work) to assimilate
facts and arguments that might prove incompatible with one's predilections.
The output of this process may be far from socially optimal.
But, once enacted, the program is difficult to change. Social and
organizational inertia then favor continuation of the program as it
exists. Highly visible aspects of the program may acquire symbolic or
emotional significance which of themselves raise the social cost of a retreat
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from those objectives. New vested interests are created which will
resist change--notably a bureaucracy dedicated to administering the
law as it exists. Those who supported the legislation (in this case,
including virtually every member of Congress) quite undertandably
are reluctant to believe that the program may have been seriously
mis conceived.
If this were the whole story, one might be led to pessimism ap-
proaching despair over the prospects for dealing effectively with
complex issues involving difficult tradeoffs affecting the lives
of private individuals. Yet that kind of issue--the most salient cur-
rently involve energy--are certain to be extremely important in the
years ahead. On this view, the most troublesome aspect of the auto
legislation is not the difficulties with the air quality control program,
but that the explanation of howl the difficulties arose suggests that
there may be a systematic propensity of American government, with
its special emphasis on division of powers and growing emphasis on
popular participation, to perform badly in dealing with precisely
the sort of issues which are likely to dominate the public agenda
in the years ahead.
But a closer look at the "what went wrong" question allows a
somewhat more optimistic reading. Most important, the system has
some capacity to learn--indeed more so than may be immediately apparent,
given that political actors find it much easier to change the substance
of policy than to change the rhetoric describing policy. The environ-
mental issues being dealt with in the early 1970s represented a new
class of problems for federal regulation of businesses, with important
_ I II_ __I I_ _I_ _·
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differences in underlying character from those dealt with in the past.
The very novelty of the issues made it easy, even for people who felt
they had been spending a good deal of their time working on the problem,
to err in their assessments of the substantive issues and to misjudge
the appropriateness and likely effects of various proposed remedies.
The constitutional division of power within the American government,
which naturally creates some difficulties even as it guards against
others, was aggravated not merely by the political difference between
the Republican executive and the Democratic majorities in Congress,
but also by the Vietnam-engendered weakening of confidence in the
executive, and by Richard Nixon's peculiar capacity to incite distrust
and bad feeling. With the passage of time, some of these difficulties
have been cured, and others at least ameliorated. What has not been
cured, or even adequately recognized as a defect in the policy process,
is the structural flaw which, we will argue, lay at the root of the
difficulties.
The general problem is that described in Section 1 of this chapter.
Situations arise in which the active partcipants in a decision are
erroneously taken to represent the full range of interests that have
an important stake in the decision. But they do not do so, with the
consequence that important considerations are easily left out of the
policy process because none of the active participants are adequately
motivated to raise them.
In the case at hand, the context was almost entirely perceived
as the auto industry vs. the public interest in a cleaner environment.
Thus when the Muskie committee completed its draft of the bill in
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mid-August, it was not publicly released, but circulated privately
to the auto companies (and to those industries affected by other por-
tions of the bill). The committee knew that the environmentalists
were happy with the bill; it therefore wanted to be sure that "the
other side" had its say. But since "the other side" was not going
to pay for the costs of meeting the standards--that would fall to
the public--the automakers made only perfunctory objections to the
features of the bill which would involve the greatest costs, and con-
centrated their efforts on improving the bill from the point of view
of the industry. In other words, the industry invested its political
capital in minimizing the likely costs to industry not in minimizing
the total cost, most of which could be passed on to the public. But
of course no one involved was motivated to think of the policy process
in these terms, and certainly not to so describe the process in their
public rhetoric.
It would be a mistake to suppose that this situation was unique,
or even terribly unusual. The same sort of systematic error, possibly
with far greater cost to the nation, could easily be made in the area
of energy policy, to the extent that the energy problem is perceived
as the big oil companies vs. the public.
There are several ways of looking at this dilemma. Here we will
develop a view of the underlying difficulty as the political analogue
of the economic problem of externalities--a connection which may be
worth stressing since problems with political externalities are pecu-
liarly likely to arise in contexts marked by important economic ex-
ternalities. The argument goes as follows:
_ I _· 
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The reason that government must act to control auto emissions
(and environmental pollutants generally) starts with the fact that
the effects due to any individual car (or individual user of any pro-
duct whose production or use creates pollution) is extremely incon-
sequential. Significant auto pollution is due to the combined effects
of very large numbers of automobiles. Indeed, the individual auto
user has no way of detecting the amount of controlled pollutants (IIC,
CO, and NOx) his car emits: only carefully instrumented tests can
measure the emissions, which are invisible to the individual driver.
So the individual driver has little motivation to consider emissions
controls as something worth paying for. lie cannot see that it makes
any difference in his own car's exhaust; nor could the most careful
instrumentation detect any difference in the total level of pollution
in his community should he buy a clean-running car. So the pollution
from his car becomes an "external" cost--meaninq, as economists use
the term, a real cost which the decision-maker is not adequately moti-
vated to take into account. It is effectively external to his own
judgments about how to spend his resources.
Since the consumer is but weakly motivated to take the costs
of pollution into account, the firm making what the consumer buys
is also weakly motivated. For the firm makes its profit by providing
the consumer what he wants to buy (or at least, what he wants to buy
influenced to the extent feasible by what the firm is able to persuade
him he wants to buy). The result of all this is a social dilemma
in which individual consumers, and individual firms, are not adequately
motivated to take pollution costs into account, although all may have
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a joint interest in having everyone do so. The solution to this dilemma
is to have an agreement that everyone will do his share, on the con-
dition that everyone else also does so. The mechanism for arranging
this social agreement is to pass a law.
The reason a political analogue of this economic dilemma arises
especially easily when economic externalities are at issue is that it
will almost always be very inefficient--in fact, generally totally
impractical--to have the law aimed at individual buyers. The number
of firms which make a product will be very small compared to the num-
ber of buyers of the product, so it is easier to regulate (or provide
incentives, as by some sort of tax scheme) on the producers rather
than on the consumers. It is also generally, though not always, po-
litically easier to regulate the producer. In this way the direct
interests in the legislation (or the regulations coming out of an
administrative proceeding, or the parties in law suits which shape
policy) become the environmental interests vs. the producer interests.
The consumer interest is not directly involved, and being diffuse
and typically unorganized, it is hard to activate unless the legisla-
tive proposal is quite bluntly aimed at individuals. (Such would
be the case, for example, if we sought to conserve petroleum by levying
gasoline taxes comparable to those which prevail overseas. The situa-
tion naturally changes drastically if the law is aimed at individuals,
though only subtly or indirectly so, but the costs of compliance eventual-
ly become clear at the level of individual impacts: as illustrated
by the fate of the transportation controls in the Clean Air Act.)4 1
The net effect of this is that an important externality may
may arise which is political, rather than technogical, in origin.
U ·_ I __
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In the case at hand, the environmentalists perceived their role as
maximizing benefits to the environment; if industry perceived its
interest as that of minimizing total costs, then one could expect
that out of this clash of competing interests some reasonable social
balance would arise. But industry's interest is not to minimize total
social costs, but to minimize those costs which must be borne by the
industry--many of which are not even economic in nature, such as sheer
distaste for having to deal with government bureaucrats, or having
to do things which may not be terribly important in terms of industry-
borne costs but which seem (to the industry, at least) foolish and
offensive to the businessman's ethic of efficiency. (For both environ-
mentalists and businessmen, one should not underestimate the power
of ideological commitments--to cleanliness for its own sake for the
environmentalists, regardless of whether one can make a good case
for damaging consequences from a little more pollution; for efficiency
and freedom from outside interference for businessmen, regardless
of whether there is any substantial impact on profits.)
So we have a structural flaw, in which rational behavior by in-
dividual actors leads to a socially perverse outcome. It is not an
inevitable problem: on many issues, no doubt, the clash of the directly
involved interests produces a reasonable social result. Most of
us would like to believe that that is generally the way the American
political system works. But more and more, evidence accumulates (the
most conspicuous cases are those involving regulatory agencies) that
what I have been calling "political externalities" are a consequential
problem. And it is not an easy problem to deal with.
_1_ 1111111111
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It is not clear how institutional arrangements could be altered
to create a new actor in the policy process whose own vested interest
is to be the advocate for socially important considerations which
are being ignored by others. It is not clear how one could operationally
define something that approximates this goal; and, even if defined,
it is not clear how it would attain enough power to become an important
factor in the process, since others will naturally resist anything
which dilutes their own power. (The "science court" proposal is ap-
parently intended to deal with at least part of this problem. But
the difficulty of defining what a "science court" would be, in a way
that makes sense to technically and politically sophisticated skeptics,
illustrates the difficulty of prescribing a remedy.) It is likely
that new institutional arrangements will sooner or later evolve; but
not likely that a workable all-at-once reform can be designed. The
starting point is to recognize the problem.
.I( -· -
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FOOTNOTES
1. For more sympathetic accounts of the legislation than that given
here, see Charles Jones, Clean Air: The Politics and Policies of
Pollution Control, Chapter 7 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975),
and Helen Ingram, "The Political Rationality of the Clean Air Act,"
paper prepared for the MIT Symposium on the Clean Air Act, December
1976 (forthcoming, MIT Press).
2. J.Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation" in J.W. McKie (ed.), Social
Responsibility and the Business Predicament (Brookings, 1974).
3. The first version of the bill circulated by the Muskie subcommittee
specified that the costs of emissions control devices be listed on
the new car price sticker. But this was deleted at the request of
the industry. See Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, prepared by the Environmental Policy Division, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Committee on Public
Works, U.S. Senate, Serial No. 93-18, January 1974 (2 Vols.). Cited
henceforth as LH. The "sticker price" provision appears at the end
of Section 207c of the Committee draft (LH, p. 685); the industry's
argument for its deletion appears at LH, p. 722.
I have not seen any estimate, by the industry or others,
of the costs to the industry of compliance--that is, some esti-
mate of the costs of compliance net of the costs passed on to
auto buyers. Other things equal, an increase in the cost of
cars can be assumed to reduce sales, but this does not necces-
sarily imply a net loss to automakers, since the loss of sales
is at least partly, and perhaps fully, offset by the increase
in price per unit. The committee did assert (but did not write
into the lavw) that the makers should not add a profit for emissions
control devices. And no doubt one will not find in the any
company's books a line labeled "profit from emission controls."
The industry has made estimates of the loss of sales (as
noted above, not to be confused with loss of profits or lowered
return on investment) due to government mandated emissions con-
trols and safety standards. In terns of first cost to users,
the latter are substantially more important. See, for example,
the industry submissions at pp. 1216-1264, 1975 Hearings on
Implementation of the Clean Air Act (henceforth cited as 1975
Hearings.) On projected sales losses, see, for example, Ford
estimates at p. 339, 1975 Hearings.
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4. The most recent effort to quantify total costs (including fuel pen-
alities, etc.) is the Dewees paper for the MIT Clean Air Symposium.
5. See Figure 5, LH, p. 1243 (lodel Year 1971 standards, which were
promulgated prior to 1970).
6. See, Presidential Messaqe (Nixon), LH, p. 1502.
7. New York Times, January 15, 1970, p. 1.
8. LH, pp. 1082-1087. The charts in the text were drawn by overlaying
the separate charts for various standards submitted to the Com-
mittee.
9. There are actually differences among (a) the Nixon 1980 proposal;
the Barth paper published some months later (June, 1970) intended
to justify the Nixon 1980 goals (see Acting HEW Secretary Veneman's
comments at IH_, p. 738); and the 90% reduction from 1970 levels
prescribed by the law. However, throughout the legislative his-
tory, the three sets of numbers are almost always treated as
equivalent. See, for example, Sen. Muskie's comment, LH, . 228.
10. See, for example, the discussion in F. Grad, et al. Note that the
graphs refer to projected emissions, not to actually achieved
air quality. The connection between auto emissions and air quality
remains poorly understood, and since the relation between air
quality and actual health effects is also poorly understood, any
estimate of the health effects of marginal tightening of the
standards becomes a matter of almost pure guesswork. Further,
actual emissions measured on cars in use typically exceed the
standards, but not by nearly enough to account for the relatively
small improvements that have so far been noted in air quality.
However, a glance at the data plots used in the Barth analysis
(LH, pp. 768-9) shows the inherent difficulty of establishing
clear relationships, which increases as tighter controls make
auto exhaust emissions a smaller fraction of total pollution.
The Barth paper, incidentally, based its calculations on, among
other things, an assumption that cars in use would exceed the
new car standards. (Il, D. 764). For more details on this issue,
see Chapter 2 of this report.
11. LHI, p. 238. See Chapter 4 of this report for more discussion of
the role of health issues in the overall history of environmental
regulation.
12. I_4, p. 226.
13. Certainly the total elimination of auto pollution could be expected
to have some effects, such as a major reduction of oxidant epsodes
in Los Angeles. But if we move beyond such effects, which few
claim to themselves, represent a significant health problem, then
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persuasive data seem hard to come by. See, for example, the
discussion of the issue in Jacoby & Steinbrunner, Clearing the
Air (Ballinger, 1974), Chapter 7. The strongest claims to mea-
surement of aggregate public health effects are those of econo-
mists using regression analysis. These studies must be viewed
with caution, for there are severe problems with multicollinearity
and uncontrolled variables, notably on prevalence of smoking.
14. See, for example, 1975 Hearings, p. 25.
15. OECD, "Report of Committee of Experts of Automobile Pollution,"
1972.
16. For detailed discussions of this issue, see the Mills/White paper
for the MIT Clean Air Conference and Jacoby & Steinbrunner (op
cit).
17. Jones (op cit), p. 270.
18. 1975 Hearings, pp.271 ff.
19. On the Japanese standards: although set at numerical levels like
those of the U.S., the test procedure differs in a way that seems
to make it harder to meet the HC and CO standards, but much easier
to meet the NOx standard. See 1975 Hearings, pp 186-7 (noting
that the Japanese standards are given in grams/kilometer not
gms/mi). ot only is the Japanese test cycle very different from
the U.S., and the endurance required only 18,000 miles (vs. 50,000
for the U.S.), but many other details of how the Japanese certify
cars are something of a mystery to European and American car
makers.
Aside from the U.S. and (as qualified above) Japan, the
toughest standards are those of Canada, Sweden, and Australia,
which are essentially the U.S. 1973 standards, and are about a
factor of 5 below those set by the Clean Air Act. See Table 1
of the text.
20. The supposition that there is a scientific basis for identifying
a zero effects level of pollution provides a nice example of
the problems created by the fragmentation of expertise and res-
ponsibility. Required to produce such numbers, the technical
people do so, fully aware that there is a large amount of arbi-
trariness in the procedure (starting with setting the air quality
standards, then compounded in translating the quality standards
into emissions standards). They protect their scientific conscience
with numerous caveats in their reports. The numbers are then
used by others as if they represented a scientific determination
of levels below which public health is protected, and above
which it is not. An EPA official who was closely involved in
the establishment of these standards told me that the top level
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response to the scientific misgivings about the whole business
was typically that if the scientists couldn't figure out how
to set the standards, then the lawyers would do it for them.
21. See Nixon's remarks at the bill-signing ceremony, LH, p. 105.
22. So far as I could find, there is no summary available of all
the changes made in the bill between the original Muskie com-
mittee bill (LH, pp. 629ff) and the final bill. Of those
noted here, the cut in the warrantee requirement and provision
for a one year delay were added within the Senate committee;
the others emerged from the House/Senate conference.
23. See for example, New York Times, November 18, p. 29.
24. New York Times, August 14, 1970.
25. See, for examples, Jones and Ingram (both cited, Note 1).
26. See comments on this point in the Senate Report, LH, p. 950.
27. New York Times Index (1970), pp. 34-39 and 159-162. Anyone interested
in the legislation would do well to read through this readily
available material, which has the great virtue that it simply
reports what the Times was telling its readers in 1970, un-
colored by the selection of material which narrative accounts
cannot avoid.
28. Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1970.
29. Mew York Times, July 11, 1970 and July 12, 1970.
30. New York Times, August 23.
31. For the Nixon program, see his Message, LH, p. 1503, and comments
by Administration officials reported in the Times account
of July 11, 1970 (Note 29).
32. LH, p. 719.
33. Sen. Muskie's summary of the ammendments to the Clean Air Act
he introduced on March 4, 1970 (which along with the Nixon
proposals, was the legislation on the table when hearings
were held) appears at LH, pp. 1470-71. There is no mention
of tighter standards for automobiles. Indeed, there is no
mention of automobiles at all.
34. New York Times, January 15, 1970.
35. LH pp. 232, 234, 236.
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36. 1975 Hearings, p. 398.
37. For a detailed discussion of the problems of maintaining the
standards in use, see, for example, Jacoby & Steinbrunner,
op. cit. See also, the material cited in Note 26 and the
legislative hearings on that bill.
38. The Administration recommendations (Nov. 17, 1970) are at L,
pp. 211 ff.
39. On the 50,000 mile "useful life" see the Conference Report, LH,
p.200, which also discusses the exemption for exported cars.
The auto excise tax (then at 7%) was repealed 10 months after
the passage of the Clean Air legislation (New York Times, Decem-
ber 11). The legislative history does not indicate a rationale
for the increase in penalty from $1000 to $10,000.
40. When pressed on this point by Sen. Griffin, Sen. uskie cited
the various hearings his committee had held on related legis-
lation (H, p. 239). The point remains that no hearings were
held on this legislation, and the hearings on which legisla-
tion was held contained no provisions comparable to those
in this legislation. Why then could this procedural flaw
be treated so casually by legislators, with their overwhelmingly
legal backgrounds. I think that the answer is that as lawyers,
they were accustomed to waiving all sorts of safeguards pro-
vided that the parties involved approved. If the issue was
perceived, or misperceived, as the environmental interest
vs. the auto company interest, then the lack of hearings was
not a serious matter: neither of the parties objected to this
short-cutting of normal procedure. (See the industry comment
on this point, cited in Note 32.)
41. See, for example, New York Times, January 14, 1977, p. 1.
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